THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

# BETWEEN RELATIVISM AND ABSOLUTISM: A STUDY OF PROBLEMATIC DIMENSIONS IN THE *DIALEKTIK* AND *DOGMATIK* OF FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER

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BY
GERHARD E. SPIEGLER

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# PREFACE

In the "Preface" to the second edition of his *Dogmatik* Friedrich Schleiermacher protests against the honor of being treated as "the head of a new theological movement." He indicates the express hope that his readers might use his thoughts as a stimulus for further work rather than as a "source of formulae" which have to be preserved and slavishly repeated as binding norms.[1] It is this that the work of Schleiermacher has been to this writer, a stimulus in the development of his own theological thinking. Being unashamedly a proponent of a form of *Kulturprotestantismus*, this writer has turned time and again to the thought of this great theologian for help in discovering the limitations and possibilities of a "cultural theology."

The revolt against a particular type of cultural theology in the early part of the twentieth century, while making valuable and perhaps even lasting contributions to contemporary theological thought, has not succeeded in eradicating the concern and need for some form of cultural theology itself in the present situation. Today *diastasis* seems as little the answer to our theological questions as synthesis. If anywhere, the answer must be sought in a position which lies between these radical poles.

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[1] *Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsäzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt*, 2 vols. (2d ed. rev.; Berlin: G. Reimer, 1830-31). Hereinafter this work, which is also known as *Dogmatik* or *Glaubenslehre*, is referred to as *Gll*.

In an age where the principle of relativity has established itself in the foundations of both modern physical science and historical scholarship, it seems entirely possible that also Christian theology will have to forego its mooring in modes of thought which are entirely predicated upon some form of substantive and absolutist type of thinking. Maybe the answer does not lie with the "all" or "none" of absolutism but with the "some" of relativism. A cultural theology which is to be relevant at all must then be based not upon the idea of complete synthesis, but upon the idea of relationship in which distinctness and relatedness are preserved. Cultural theology must be, if it is to be at all, a theology based upon relativity, or as Schleiermacher put it, upon the idea of contract; or we might even repossess the term "covenant" from the critics of Kulturprotestantismus.

Standing in the great theological tradition with Origen, Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas, Schleiermacher, probably more than anyone else in modern history, devoted his life in word and deed to the explication of the contractual terms between theology and culture. He recognized that it could not be his task to establish this contract, for this contract in its most profound sense was predicated upon the actuality of the relationship between God and world. When speaking of the subsidiary contract between theology and culture, he was aware of its ground, the contract or covenant between God and world. This relationship, unless eternal, could not be established; and if so, it had only to be explicated.

When measured against the developments of the future, Schleiermacher's success in laying the foundations for a cultural theology seems indeed negligible. Instead of pursuing the idea of a contract between theology and culture, based upon the affirmation of an eternal covenant or relationship between God and world, future theologians tended to ignore the essentially bipolar character of his thought, eliminating thereby the tension inherent in the very idea of contract. Concentrating upon either one or the other pole of the fundamental God-world relationship, one could interpret Schleiermacher's thought as being either mystical or anthropological in character. He could be made either into a theologian of mystical feeling or into a theologian of psychological feeling. In either case his position as a theologian, not to say Christian theologian, was put in question. Most profoundly he appeared as the great anthropologist of the human spirit.

While some of Schleiermacher's later critics were more careful than others in their use of epithets, it seems, to say the least, that Schleiermacher emerged as a rather ambiguous figure in the contemporary scene, covered both with invective and praise. The theology after the revolt in the beginning of this century rejected rightly the identification of theology with an anthropology of the human spirit, insisting that theology had to deal with a sovereign God and not with autonomous man. In studying the work of Schleiermacher his critics focused upon his idea of contract as a corruptive element within his thought, insisting that the very idea of a cultural theology was, if not altogether impossible, then destructive of the sinew of the Christian faith.

Being not convinced of the impossible or destructive character of cultural theology, this writer began to search for those elements in Schleiermacher's thought which had made it possible for his theology to be interpreted as an anthropology of the human spirit. Since this possibility does undeniably exist, the question was to determine whether the very idea of contract or relativity had really opened the door for a theological development that was unacceptable from the perspective of contemporary theology. At issue was the question whether a theology of relativity or a cultural theology was necessarily and unalterably incompatible with the new theocentric realism of contemporary theological thought. If, however, Schleiermacher's relativism itself was not responsible for the possible reduction of his theological thought to anthropology, then some other factor must account for this possibility. Focusing on this question, it was unavoidable that we should turn to Schleiermacher's _Prinzipienlehre_, that is, his _Dialektik_, in addition to his dogmatic thought as the source for our inquiry. From our investigation the following thesis emerged: The foundations of Schleiermacher's thought are ruptured not by his employment of the principle of relativity, but rather by his failure to apply it also to his doctrine of God. By exempting God as the Absolute from relativity altogether, Schleiermacher makes of God a _totaliter aliter_, providing thereby the possibility of interpreting his theology, which is absolutely dependent upon the premise of the relationship between God and world, as an anthropology. The possible reduction of Schleiermacher's theology to an anthropology of the human spirit is rooted not in his relativism, but in the absolutism to which he adheres in his conception of God. It is the absolute other or transcendent character of God which makes out of theology anthropology.

This dissertation embodies in an abbreviated form both the process of our investigation and its results. Its concern, as will be evident, is both a historical and a constructive one. We begin our study with a discussion of the methodological problem which the interpretation and valuation of Schleiermacher poses from the contemporary theological perspective. Subsequently we attempt to facilitate the understanding of Schleiermacher's dialectical thought through a discussion of the Dialektik in its conception and formation. Then we proceed to a descriptive and critical treatment of the fundamental structure and problem of the Dialektik. And we conclude our study with the attempt to view some dogmatic problems in Schleiermacher's Dogmatik in the light of our study of the Dialektik. Our study purports to be no more than an attempt in the interpretation of Schleiermacher, following therein his invitation to use his ideas as a stimulus for further thought.

Finally, I must acknowledge my indebtedness to all those who made the completion of this study possible. My particular gratitude belongs to my teacher and adviser, Professor Jaroslav Pelikan, Jr., under whose direction this study was conceived and completed. I am also mindful of the debt I owe to Professors Bernard E. Meland and Joseph Sittler, Jr., as the other two members of my dissertation committee. Last but not least, I must express my gratitude to Professor Bernard M. Loomer, who both as a teacher and a friend has made a lasting impression upon this writer.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Chapter

I. FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

II. THE *DIALEKTIK*: ITS CONCEPTION AND FORMATION . . . . 35

III. THE FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE AND PROBLEM OF THE *DIALEKTIK* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

IV. THE *DOGMATIK* IN THE LIGHT OF THE *DIALEKTIK* . . . . . 137

V. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

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|---|---|
| *D* | Friedrich Schleiermacher. *Dialektik*. Edited by L. Jonas. |
| *Gll* | ________. *Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsäzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt*. |
| GKS | ________. *Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre*. |
| *GP* | ________. *Geschichte der Philosophie*. |
| *HD* | ________. *Dialektik*. Edited by I. Halpern. |
| *LB* | L. Jonas and W. Dilthey (editors). *Aus Schleiermachers Leben: In Briefen*. |
| *SL* | Friedrich Schleiermacher. *Sendschreiben an Lücke*. |

Das höhere Leben ist ununterbrochen fortgehende Beziehung des Endlichen aufs Unendliche. Dieses in Verbindung gesetzt mit dem Beziehen des Endlichen aufeinander ist das wahre Philosophieren. Diese letzteren Beziehungen um jener willen aufheben, das ist, was man im schlechten Sinne Mystik nennen kann.

Friedrich Schleiermacher,
cited by W. Dilthey, Leben
Schleiermachers, p. 342.

# CHAPTER I

## FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY

Studies in historical theology reflect the situation from which they proceed as much as do the modes of thought which they examine. The theological climate of opinion, what Schleiermacher would call "die Principien [der] gesammten theologischen Denkungsart,"[1] determines both the possibilities and the limits of theological insight. In fact, historical problems depend to a large degree on the prevailing theological mood not only for their treatment but also for their very selection for scholarly investigation. Thus we know today that it is simply impossible to evaluate critically Ritschl's great historical work Geschichte des Pietismus[2] without close examination of his systematic work Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung.[3] Ritschl's concern for Pietism and his treatment of it cannot be understood apart from his conception of Christianity as "die grosse und unvermeidliche Ermöglichung bzw. Verwirklichung eines praktischen Lebensideals."[1] His hostile treatment and negative evaluation of Pietism, which for him meant a departure from the spirit of the Reformation and a return to the spirit of monasticism, reflects clearly his theological perspective, from which the only proper expression of the Christian faith is to be found in the "Betätigung im Reiche Gottes und also Betätigung im Berufe und Tugendbildung. . . ."[2] The massive biblical and historical apparatus which Ritschl produced and utilized must be seen in the light of his theology of moral values. The same is true for Ritschl's great pupil Adolf v. Harnack, whose interest in the treatment of the history of dogma is bound up with his own conception of Christianity as expressed in his *Das Wesen des Christentums*.[3]

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[1] Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums (2d ed. rev.; Berlin: G. Reimer, 1830), p. 32.

[2] (Bonn: A. Marcus, 1880-1886), 3 vols.

[3] (3d ed.; Bonn: A. Marcus, 1888-89), 3 vols.

Karl Barth recognizes the conditioned and perspectival character of historical writing when he says:

> Es gibt eine ganze Reihe von Darstellungen . . . bei denen es allzu auffällig ist, dass wir von ihren Verfassern nicht sowohl bei einer gemeinsamen Nachforschung, nach dem, was die Alten uns sagen möchten, geführt, sondern vielmehr von Einem der schon gefunden hat, der mit dem Hören schon fertig ist, mit lebhaften Gebärden irgendwohin gewinkt werden, nämlich dorthin, wo er selber nicht geht, sondern bereits steht, . . . dass uns die Gestalten der Vorzeit nur als positive oder negative Vorläufer des jeweiligen Messias verständlich gemacht werden sollen, so bescheiden dieser seine eigene Erscheinung, sein eigenes Erkennen (seine eigene Dogmatik in diesem Fall) unter dem faltenreichen Gewand des angeblichen Historikers verbergen mag.[4]

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[1] Karl Barth, *Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert* (Zollikon-Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag A.G., 1947), p. 599.

[2] *Ibid*., pp. 601-602.

[3] (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1900).

[4] *Die protestantische Theologie*, p. 6.

There is no need to labor the above methodological point, which in itself is already a reflection of our recognition of the historical character of all expressions of thought. The insight which Barth expresses in the above statement is but a modification of what more recently H. R. Niebuhr,[1] following in the footsteps of E. Troeltsch,[2] has described as the radical permeation of all modes of thought by "historical relativism." The problems which have emerged from the recognition that all thinking is historical are of no immediate concern here. The immediate purpose which the raising of this methodological point serves is to call to our attention the fact that historical studies have not one focal point, but two. In making this point, we assert simply that the historical object cannot be separated from the historical subject.

Given the perspectival character of historical research, it is no longer possible to ignore in historical studies the situational vantage point from which they proceed. The examination and re-examination of historical problems requires both the critical analysis of previous problem formulations and judgments and the renewed investigation of the historical material itself. If we may adapt one of R. G. Collingwood's formulations concerning the nature of historical questions,[3] the following questions must be asked by the critical historian: What in the historical object "A" facilitates and limits the apprehension and appreciation of certain of its facets by the historical subject "B"? What in the historical subject "B" facilitates and limits its ability of apprehending and appreciating certain facets in the historical object "A"? This means simply that in order to be able to ask new critical questions in historical research we must examine critically the old questions which have previously guided the direction of scholarly inquiry. The degree to which a historian will either be able or willing to deal with the perspective of former historical studies will vary from case to case. Historians who share a common theological perspective will reveal in their treatment of historical problems their common theological climate of opinion, no matter how much difference their detailed studies may show. The prevalence of a common perspective does not negate, however, the significance of differences contained in various studies. It does, however, lead to a question whether because of the common perspective certain questions cannot be asked either because one is not able to recognize them, or because if one recognizes them, one rejects them as irrelevant or obsolete. Here again Karl Barth has recognized the dangers which beset historical studies and which increase with the historical proximity of the subject to be treated. Speaking for himself and other contemporary theologians, he says:

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[1] The Meaning of Revelation (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941).

[2] Cf. Der Historismus und seine Probleme, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. III (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohn [Paul Siebeck],1922).

[3] The Idea of Nature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 128.

> Hätten wir uns hier z.B. mit der Theologie des Reformationsjahrhunderts zu beschäftigen, dann wäre wohl das Kanonisierenwollen die Gefahr, vor der jetzt zu warnen wäre. Wer sich heute mit der Theologie des 19. Jahrhunderts beschäftigt, der ist, weil man immer gegen die jeweils vorausgegangene

> Zeit besonders verschlossen und vielleicht undankbar zu sein plegt, davor zu warnen, dass er nicht meinte, sie erledigen und sich ihrer entledigen zu können.[1]

Barth is quite conscious of the problem of historical interpretation. He wishes that one should listen to the "Stimme der Alten" and then make one's own decision in response to them; but as he points out, our response then is "für oder gegen uns selbst, nicht für oder gegen jene."[2]

One can agree with Barth easily enough, but it seems that the problem is more complicated than this. To listen may be the requirement, to fulfill what is heard may not be so easy. Indeed, our very range of reception is limited, so that we may hear the words but not comprehend their meaning. It is only when changes in the climate of opinion emerge that sounds and their meanings, which previously were lost, become intelligible. But even then it may be difficult to determine whether the new voices we hear are the voices of the past or of the future. Barth is certainly right when he rejects all such historical efforts which simply use "history" to buttress a peculiar theological position. He correctly refuses to have his interpretation of 19th-century theology read as an attempt to show how

> am Ende des langen Irrweges von Schleiermacher über Ritschl zu Troeltsch, Seeberg und Holl endlich und zuletzt bei der sogenannten dialektischen Theologie als der längst erwarteten und geahnten, aber immer wieder verfehlten Rettung aus aller Not herauszukommen [sei].[3]

But to avoid treating our own position as the telos of the historical process is not really the problem. The problem as we confront it is much more deep-seated. It has its roots in our growing recognition that perspective itself is bound up with the very nature of actuality. This means that "perspective" or better "relativity" is a fundamental metaphysical category which describes not merely the phenomenon of "subjectivist" limitation, but the very character of actuality itself. Hence there is no escape from relativity. Even more than this, it is not even desirable to escape from it, for the departure from relativity would be a departure from actuality. The question and problem is therefore: How much are we able to hear and see of our past from our given position on the space-time continuum? Given our perspective, what is within the range of our vision and what is beyond it? Barth may avoid the problem as determined by him, but can he or anyone else escape the involvement in relativity?

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[1] Karl Barth, Die protestantische Theologie, p. 9.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 8.

It may be relatively easy for us to determine the theological perspective of Ritschl and Harnack, but this task is far more difficult if not impossible with respect to our contemporaries. Yet, in order to be theologically and historically critical we must undertake this task, whatever the risk. Two things may facilitate the examination of our contemporary perspective as well as the limitations it imposes. On the one hand we are aided by the fact that the contemporary theological circle is characterized by complexity rather than simplicity, and on the other hand by the fact that the theological circle is fluid and not stagnant, always aiming at self-transcendence. Thus we may find that certain perspectival limitations are not rooted in widely shared common structures, but in the more restricted and narrower idiosyncracies which participate in structures that are wider in scope. Given the complexity and fluidity of the theological circle, it seems possible, at least to some degree, to differentiate between these shared and non-shared elements in our theological circle. From the individual viewpoint within a common perspective we can therefore distinguish between peripheral and central components in the theological climate. This is not identical with saying that we can definitively establish the significance of these components. All that we can do is to describe the make-up of our theological circle in terms of shared and non-shared factors. Our self-criticism is by and large restricted to a critique of the non-shared factors.

A study in the thought of Schleiermacher must make an effort to determine the degree to which the analysis and evaluation of his work has been guided by peripheral rather than central contemporary theological factors. We must ask: What in Schleiermacher facilitates and what limits the apprehension and appreciation of certain facets of his thought by the contemporary theologian? What in the contemporary theological scene facilitates and what limits our ability of apprehending and appreciating certain facets of the thought of Schleiermacher? We must further ask whether the limiting or facilitating factors involved in either Schleiermacher or contemporary theology are central or peripheral. Eight extreme logical possibilities exist: (1) that which is central in Schleiermacher may either support or clash with what is central in contemporary theology; (2) that which is peripheral in

Schleiermacher may either support or clash with what is peripheral in contemporary theology; (3) that which is central in Schleiermacher may either support or clash with what is peripheral in contemporary theology; (4) that which is peripheral in Schleiermacher may either support or clash with what is central in contemporary theology.

On the basis of the present state of Schleiermacher research it is not possible to answer any of the above questions unequivocally. This is indicated by the fact that after more than a century of scholarship, Schleiermacher's work, his contribution to and significance for contemporary theological thought, remains ambiguous. It is simply amazing that a man who by wide consent must be considered the most significant theologian of the past century (Barth has no objection to the phrase "der Kirchenvater des 19. Jahrhunderts")[1] has remained such a mysterious figure. We find that judgments concerning the nature of Schleiermacher's thought, its contribution to and significance for the advancement of theological thought, differ considerably. This divergence of scholarly opinion cannot be accounted for solely in terms of Schleiermacher's thought, but must also be explained in terms of the various theological perspectives which in the study of Schleiermacher have shaped both the questions asked and the judgments rendered. In fact, it is the very ambiguity of our relationship to his thought as expressed in the different judgments concerning his significance, which led to the raising of the above series of questions.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 379.

In 1868 Professor R. A. Lipsius felt compelled to describe Schleiermacher as "ein prophetischer Bürger einer späteren Zeit."[1] Almost one hundred years have passed, but there is no indication that Lipsius' statement is anything more than an exuberant phrase. Even if we exclude a major consideration of the bulk of former treatises on Schleiermacher and restrict ourselves to more recent studies, we find great divergence in the evaluation of his work. Hugh Ross Mackintosh sums up his essay on Schleiermacher in these words:

> It is painful to watch this extraordinarily gifted man, who lacked nothing but a touch of childlike and unreserved trust in the Father, expound as the Christian view of salvation what too often is but the attenuated creed of idealistic monism. We are passing out of his era, but for long his work will remain to bewilder and instruct the theologian. Generations will learn from it the technique of systematic thought. But more and more it will impress rather by its contrast than by its likeness to the faith of Prophets and Apostles.[2]

In his sensitive and careful essay on Schleiermacher, Karl Barth is much less sure than Mackintosh or Brunner in their hostile critique that Schleiermacher can be relegated to an all but forgotten past. Barth writes:

> Kein Mensch kann heute sagen, ob wir ihn wirklich schon überwunden haben, oder ob wir nicht bei allem nun allerdings laut und grundsätzlich gewordenen Protest gegen ihn noch immer im Tiefsten Kinder seines Jahrhunderts sind.[3]

But Barth too remarks of Schleiermacher's work that

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[1] "Studien über Schleiermacher's Dialektik," Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie, XII, 1 (1869), 3.

[2] Types of Modern Theology (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), p. 100.

[3] Barth, Die protestantische Theologie, p. 380.

> sein Resultat die entscheidende Voraussetzung aller christlichen Theologie in Frage stellte in einer Weise, wie es seit den Tagen der alten Gnosis vielleicht nicht wieder geschehen war.[1]

When compared with the treatment of Schleiermacher at the hands of Emil Brunner,[2] Barth's respect for Schleiermacher is much greater, but it is nevertheless the respect for a dangerous enemy and not the respect for a prophet. Barth disagrees with Brunner on the specific treatment of Schleiermacher, but he is united with him in a common struggle against Schleiermacher. This is expressed in a statement in an earlier essay on Schleiermacher, which nevertheless seems still valid; he says:

> Schleiermacher ist eine Potenz, mit der man weder auf den ersten noch auf den zweiten oder dritten Anhieb fertig zu sein meinen darf. . . . Ich glaube mich auch mit meinen Freund E. Brunner einig zu wissen, wenn ich unsern gemeinsamen Krieg gegen diesen Mann und sein Werk als - Bewegungskrieg auffassen und führen möchte.[3]

In the light of these judgments the enthusiasm expressed by Lipsius seems nothing but an error, were it not for the fact that just recently the tenor of his theme has been taken up by a contemporary theologian, Jaroslav Pelikan, who writes:

> Now it is becoming evident that in the thought of Schleiermacher Protestantism possesses a resource for a world view that is simultaneously comprehensive and Christian--comprehensive in the sense that it takes seriously what the sciences

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 424.

[2] *Die Mystik und das Wort* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1924).

[3] *Die Theologie und die Kirche* (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1928), p. 189.

> and the humanities have learned about reality, Christian in the sense that it relates all of this to the revelation of God in Jesus Christ.[1]

These words repeat to some degree what Lipsius had to say almost one hundred years ago when he stated:

> Heute, wo das Verlangen nach einer Versöhnung von Christenthum und Cultur aufs neue sich zu regen beginnt, ist schon ein weiterer und freierer Boden für das wieder aufzunehmende Werk gewonnen, und wenn die Stoffe, aus denen man bisher arbeitete, verschlissen oder brüchig, die bisherige Arbeitsmethode veraltet ist, so dienen uns die bisherigen Misserfolge zur Warnung. Aber Einer ist, von dem wir noch heute zu lernen vermögen, ja dessen innerstes Wollen und Streben erst jetzt in seiner ganzen Tiefe unsern Blicken sich erschliesst--und dieser Eine ist Schleiermacher.[2]

Confronted with such divergent judgments, it is difficult to determine whether Schleiermacher is a threat to or a resource for the advancement of theological thought. Divergence of opinion, if nothing else, indicates that we are confronted with a problem which cannot be dismissed but must be explored as to its origin. By far the majority of contemporary theologians regard the thought of Schleiermacher as contrary to current lines of theological thought, while nevertheless extolling his greatness. This and the fact that some theologians view Schleiermacher's work as being at least to some degree complementary to the work of contemporary theology, indicate that a restudy of Schleiermacher's thought is not only in order but necessary. Scholars have made it abundantly clear what we must learn not to do from Schleiermacher, but very little is said concerning what we must learn to do from his example. It seems, in the words of Karl Barth, that if we must not only concede Schleiermacher's "persönlichen Ernst" but also the "sachlichen Ernst" of his theological work, then more than a purely negative treatment of his thought is required. The praise of Schleiermacher cannot be justified on purely personal and formal grounds, but must also be grounded in the material contributions which he made in order to sustain such praise. Karl Barth claims that in Schleiermacher "haben [wir] es mit einem Heros zu tun, wie sie der Theologie nur selten geschenkt werden,"[1] a man with whom by comparison, Ritschl was a mere episode.

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[1] The Riddle of Roman Catholicism (New York: Abingdon Press, 1959), p. 229.

[2] "Studien über Schleiermacher's Dialektik," pp. 2-3.

If Barth is right, it seems strange that Schleiermacher's contribution to the life of theology should be merely a negative one. It raises the question concerning the adequacy of the treatment of Schleiermacher by contemporary theologians. In view of this situation we might repeat the words of Lipsius as being as applicable today as they were one hundred years ago:

> Man möchte es seltsam finden, dass ein Genius, dessen Schaffen und Ringen den höchsten geistigen Interessen unsers Zeitalters diente, bis heute selbst der Mehrzahl unserer Gebildeten beinahe als eine fremdartige Erscheinung gegenübersteht, wenn nicht der ganze Entwickelungsgang des 19. Jahrhunderts den Schlüssel für dieses Räthsel an die Hand gäbe.[2]

We must ask, as we have, what makes Schleiermacher a riddle to us? Is it our perspectival blindness or is it the obscurity and dated character of Schleiermacher's thought itself which hinders us? Or is it both? Barth designates "openness" as the essential requirement of historical theology:

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[1] _Die protestantische Theologie_, p. 380.

[2] Lipsius, "Studien über Schleiermacher's Dialektik," p. 1.

> Einen Andern hören, heisst jedesmal, das eigene Anliegen suspendieren, um für das Anliegen des Anderen offen zu sein. Es wird immer dafür gesorgt sein, dass es mit dieser Offenheit nicht zu weit her sein wird. Sie ist aber die an uns gerichtete Forderung. . . .[1]

A critical evaluation of the treatment of Schleiermacher by contemporary theologians is required prior to a renewed study of his thought. This is so not only because of the requirement of openness, but in order to increase our ability to look anew and with fresh questions at Schleiermacher's thought.

The problematic indicated in the previous section can (in spite of its complexity) be reduced for our purposes to one basic question. We must ask ourselves whether the central concern which has dominated the theological labors of Schleiermacher is incompatible with the central motifs of present-day theological thought. To put it in another way, can we still regard Schleiermacher's questions as our own, can we still take him seriously as a resource for our own theological work? Contrary to Brunner, Barth insists that a distinction between man and his work is an impossible abstraction. To reject a man's work, he says, means to reject the man. By the same token it must be said that to deny the seriousness of a question is to deny the seriousness of the answer. In order to concede the sachlicher Ernst of Schleiermacher's work, we must also concede the material seriousness of his questions. If in all fairness we cannot accept the validity of Schleiermacher's questions, we cannot avoid admitting that doubt is cast upon our ability to treat his answers seriously.

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[1] Die protestantische Theologie, p. 10.

When the question is rejected, the answer is doomed to failure. Only when we accept the fundamental question can we reject and utilize certain aspects of the answer. One may argue that the rejection of the question does shape our final value judgments, but not our historical analysis. But this is not a valid argument, for final explicit value judgments are nothing but the culmination of a series of value judgments made in the course of historical investigation. Historical analysis depends upon our ability to understand, which in turn depends upon our ability to appreciate the thought patterns with which we are dealing. Obviously this does not mean that we must accept all previously asked questions as our own. What it does mean is that in order to facilitate a critical evaluation of our conclusions, we must determine the nature of our relationship to these questions in the light of our own modes of thought. The character and quality of our historical treatment will depend upon our judgment concerning the continuing validity of the question.

In his Sendschreiben an Lücke Schleiermacher characterizes his central concern as follows:

> Wenn die Reformation, aus deren ersten Anfängen unsere Kirche hervorgegangen ist, nicht das Ziel hat, einen ewigen Vertrag zu stiften zwischen dem lebendigen christlichen Glauben und der nach allen Seiten freigelassenen, unabhängig für sich arbeitenden wissenschaftlichen Forschung, so dass jener nicht diese hindert und diese nicht jenen ausschliesst: so leistet sie den Bedürfnissen unserer Zeit nicht genüge, und wir bedürfen noch einer anderen, wie und aus was für Kämpfen sie sich auch gestalten möge.[1]

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[1] Edited by Hermann Mulert ("Studien zur Geschichte des neueren Protestantismus," II; Giessen: Alfred Töpelmann, 1908), p. 40. Hereinafter this work is referred to as SL.

To the accomplishment of this aim, Schleiermacher devoted his whole life, attempting to work out tentative but guiding terms for the execution of this eternal contract. In this sense Karl Barth is right when he describes Schleiermacher's theology as being in its "innersten Heiligtum Kulturtheologie."[1] Schleiermacher reveals his deepest motives when he says he wants to prevent that

> der Knoten unserer Geschichte für immer so auseinandergehn [muss]: das Christentum mit der Barbarei, die Wissenschaft mit dem Unglauben.[2]

This concern, which guides and gives direction to his questions, Schleiermacher shares with many of his contemporaries, particularly with Hegel. But unlike the great theologian turned philosopher, Schleiermacher wants to establish a contract on co-equal terms for the participants, where relatedness does not vitiate distinctness and vice versa. Schleiermacher does not resort to a construction of a synthetic unity for purposes of resolution, sublating (aufheben) difference in identity. His aim is harmony and not identity. His aim is neither the subordination nor the superordination of one participant in this contractual relationship to the other, but coordination. We may rightly question Schleiermacher's success in the accomplishment of this task, and he would be the last to censure us for doing so. But can we also question the legitimacy of the concern or problem? What of the earnestness of the task itself? Are we prepared to say that the seed of corruption, leading to the prostitution of the Christian faith, lies in the very nature of the task?

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[1] Die protestantische Theologie, p. 387.

[2] SL, p. 37.

Rejection of Schleiermacher's basic concern would limit our ability to understand his answers. The fact that Schleiermacher's concern is an ancient one and has never found a permanent answer does not invalidate the concern itself. It is true that today more than ever we have become disillusioned with the very task of Schleiermacher. We can point to the great failures of the past and turn away to apparently more fruitful labors. Looking at his generation Lipsius writes:

> Die von der Hegel'schen Schule anfangs erweckten Hoffnungen auf eine tiefere Versöhnung des Glaubens und Wissens hatten sich seit Strauss als Illusionen erwiesen, und leicht genug möchte geschehen, dass auch das Streben eines Schleiermacher Vielen in demselben zweideutigen Lichte einer künstlichen Vermittlung an sich unversöhnlicher Gegensätze erschien.[1]

The fundamental question is whether the "eternal contract" is an impossibility because in it incompatibles are to be related. And if not incompatibles, does the reciprocal constitutive qualification of the contractual participants mean corruption of both? We must ask whether the establishment of the contract means that man wants "to create" an eternal contract, or does it mean that man want "to explicate" in concrete terms a given eternal reality? It is obvious that it is much easier to abandon Schleiermacher's effort and to resolve the contractual tension in terms of identity or difference and, with Fr. A. G. Tholuck, to describe Schleiermacher's effort to retain the tension as sophistry or, with Hegel, as the lack of strength of heart. To claim Schleiermacher as a resource for contemporary theology means to accept his fundamental concern as still a valid one. The attack upon Kulturprotestantismus cannot be based on the success or failure of the various constructive efforts to execute the concern for mediation in a cultural theology (Kulturtheologie), but must proceed against the very notion of mediation itself.[1] In the final analysis the problem revolves around the question whether it is possible to retain relatedness without abandoning distinctiveness, which means inquiring concerning the fundamental character of the principle of relativity.[2] In Schleiermacher's terminology this is asking whether quantitative or relative difference is a more fundamental notion than qualitative or absolute difference. We must ask ourselves whether Kierkegaard's apparent victory over Hegel was also a victory over Schleiermacher. The issue is whether the very principle of relativity necessitates the corruption of basic Christian concerns, even of the Christian faith itself.

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[1] "Studien über Schleiermacher's Dialektik," p. 2.

Barth also designates Schleiermacher's basic concern as being determined by the "Prinzip der Mitte" or by the concept of peace. In his first essay on Schleiermacher he writes:

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[1] "The task of theology is mediation, mediation between the eternal criterion of truth as it is manifest in the picture of Jesus as the Christ and the changing experiences of individuals and groups, their varying questions and categories of perceiving reality." [Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era, trans. J. L. Adams (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. xxiii.] Tillich is right in stressing the mediating function of theology, but it is at least doubtful whether it is or can be a mediation between an "eternal criterion of truth" and "changing experiences" or "varying questions and categories of perceiving reality." Mediation if proposed as the mediation between the One and the Many, between the absolute and the relative, seems impossible to be accomplished because of the absoluteness of one of the poles in this relationship, unless we advocate a position not unlike Hegel's, making the one pole in the relationship merely the expression of the other. Given Tillich's formulation of the problem, it is a question whether his "symbolic theology" can truly be called a "mediating theology."

[2] Infra, p. 83.

> Es ist die Gestalt des Fadenkreuzes, wie man sie in astronomischen Fernrohren verwendet, die für den Aspekt dieser Methode der Gegensätze bezeichnend ist. Immer liegt der Idealfall der Wissenschaft genau in der Mitte, dort wo zwischen beiden oder vielmehr zweimal beiden Gegensätzen nun eben Frieden herrscht. Der Friede ist die Wahrheit.[1]

And again in his second essay he claims for Schleiermacher

> gibt [es] keine solchen unüberbrückbaren Gegensätze und darum kann und darf es im Allgemeinen und im Besonderen, im Äusseren und im Inneren keinen Unfrieden geben. Die mannigfaltigsten sittlichen und religiösen Themata hat Schleiermacher unter dem Gesichtspunkt behandelt, dass die Wahrheit in der Mitte, in der Versöhnung, im Indifferenzpunkt . . . in dem "ausgleichenden gemeinsamen Ton" zwischen den vermeintlichen Gegensätzen liege, dass es gelte, die Gegensätze in ihrer Relativität . . . zu sehen.[2]

Barth continues in his description of Schleiermacher, saying that what he preached from the pulpit and did in his ecclesiastical functions in terms of the concept "peace,"

> fällt nun aber sachlich zusammen mit dem letzten und höchsten Formal- und Materialprinzip auch seiner philosophischen Lehre. Sie ist charakterisiert durch eine durchgeführte Methode der Teilung und Vereinigung aller Principien: Subjekt und Objekt, Wissen und Sein, Vernunft und Natur, Ethik und Physik, Spekulatives und empirisches Wissen, wobei die Übergänge im Unterschied zu denen der Hegelschen Dialektik je von dem einen zum andern Gegensatz fliessende, quantitative sind und wobei die Wahrheit-wiederum im Unterschied zu Hegel--nicht in einem definierbaren Dritten, sondern in der undefinierbaren Mitte . . . zu suchen ist.[3]

Barth has certainly recognized the central concern of Schleiermacher. But it seems that his interpretation of the meaning of the "Princip der Mitte" as peaceful indifferentiation is in error. This is suggested by Barth himself when he also describes the notion of life as central to Schleiermacher. He states that we would be in error if we were to assume that the principle of the Mean meant the absence of life, the collapse of all differentiations into a caput mortuum, that is, into a great ineffable neuter. But if this is so, is it correct to claim that for Schleiermacher the truth lies only "in der Mitte" or "im Indifferenzpunkt"? What is the meaning of the principle of the Mean in the light of the notion of life? Is it that Schleiermacher's "higher realism" expressed through the concept of life and through his insistence upon the reality of individuality has no meaningful relationship to his philosophical-theological formal and material principle of the Mean? If not the peace of death but the peace of life characterizes the thought structures of Schleiermacher, then it is impossible to reduce the contractual tension in his thought to simple identity as just another abortive effort of the philosophy of identity.[1] As clearly as Barth has seen the basic tension in Schleiermacher as expressed in the principles of the Mean and of life, he has not perceived or investigated their relationship in terms of their significance for the interpretation of Schleiermacher's thought. It may be that from Barth's perspective the very notion of relative difference, that is, the principle of relativity is regarded as an impossible one, and that therefore it is assumed that the terms of the contract must finally be explicated in terms of identity or difference. Schleiermacher's enterprise for all its virtuosity must then be regarded as doomed to failure from its very beginning. In the words of Lipsius this would mean that

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[1] Die Theologie und die Kirche, pp. 149-150.

[2] Die protestantische Theologie, p. 403.

[3] Ibid., pp. 404-405.

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[1] Cf. infra, pp. 87-88.

> weltliche Bildung und kirchliche Frömmigkeit das stillschweigende Übereinkommen getroffen [hätten], einander auf ihren beiderseitigen Bahnen nicht zu durchkreuzen: die eine liess die andere ruhig ihre Strasse ziehn.[1]

The development of recent theology, at least in its dominant expression, favors *diastasis* over against *synthesis*,[2] though particularly in the last few years voices have been heard proclaiming complete synthesis. One of the most recent expressions can be found in a theological study of Bultmann, entitled "Christ Without Myth."[3] The voices of radicalism, be they raised in terms of either identity or difference, are by necessity louder and clearer than the voices of mediation, which lack the advantage of being able to begin with simplicity rather than with complexity. A mediating voice, opposing both extremes, comes from Emanuel Hirsch, who says:

> Es kann heute nicht mehr Aufgabe eines philosophisch gegründeten Welt- und Lebensbildes von allgemeiner menschlicher Gültigkeit sein, den christlichen Glauben bis in seine letzten Tiefen zureichenden Ausdruck zu geben. Christentum und Theologie bedürfen lediglich einer den christlichen Denk- und Willensantrieben offen stehenden, wahlverwandten Welt- und Lebensansicht, die dem allgemeinen geistigen Leben in Wissenschaft, Kunst, Politik und so fort ein christlichen Glauben, Empfinden und Arbeiten gemässes Gepräge gibt und Christen wie Nichtchristen in Seele, Gesinnung und Geist mit-

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[1] "Studien über Schleiermacher's Dialektik," p. 2.

[2] These two terms *diastasis* and *synthesis* were used by Werner Elert, *Der Kampf um das Christentum* (München: C. H. Beck, 1921) as key concepts through which the historical process can be interpreted in a schematic way.

[3] Schubert Miles Ogden, "Christ Without Myth," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Divinity School, University of Chicago, 1958).

einander verknüpft. Mehr ist weder nötig noch möglich.[1]

But beyond this cursory remark, Hirsch does not offer any suggestions for a further study of the problem. Given Schleiermacher's central concern as expressed in the idea of contract or relativity and the problem which it poses for theological thought, it is surprising that a more specific examination of it has not been made in recent years. If it is true that "contact" or the principle of relativity is a central concept in Schleiermacher's thought, then one would expect that it had been thoroughly studied first at its source, and consequently in terms of a specific contractual polarity. The source in which Schleiermacher develops this basic idea formally is his _Dialektik_; a specific contractual polarity which is fundamental to all others we find is in the relationship of theology to philosophy or better yet in the relationship of God and the world. Translated into concrete, literary terms, the problem of the principle of relativity in Schleiermacher points toward the investigation of the internal structure of his _Dialektik_ as such and then toward a study of the relationship of the _Dialektik_ and the _Dogmatik_.

It remains a question whether Schleiermacher's fundamental concern is necessarily incompatible with the basic theological insights developed in contemporary theology. Karl Barth can assert in his essay on A. Ritschl that it is incorrect to say that "in der Geschichte der neueren Theologie seit Schleiermacher [Ritschl] der Einzige gewesen [sei], der im eigentlichen Sinne

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[1] _Geschichte der neueren evangelischen Theologie_ (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1954), V, pp. 266-267.

Epoche gemacht habe."[1] He claims that strictly speaking, Schleiermacher was the only one who was "epochemachend." For him it is clear that "wenn die alte Zeit heute das Feld behaupten oder neu erobern sollte, dies unter dem Zeichen Schleiermachers oder vielleicht Hegels und auf einen Fall unter dem Zeichen Ritschls geschehen würde."[2] If this is so, the recent theological developments must then be viewed as being more profoundly directed against Schleiermacher than against Ritschl. The real foe, in spite of the many more explicit attacks upon Ritschl and his successors, is Schleiermacher. Rudolf Bultmann writes that the polemic against theological liberalism is not "die Auseinandersetzung mit einzelnen liberalen Theologen" but with "einer bestimmten theologischen Richtung,"[3] of which no one is more representative than Schleiermacher. Bultmann sums up the main accusations against liberalism and therefore against Schleiermacher:

> Der Gegenstand der Theologie ist Gott, und der Vorwurf gegen die liberale Theologie ist der, dass sie nicht von Gott, sondern von Menschen gehandelt hat. Gott bedeutet die radikale Verneinung und Aufhebung der Menschen; die Theologie, deren Gegenstand Gott ist, kann dehalf nur den λόγος τοῦ σταυροῦ zu ihrem Inhalt haben; dieser aber ist ein σκάνδαλον für den Menschen. Und so ist der Vorwurf gegen die liberale Theologie der, dass sie sich diesem σκάνδαλον zu entziehen oder es zu erweichen suchte.[4]

The basic sin of liberalism is that in it we see the effort of man to assert himself over and against God; the sovereign otherness of God has evaporated in the notion deus in nos. With regard to Schleiermacher Barth has expressed this when he said:

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[1] Die protestantische Theologie, p. 598.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Glauben und Verstehen (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1952), I, p. 1.

[4] Ibid., p. 2.

> Das Bewusstsein um Gott bleibt also "eingeschlossen" in das Gefühl, und so kann die Aussprache der Vorstellung "Gott" nichts anderes bedeuten als die Aussprache des Gefühles über sich selber, die unmittelbare Selbst-Reflexion.[1]

Bernard Meland describes the anthropological "theology" of liberalism in terms of its enslavement to mentalism; he says:

> One way of stating it is to say that Liberalism rides upon the surfaces of thought currents that were occasioned by Idealism and by the pragmatic era. In this perspective, reality, man's reality, God's meaning, existence as event, are conceived wholly within the category of conscious experience.[2]

The revolt against these thought patterns expressed itself in a return to thought forms which stressed the sovereignty and otherness of God and the sinfulness and creatureliness of man, who as a sinner and creature was utterly subject to God's judgment and in need of divine grace. The new concern was symbolized in a revival and reappropriation of classical Christian concepts such as: spirit, grace, judgment, sin, redemption, forgiveness, sovereignty, and transcendence of God and many others. This recovery of the essential symbols of the Christian faith signified a change in the theological climate which cannot be reversed. In the light of contemporary modes of thought, a mere repristination of liberalism is just as impossible as the repristination of classical theological thought forms. The "new realism,"[1] as Bernard Meland has called it, is not a mere return to the past but an adventure of past and present. When we asked whether the central concern of Schleiermacher is incompatible with our present-day theological insights, we asked whether Schleiermacher's concern for "contract," expressed in the principle of relativity, vitiates *per se* insights related to concepts such as the sovereignty and transcendence of God. The treatment of Schleiermacher by contemporary theological scholars seems to indicate that it does. Yet we are not convinced that this is necessarily so. We can agree that a more positive judgment of Schleiermacher as a teacher for contemporary theology cannot be based on the abandonment of these new theological motifs, which seem to constitute what we previously called the shared or central factors in our theological circle. It appears to us that the mutual exclusiveness of Schleiermacher's basic concern and the "new realism" of contemporary theology has not been proven. Where proof was attempted, it was not based on the central notions constituting the "new realism" but on some of the unshared and peripheral factors which make up the specificity of our theological circle. Thus, for instance, while we agree that the concept of the sovereignty or transcendence of God cannot be stricken from the contemporary record, it is, at least to us, by no means evident that the sovereignty or otherness of God isidentical with the principle of absolute or qualitative difference. Hence, while it may be true that a specific doctrine of immanence as current in the nineteenth century is a dated doctrine, it is not necessarily true that all doctrines of immanence must be eliminated if we wish to retain the doctrine of God's transcendence. In reference to this Meland states:

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[1] Die protestantische Theologie, p. 418.

[2] Faith and Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 33.

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[1] "The New Realism in Religious Inquiry" (unpublished paper).

> Immanence . . . presupposes transcendence as a category of differentiation in the sense that individuality and mutuality are simultaneously embraced, and God and man represent distinct though related categories.[1]

In order to determine whether we are confronted with truly incompatible factors in a dialogue between Schleiermacher and contemporary modes of thought, we must attempt, if not a normative then a descriptive distinction between shared and nonshared components in the theological circle today.

The character of our theological climate of opinion is one of complexity rather than simplicity and our task may seem therefore difficult if not impossible. This difficulty is not primarily related to the complexity but rather to the element of contemporaneity of present thought. Our very involvement as contemporaries in the complexity of the situation does not permit us to gain a perspective from which relevant generalizations, rooted in concretion and embracing concretion, have become a real possibility. Granted the difficulty, we cannot succumb to the desire to reduce complexity dogmatically to simplicity nor can we acquiesce in complete fragmentation. We must attempt to search for continuity within discontinuity, affirming relatedness while respecting distinctness, mindful of the fact that we are operating on a high level of abstraction and not within the stream of concrete diversity.

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[1] Faith and Culture, p. 58.

In an effort to distinguish between shared and nonshared factors in our theological circle, it is imperative to make a distinction between the crisis situation which came to a head in the early part of our century and the stream of theological constructive efforts proceeding from it. Most, if not all, contemporary theological constructions have their roots in the crisis situation. In this sense all of contemporary theology is crisis theology. What we assert is that the crisis situation is logically prior to and more extensive than any of the individual efforts which attempt to deal with it. The crisis situation is the most widely shared element, while specific interpretations as to its meaning differ, and consequently so do the proposals for reconstruction. This crisis which characterizes the common ground of our theological circle is not restricted to it, but is rather expressive of all modes of contemporary thought. This points up the significance of the shared space-time continuum as a common locus for all thought forms. This crisis was not produced by individual efforts, but it was the result of the convergence of a multitude of natural, historical, intellectual and spiritual forces. Though it can be said that certain individuals, more than others, were causal efficients in making it explicit, it was the very past which by itself and in itself made a plunge toward self-transcendence and broke through its own tired and sterile barriers of thought. The arena of this crisis was the narrow immediacy, but its roots were in the rich and wide past in all its complexity.

We might designate this crisis as an ontological crisis over and against the epistemological crisis associated with the work of Kant. When, for instance, the early Heidegger calls for a renewed "Seinverständnis," when he repeats Plato's question concerning the "Sinn des Seins" over and against the preoccupation with "Seiendem," he expresses what we have called the ontological crisis.[1] And when the later Heidegger, the Heidegger, after der Bruch or die Kehre, having abandoned the completion of Sein und Zeit, begins to focus on the notion of Seinsgeschichte, he echoes the increased seriousness of the experienced crisis. Following among others Hölderlin's poetic suggestion of the departure of the old gods, Heidegger expresses the idea that the crisis of our time is rooted not in a lack of faith, but im Wandel der Götter itself. The gods have withdrawn! Being hides itself just as the old gods. Being is im Wandel (change); after Seinsfülle comes Seinsverlassenheit, and in its footsteps follows Seinsvergessenheit. Ours is such a time of Seinsvergessenheit![2]

In most general terms the notion of crisis points to the deeply felt experience today, that being itself and not just our knowledge of being seems to have evaporated in the stream of becoming. The disintegration of physical substances into pulsating quanta of time-space configurations, approachable only by way of statistical averages which are expressive of probabilities and not of certainties, has its equivalent in the humanistic disciplines in a radical historical relativism. Dogmatic thinking is abandoned for historical thinking. Ernst Troeltsch's statement to a group of theologians as reported by Wilhelm Pauck,[1] "Meine Herren, alles wackelt," seems an understatement rather than an overstatement. If the world is the product of anything at all, it seems less and less the product of or expression of cosmic reason. With Aristophanes we might say, "Whirl is King, Zeus is dethroned." Man himself seems lost in the whirlpool of a-rational if not irrational forces, which penetrate the very integrity of his self. We feel pushed and manipulated by a reality which is beyond our control and recognition. Our labor seems to be the labor of a Sisyphus.

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[1] "Haben wir heute eine Antwort auf die Frage nach dem, was wir mit dem Wort 'seiend' eigentlich meinen? Keineswegs. Und so gilt es denn, die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein erneut zu stellen." [Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Neomarius Verlag, 1949), p. 1.]

[2] Most of Martin Heidegger's later and "smaller" works echo this theme. But of these two are particularly enlightening with respect to the Kehre: Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1943) and "Brief über den 'Humanismus,'" Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit (Bern: Verlag A. Francke A.G., 1947).

The theological circle, which is located within the extensive continuum of the contemporary situation, shares in this general crisis experience. Theologians share in the humanum; they are Mitmenschen and not docetic shadows. Out of this contemporary crisis-situation we can understand the direction which theological thought has taken. We find in historical theological studies as well as in constructive ones two dominant motifs, one positive, the other negative. Positively, we have witnessed an increased concern for and an appropriation of classical modes of Christian thought. Historically this is expressed in the emphasis put on biblical and Reformation studies; the recent Lutherrenaissance is just one example of it. Constructively this becomes evident in the centrality of biblical and Reformation conceptions for systematic studies. Negatively, we can point to the historical and systematic attack upon the theological structures of thought of the nineteenth century. Therefore, depending upon which aspect we emphasize, the change in the contemporary theological climate can be described as either a new Reformation or a revolt.

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[1] Stated in an address to the "American Theological Society," Chicago, 1961.

To illustrate our point of shared and non-shared factors in the contemporary theological circle, we could select a number of contemporary theologians, but no other theologican is a more paradigmatic figure than Karl Barth. Already in terms of sheer influence, Barth is of central significance. He is the central theological figure today, not only because of his influence but also by virtue of the nature of his work. His work demonstrates most clearly the dominant theological mood, both in terms of its possibilities and in terms of its limitations. What we would consider central in the theological circle today stands out in relief, and also that which we would consider peripheral is most clearly stated. In addition to this, Barth's significance does not rest solely on his dogmatic-constructive work but also on the extensive historical studies he has produced. The problem of shared and nonshared factors is therefore best explicated by his example. No one else more than Barth has stated as clearly and as persistently, the dominating and guiding theological insights which emerged with and out of the shared crisis situation. By the same token no one else but Barth has put forth as loudly and as insistently such a comprehensive particular answer to the crisis as he has. Yet to identify Barth's radical theological _modus operandi_ with the insights derived from the shared crisis would all but make impossible the appreciation of the complexity of present-day constructive theological efforts. Barth's shaking of the foundations is not identical with their reconstruction. Wilhelm Pauck writes, "Barth is not _the_ prophet of the new Christianity. He is the 'preacher in the wilderness.'"[1] Barth's objection to the self-glorification of man, man's escape from God, his insistence upon the sovereignty of God and God's judicative otherness are widely shared insights today which cannot be overlooked. The reduction of God's objective reality to a subjective manageable reality is also rightly rejected by Barth as the prideful overextension of man's powers. His insistence upon man's creatureliness and sinfulness and his pointing to God's freedom and grace cannot be abandoned by most contemporary theologians. These insights are widely shared, so widely that we can discover them in such a divergent figure as Henry Nelson Wieman, who writes:

> Here is the first half of the greatest evil of our time: It is not impoverishment of the masses; it is not war and not danger of social revolution; but it is the abolition of the absolute from our temporal existence. It is our inability to distinguish anything as sovereign over all of human history. . . .[2]

Wieman's insistence upon the sovereignty of God, expressed in his distinction between the creative good and the created good, expresses his concern for a transcendent objective reality. Apart from its theocentricity, Wieman's thought is inexplicable, just as is Barth's. But it would be just as dangerous to identify some of Wieman's basic insights with his specific methodology. Wieman's empirical method, epitomized in his notion of the fourfold event, is just as peripheral in the larger context of contemporary theology as Barth's biblical method, focusing upon the notion of the Word of God. If we designate Barth and Wieman as the two extreme poles in the contemporary theological spectrum, then we can discover within formal continuous structures of abstractions specific differences of a much less high order of abstraction. There is no point in arguing that it is the specificity which constitutes the uniqueness of these men; to this we can easily agree. It is obvious that they will have to be judged in terms of their unique contributions, and that they can only be understood in terms of their specificity. This is not at issue! The question which we are raising does not relate to their specificity, which we as contemporaries cannot really evaluate except from some other contemporaneous vantage point, in which case the judgment is always a foregone conclusion. Our question points to the continuous abstract structures which are being shared today, and then we ask: Do these shared factors produce the negative evaluation of Schleiermacher, or the nonshared factors? Does Schleiermacher's central notion of the "eternal contract" or "relativity" abrogate the sovereignty of God as a central concern of contemporary theology? Must we necessarily reject all forms of Kulturprotestantismus if we do not wish to reject central insights which have emerged from our common experience of crisis? Is it just to interpret Schleiermacher as merely another instance, no matter how much personally he may have struggled against it, of the philosophy of identity? Is Barth's absolute distinction between the Christian faith and philosophy the only answer to Hegel's subordination of the Christian faith to philosophy? Or is Schleiermacher's effort to work with the principle of relativity to be taken seriously as a genuine possibility? Hegel's emaciation of the Christian faith seems as radical a solution as the emaciation of the non-theological disciplines by Barth through his insistence that only theology can deal with the "meaning of being," that is, with ontology. We must ask ourselves whether the treatment of Schleiermacher by many contemporary theologians is not due to a clash of two philosophical positions. The proponents of the one insist upon the mutually constitutive character of all relations as internal relations, and the advocates of the other assert the mutually exclusive character of at least some relations.

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[1] _Karl Barth: Prophet of a New Christianity?_ (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1931), p. 220.

[2] _The Source of Human Good_ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 113.

Given the contemporary theological scene with its persistent struggle between apparently exclusive positions, it seems necessary to take stock of ourselves and investigate the "no's" which are constantly proclaimed. Schleiermacher saw in Streit an essential element of a profitable discourse and of the advancement of knowledge, but when "dispute" results in a stalemate, dialogue ceases. Theological discussions today seem to have approached a stalemate; no advance seems possible unless we can begin at the point of our shared insights. This is possible when we are willing to accept the fact that ours is an age of fermentation and not of maturation. It is for these reasons that a study of Schleiermacher can prove to be valuable not only from an historical point of view, but also from the point of view of constructive theology.

Barth complains about Brunner's treatment of Schleiermacher because he has "gerade nicht da angeklopft . . . , wo er eigentlich zuhause [sic] war, und von wo aus er auch entscheident gewirkt hat."[1] By the same token it is regrettable that the admittedly influential philosophical substructure of Schleiermacher has not been given more detailed attention. It seems that when the main objection to Schleiermacher centered around the adequacy of his doctrine of God that this particular aspect would have deserved more specific treatment, both philosophically and theologically, as the ground from which his doctrine of the "feeling of absolute dependence" emerged. If we accuse Schleiermacher of "immanentization" of the divine, the nature of his doctrines of God and the world should not have been assumed as understood, as clear and distinct in terms of certain preconceptions; an effort should have been made to investigate them at their source, namely, in his *Dialektik*. In focusing upon the *Dialektik*, we hope in the subsequent chapters to come to a better understanding of Schleiermacher's structure of thought and its problems.

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[1] *Die protestantishche Theologie*, p. 389.

## CHAPTER II

## THE DIALEKTIK: ITS CONCEPTION AND FORMATION

In his recent book on Schleiermacher Poul H. Jørgensen evaluates and criticizes the thought of Schleiermacher as follows:

> Betrachtet man nämlich das System von seiner ersten Phase bis zur letzten, so wird man eine seltene und bewunderungswürdige Kongruenz entdecken zwischen allen Stufen im System. Es besteht keine Disharmonie zwischen dem zuerst und dem zuletzt Gesagten; aber in dem zuerst Gesagten selbst, in den Grundlagen, den Axiomen . . . liegt die Disharmonie. Das ist ganz gewiss eine äussere Kritik, weil wir Schleiermachers Axiome nicht anerkennen können, während wir Schleiermacher mit einer inneren Kritik nicht zu treffen vermögen. Was wir als das Inkommensurable ansehen, wiederholt sich immer wieder . . . da es in den Axiomen liegt.[1]

This assessment of the nature of Schleiermacher's thought points directly toward the study of the Dialektik, in which Schleiermacher himself attempted the "Bestimmung der erkenntnistheoretischen und metaphysischen Grundlagen seines gesamten Denkens."[2] The understanding of the nature of Schleiermacher's philosophical thought and its significance for the interpretation of his theology must begin with a study of the nature, structure, and aim of his Dialektik. Mere inferential treatment of his philosophy is not sufficient and not needed, since the Dialektik is available. The failure of scholars to find the key to Schleiermacher's thought in categories external to his thought is evident to anyone who surveys the critical literature available. Schleiermacher himself was painfully aware of the various efforts to interpret him in categories other than those developed by himself. He writes tauntingly of his critics in a letter to Brinkmann, "Aus mir wissen sie aber immer noch nicht was sie machen sollen, bald bin ich ein Atheist, bald ein Herrnhuter."[1] And in a letter to Gass he complains, "Neuerlich meinten einige akademische Herren, ich ginge auf den Katholicismus aus . . . zum Spinozisten, Atheisten und Herrnhuter ist nun der Kryptokatholik das passendste vierte Prädikat."[2] The whole sorry state of affairs is summed up by him in the Sendschreiben an Lücke, where he states bitingly,

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[1] Die Ethik Schleiermachers (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1959), p. 84.

[2] Hirsch, Geschichte der neuern evangelischen Theologie, V, p. 282.

> Wenn der eine mich einen Gnostiker nennt, der andere aber einen Alexandriner, die er den Gnostikern gerade entgegenstellt, wenn der eine mich auf Schelling zurückführt, der andere auf Jacobi, der eine mir die Prinzipien der Mönchsmoral zuschreibt, der andere meint ich sei . . . ein Kyrenaiker,--diesen könnte ich noch sagen, sie möchten nur zuerst dieses unter sich ausmachen.[3]

While it is possible to absolve Schleiermacher's contemporaries in view of the fact that he provided them with a variety of apparently conflicting and puzzling statements but not with the key to the problem, this is not as easily done with later critics, to whom this key in the form of the Dialektik had become available. An article of 1828 entitled "Schleiermacher" states "sein eignes philosophisches System hat er jedoch bisher in einer

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[1] Ludwig Jonas and Wilhelm Dilthey (eds.), Aus Schleiermachers Leben: In Briefen (2d ed. rev.; Berlin: G. Reimer, 1860-63), IV, 242. Hereinafter this work is referred to as LB.

[2] Fr. Schleiermacher's Briefwechsel mit J. Chr. Gass, edited by W. Gass (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1852), p. 22.

[3] SL, p. 10.

Art von Halbdunkel gehalten, aus welchem hin und wieder eine pantheistische Ansicht der Dinge hervorzuleuchten scheint."[1] This judgment indicates the problem which Schleiermacher's contemporary interpreters faced. The problem for his later critics is aptly characterized by Hirsch, who describes Schleiermacher's Dialektik as "eine harte Geduldsprobe" because of its reflective formalism.[2] The difficulty of the study of Schleiermacher's Dialektik is further increased by its external form.

The Dialektik was published for the first time in 1839, five years after his death. Schleiermacher himself had entrusted his faithful pupil Ludwig Jonas with its publication, as Bruno Weiss reports in the following statement made by Schleiermacher to Jonas,

> Ich übergebe Dir meine Papiere, lass Dir angelegen sein, daraus vor allem, sogut es sich wird machen lassen, die Dialektik, die christliche Sittenlehre und meine Ansichten über die Apostelgeschichte zusammenstellen und in Druck zu geben.[3]

Jonas executed this task with the greatest possible effort and devotion, so that his edition of the Dialektik[4] retains in the opinion of Hirsch "allen Versuchen gegenüber, das von Schleiermacher nicht mehr gestaltete ganze aus einem Guss doch noch herzustellen, ihre Überlegenheit. . . ."[1] But nevertheless the result of Jonas' labors is far from satisfactory and must remain so by the very nature of the material which he assembled. The welding together of the various fragments, even if supplemented by student notes from Schleiermacher's actual lectures, can never achieve in form and intelligibility the perfection it could have, had Schleiermacher succeeded in publishing the Dialektik, either in the form of the Dogmatik, or of the Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums, as he had intended to do. The Dialektik as it has come down to us is simply a collection of lecture notes, preliminary drafts, and sketches as prepared by Schleiermacher for his lectures and revised and extended after his lectures. Moreover, the material collected comes from a period extending over more than two decades. Thus it is quite natural to ask oneself how valuable and, if valuable, how reliable are our sources? The value of the material stands in direct relation to Schleiermacher's evaluation of his presentations in the lectern. The reliability can in part be assessed in terms of a comparative and developmental study of the various drafts contained in the collection. With regard to his activity as a lecturer Schleiermacher reports to his friend Brinkmann,

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[1] Krugs Encyklopädisches-Philosophisches Lexikon, III, p. 551, cited by I. Halpern, "Der Entwicklungsgang der Schleiermacher'schen Dialektik," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, XIV, 7 (1901), p. 211.

[2] Geschichte der neuern evangelischen Theologie, V, p. 284.

[3] Bruno Weiss, "Untersuchungen über Friedrich Schleiermacher's Dialektik," Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, LXXIII (1878), p. 13.

[4] (Sämtliche Werke, Div. III, Vol. IV, Pt. II; Berlin: G. Reimer, 1839). Hereinafter this work is referred to as D.

> Du musst mir leider aufs Wort glauben, da ich seit mehreren Jahren mit nichts Bedeutendem öffentlich aufgetreten bin. Aber das Hervorbringen liegt in den Vorlesungen.[2]

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[1] Geschichte der neuern evangelischen Theologie, V, p. 282. The editions of the Dialektik by Isidor Halpern (Berlin: Mayer and Müller, 1903) and by Rudolf Odebrecht (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1942) can in no way replace the edition by Jonas. Hereinafter Halpern's edition is referred to as HD.

[2] LB, IV, p. 240.

In a letter to Henriette von Willich he says,

> Nun drängt es mich, Vorlesungen zu halten über diesen Gegenstand; das ist immer der erste Ausweg; denn dadurch tritt mir alles am besten vor Augen und arbeitet sich aus. Dann komme ich wieder in ein geschäftiges Leben, was mir Freude macht, wenn ich auf dem Katheder stehe und Du sollst sehen, wie mir das gedeihen soll.[1]

And again he writes,

> Was mir aber jetzt schon grosse Freude macht, das sind meine Vorlesungen; mit den ersten Stunden bin ich selbst unzufrieden. . . . Aber nun komme ich hinein und die Zuhörer auch. Alles ordnet sich bestimmter, es geht immer klarer hervor, das wir die Wahrheit ergriffen haben . . . und oft überrascht mich selbst mitten im Vortrage etwas Einzelnes, was von selbst hervorgeht, . . . so dass ich selbst aus jeder einzelnen Stunde fast belehrt herauskomme. Ich kann Dir gar nicht sagen, was für ein Genuss das ist.[2]

Regarding his method of preparation Schleiermacher gives us a description in a letter to Brinkmann:

> In der ersten Zeit beschäftigt mich der Plan für ein zu sprechendes Ganze von solcher Ausdehnung gewaltig, und je weiter ich dann komme, um desto mehr Studien habe ich zu machen für das Detail. Überdies beschäftigt mich oft der Vortrag für eine Stunde länger als eine Stunde, weil ich eben auch für das Katheder nichts, was zum Vortrag gehört, aufschreiben kann. . . . Vorarbeiten ohnerachtet lasse ich dann auf dem Katheder meinen Gedanken weit freieren Lauf, als auf der Kanzel, und so kommt mir manches dort durch Inspiration, was ich denn des Aufzeichnens für die Zukunft wert halte und woraus mir so noch eine Nacharbeit entsteht.[3]

Schleiermacher's own high evaluation of the lecturing activity and his own peculiar method of operation may have been reinforced by the physical condition of his eyes, but at heart it was due to his high appreciation for the Platonic dialogical method which he came to cherish in his study of Plato. He writes,

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[1] LB, II, p. 151.

[2] Ibid., p. 176.

[3] LB, IV, p. 113.

> Das Suchen und Finden muss gegenseitig sein, aber es muss nur durch die natürliche Anziehungskraft verwandter Gemüter zustande kommen. Je mehr Absichtliches dabei ist, je mehr man fördern will, desto mehr ist man in Gefahr zu verderben.[1]

In view of this we may regret the fragmented state in which much of what he had to say has come down to us, but we cannot doubt the value, the centrality, and the deliberateness of his ideas expressed in the lectures on dialectics.

With regard to the problem of reliability, the situation is at once more serious and less serious. It is more serious in reference to the detailed execution of his thought but not in reference to the broad determining features of the thought structure as such. In fact it can be asserted that the significant axiomatic principles stand out clearly throughout his various lectures. The reason for this is indicated by Schleiermacher himself in a letter to Gass, dating from the year 1811 when he lectured on dialectics for the first time:

> Und nun gar die Dialektik; diese kostet eine schmähliche Zeit. Der Entschluss hatte lange in mir gewurmt, ich bin aber doch froh, dass er zum Durchbruch gekommen ist. Als ich anfing, waren mir erst die Hauptmassen klar, nun verarbeitet es sich allmählich mehr in's einzelne, und ich hoffe das ganze soll gut werden.[2]

Thus it is fair to assume that while details of the Dialektik were not clearly worked out by Schleiermacher, the basic structure and guiding axiomatic principles were clearly conceived by him. In fact it could be said that subsequent changes which he introduced in later lectures were designed more to improve than to radically alter the fundamental character of the *Dialektik*. Schleiermacher's ability to visualize his aims with incisive perspicuity and to move toward them with untiring persistence gives to his work in general, and to his *Dialektik* in particular, the character of a continuous, harmonious, organic whole, which in order to be understood must be understood in its totality first to be understood in part. In this sense it is quite correct to speak of his work as being a system. Schleiermacher's great biographer W. Dilthey claims this for his work as a whole, but what he says is equally applicable to the *Dialektik*,

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[1] Friedrich Schleiermacher, Platons Werke (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1804-1805), Vol. I, pp. 14-15.

[2] Briefwechsel mit Gass, p. 14.

> Wie man in Schleiermacher's geistiger Entwicklung tiefer eindringt, gewahrt man hinter der erstaunlichen Vielseitigkeit vollendeter Leistungen eine zähe Stätigkeit, ich möchte sagen Sparsamkeit seines Geistes, welche aus der Bewusstheit, festen Zusammenhang und klarer Ordnung in ihm entsprang. Nichts beinahe, auch von dem, was er für sich arbeitete, hat er zurückzunehmen gehabt, seine Entwickelung war ein vorsichtiges stätiges Voranschreiten.[1]

Isidor Halpern remarks of the *Dialektik*,

> [Sie ist] ein Document für die geistige Entwicklung eines Denkers ersten Ranges; sie gewährt uns Einblick in die Werkstatt seines Geistes, in das dialektische Ringen um eine Idee, die, wie ein Phantom, bei jedem Schritt vorwärts weiter hinaus rückt, in den Kampf eines scharfen unerbittlichen Denkens mit sich selbst, eines Denkens, das sich sträubt gegen das, was es doch erstrebt.[2]

Given this quality of Schleiermacher's work, a comparative developmental study of the *Dialektik*,[3] testing its internal continuity and reliability, may be valuable but not a conditio sine qua non for an inquiry into the principal structure of the work. Thus, while the various versions of the Dialektik show differences, they do not affect the fundamental continuity of Schleiermacher's thought. According to Halpern, "Um den Kern der Dialektik zu erfassen, wird es nothwendig sein, in der ungeordneten Gedankenmasse von den Abschweifungen und Verzweigungen abzusehen und auf die äussere Gliederung der Fassungen keine Rücksicht zu nehmen."[1] Schleiermacher moves toward his aim with an untiring tenacity, unfolding his principles in ever new combinations, beginning at different starting points. Thus while the organic character of Schleiermacher's thought can set our minds at ease with respect to the imperfection of the available sources, this makes it all the more important to determine the guiding principles or axioms in his thought, lest we be misled in specific interpretations.

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[1] Wilhelm Dilthey, *Leben Schleiermachers*, edited by Hermann Mulert (2d ed. rev.; Berlin: Vereinigung wissenschaftlicher Verleger, 1922), p. 285.

[2] "Der Entwicklungsgang der Schleiermacher'schen Dialektik," p. 215.

[3] See Br. Weiss, "Untersuchungen über Friedrich Schleiermacher's Dialektik."

Few of Schleiermacher's critics will deny that he was primarily a theologian and only secondarily a philosopher. This is true in spite of the fact that he spent the major part of his time as a student in Halle and later independently in the study of philosophy, particularly in the study of Kant.[2] Even his dislike for theology, that is, his distaste for much of that which went under the name of theology at his time, cannot eradicate his primarily religious-ethical and theological concern.[3] There is no point in attempting to adduce extensive proof for this; Schleiermacher's own words are the best testimony. He proclaims,

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[1] "Der Entwicklungsgang der Schleiermacher'schen Dialektik," p. 214.

[2] W. Dilthey, Leben Schleiermachers, pp. 93-96.

[3] Ibid., pp. 51, 53, 60, 64, and 153. Cf. LB, IV, pp. 28-29.

> Religion war der mütterliche Leib in dessen heiligem Dunkel mein junges Leben genährt und auf die ihm noch verschlossene Welt vorbereitet wurde, in ihr atmete mein Geist, ehe er noch seine äusseren Gegenstände, Erfahrung und Wissenschaft gefunden hatte, sie half mir als ich anfing den väterlichen Glauben zu sichten und das Herz zu reinigen von dem Schutte der Vorwelt, sie blieb mir, als Gott und Unsterblichkeit dem zweifelnden Auge verschwanden, sie leitete mich ins tätige Leben, sie hat mich gelehrt mich selbst mit meinen Tugenden und Fehlern in meinem ungeteilten Dasein heilig zu halten, und nur durch sie habe ich Freundschaft und Liebe gelernt.[1]

Nicolai Hartmann, for instance, asserts that "von seinen religiösen Ideen aus muss man seine Dialektik und Ethik würdigen wenn man ihren geschichtlichen Eigenwert sucht."[2] This assertion is certainly true, if by it we mean that Schleiermacher's writing of the Dialektik was motivated by theological concerns, rather than purely philosophical ones. It seems that he felt compelled to deal explicitly with strictly philosophical problems only to facilitate his theological task. Two assumptions were implicit in his explicit concern for metaphysics, one positive and one negative. Positively, Schleiermacher assumed that a relationship of philosophy and theology existed, and negatively he assumed that the available philosophical structures were inadequate for his purposes. It seems that the latter assumption or conviction was particularly instrumental for his decision to lecture on dialectics or "speculative philosophy" as he himself also called it.

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[1] Über die Religion: Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern (Berlin: Johann Friedrich Unger, 1799), pp. 14-15.

[2] Nicolai Hartmann, Geschichte der Philosophie, Vol. VIII, Part I: Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter und Co., 1923), p. 235.

But in the light of Schleiermacher's equally explicit concern for the independence of religion in general and dogmatics in particular, from metaphysics or philosophy, we must ask why he moved into the construction of a speculative philosophy. Why did he not concentrate on strictly theological work? It seems that if we interpret Schleiermacher's understanding of "independence" as the expression of the assertion of "absolute difference," his positive effort in the area of speculative thought seems strange, to say the least. From this understanding only critical efforts in the area of speculative thought would seem to be necessitated. But if we interpret "independence" as meaning distinctiveness not exclusive of relatedness, then Schleiermacher's venture into the field of speculative philosophy based upon the two above named assumptions becomes not only intelligible, but necessary. Furthermore, the often heard charge that he did not succeed in his self-appointed task to free theology from metaphysics, loses all substance. The discovery of a definite relationship of his metaphysics to his dogmatics cannot be used as a ground for charging him with either failure or innocent lack of consciousness, which in such a highly self-conscious and extremely able critic as Schleiermacher must be viewed as an exceedingly weak explanation. In our terms, if contract and not breach of contract was the aim of Schleiermacher, then we must focus upon the task of discovering the terms of the contract.[1] Thus the very fact of his concern for speculative philosophy as embodied in the Dialektik, and as expressed in his conception of its nature and function, seems to point to a concern for the discovery of a specific relationship rather than for a concern of complete independence. Yet it is puzzling that he did not make a systematic attempt to explicate his own conception, and left his readers mystified with apparently contradictory statements.[1] Thus, while his whole life and work is an expression of *Kulturtheologie*, he succeeded in specifics to give the impression that his aim was the specification of the terms not of an eternal contract but of absolute difference. His very conception of the nature of the *Dialektik*, which is developed in the whole explication of the work itself, must give a clue to the solution of the problem of the nature of the possible relationship. Before we can speak of the *Dialektik* as the key to Schleiermacher's thought, we must know what this key is and how it is to be used. But, in order to answer the question, what is the *Dialektik* both in nature and function? we must study its whole axiomatic structure itself.

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[1] Supra, p. 15.

In 1789 Schleiermacher writes to his father,

> Noch weiter aber bin ich immer von der Systemsucht entfernt geblieben. Ich habe mit den Zweifeln angefangen zu denken, und soviel ich seitdem auch gelesen und selbst nachgedacht habe, soviel Umgang ich auch mit den festesten Anhängern dieses und jenes Systems gepflogen habe, so bin ich doch gewissermassen in der Theologie sowohl als in der Philosophie auf dieser Stufe stehen geblieben. *Ich glaube nicht, dass ich es jemals bis zu einem völlig ausgebildeten System bringen werde, so dass ich alle Fragen, die man aufwerfen kann, entscheidend und im Zusammenhang mit aller meiner übrigen Erkentniss würde beantworten*; aber ich habe von jeher geglaubt, dass das Prüfen und Untersuchen, das geduldige abhören aller Zeugen und aller Parteien das einzige Mittel sei, endlich zu einem hinlänglichen Gebiet von Gewissheit, und

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[1] *Supra*, pp. 36-37.

> vor allen Dingen zu einer festen Grenze zwischen dem zu gelangen, worüber man nothwendig Parthei nehmen und sich und einem jeden Andern Red' und Antwort muss stehen können, und zwischen dem, was man ohne Nachtheil seiner Ruhe und Glückseligkeit unentschieden lassen kann. So sehe ich den Kampfspielen philosophischer und theologischer Athleten ruhig zu, ohne mich für irgend einen zu erklären . . . aber es kann nicht fehlen, dass ich nicht jedesmal von beiden etwas lernen sollte.[1]

What Schleiermacher expressed in this letter has remained valid for his whole life. Here as later he is fearful to lose himself in the "metaphysischen Wüsten,"[2] and become strangled by the closure of system. For a long time he actually feels that his mission lies in the area of philosophical criticism only.[3] In a letter to Henriette Herz he describes his view of the Moderns which, as he puts it somewhere else, God must have created for his torture,[4]

> Ich sah, wie geistlos Alles betrieben wurde, und selbst Kant, den ich eifrig studirte, konnte mir den Glauben nicht benehmen, dass die Philosophie noch gar nicht auf dem rechten Fleck wäre.[5]

But gradually he comes to the realization that such a critical withdrawal is not enough, particularly when he is faced with the prospect of having to teach in a context which is solely determined by what he must consider inadequate philosophical principles. Before he himself is actually forced to enter into the area of speculative philosophy, he reflects on the necessity of developing the limits of philosophy, he feels an urge "auf diese oder jene Art" to intervene in the current philosophical discussions, but decides to give himself more time before doing it.[1] Thus we note that for a long time Schleiermacher plays with the idea of explicating his basic philosophical ideas, but does not actually execute them.[2] As late as 1804 he can write, "Mein eignes System wird im wissenschaftlichen Kleide angethan, wohl so bald noch nicht erscheinen. . . ."[3]

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[1] __LB__, I, p. 78. (Italics mine.)

[2] __Ibid__., p. 66.

[3] __Ibid__., p. 279.

[4] __Ibid__., p. 278.

[5] __Ibid__., p. 226.

The actual course of events, however, accelerated his adventure into speculative philosophy sooner than he may have anticipated. After his appointment to the University of Berlin he was confronted with a situation which in his own opinion required his concern for speculative philosophy. Besides Fichte, whose philosophy Schleiermacher considered unfit for the university,[4] only two other members of the faculty lectured in philosophy; one taught a type of popular philosophy, and the other was engaged in the interpretation of the Platonic dialogues.[5] The appointment of Schleiermacher's friend Steffens to a chair in philosophy at Berlin was not realized, and Schleiermacher was faced with the decision to do his work in a situation which did not provide adequate philosophical preparation, or to remedy this situation by entering into the area of speculative philosophy himself. He chose the latter. But as late as 1810 he states, in describing his plans for the following semester,

> Ich bin schon angesprochen worden um die Ethik. Allein ich habe einmal verschworen, so lange Fichte der einzige Pro-

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[1] Ibid., p. 282. [2] Ibid., p. 383.

[3] Ibid., p. 390. [4] Ibid., p. 222.

[5] Weiss, "Untersuchungen über Schleiermachers Dialektik," p. 8.

> fessor der Philosophie ist, kein philosophisches Collegium zu lesen; und sollte sich das bis Ostern ändern, so hätte ich Lust, erst als Einleitung zu meinen philosophischen Vorlesungen die Dialektik zu versuchen, die mir lange im Kopfe spukt. Doch ist das noch im weiten Felde.[1]

The hoped for change in the situation did not take place, and Schleiermacher began to lecture on Dialektik in spite of it or because of it. In 1811 he announced a lecture "Dialecticen,s. artis philosophandi principiorum summam tradet etc."[2]

The Dialektik had been in his mind for some time as some references in his letters show. When working with the admired dialogues of the "divine Plato,"[3] he contemplated his own "dialogues."[4] In Halle in 1804, reporting on his work, he speaks of an introduction which does not develop as well as his introduction to the theological study:

> Das über die Fundamentallehre leidet etwas unter dem übrigen und wird sehr fragmentarisch; aber seinen Endzweck, dass es die Leute lehre, unter dem Begriff die Idee aufzusuchen, soll es doch wohl erreichen.[5]

In Halle he attempts more by concrete example than by way of theoretical and speculative explication, to demonstrate the relationship of speculation and piety.[6] Again in 1806 we hear of his "dialogues" in letters he writes to Henriette Herz and Georg Reimer.[1] Earlier, from his exile in Stolpe he tells his friend Brinkmann of his hope to write philosophical dialogues which would state what he has to say philosophically and be done with philosophical speculation;[2] he considers himself fundamentally a philosophical dilettante,[3] particularly when "system" is the criterion by which one measures the philosopher.

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[1] Briefwechsel mit Gass, p. 87.

[2] Weiss, "Untersuchungen über Schleiermachers Dialektik," p. 16.

[3] "Es giebt gar keinen Schriftsteller, der so auf mich gewirkt, und mich in das Allerheiligste nicht nur der Philosophie, sondern des Menschen überhaupt so eingeweiht hätte als dieser göttliche Mann, und dafür möchte ich ihm gern einen recht würdigen Dank bringen." (LB, IV, p. 72.)

[4] LB, I, pp. 327 and 370. Cf. III, p. 360.

[5] LB, II, pp. 10-11.

[6] Ibid., p. 44.

All this confirms our contention that Schleiermacher, though realizing the interrelation of philosophy and theology, did not conceive of himself primarily as a philosopher. He was forced into the theoretical explication of his epistemological and metaphysical views more by the recognition of the one-sidedness of the philosophical works presently available, than by a sense of mission. Thus, while interested in it, as his long concern for it shows, philosophy as Dialektik was a necessary propaedeutic rather than the main object of concern for him. As it turned out, and maybe should be, Dialektik remained his constant concern. It was a steady propaedeutical companion to his other work. Through his dialectical concern he attempted to bring to self-consciousness the formal-theoretical foundations for all of his thought and life. It purported to be no more than speculative description of the processes of thought and being, highly abstract and formal, regulative rather than definitive in character, a necessary prolegomenon to knowledge itself, logically prior as a

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[1] Ibid., pp. 58 and 69.

[2] LB, IV, pp. 84-85.

[3] Ibid., p. 89.

*terminus a quo* but actually posterior to knowledge. It was his speculative effort to account for unity in difference in theoretical terms, to give account in conceptual terms for that which is actually a given. Hence the *Dialektik* does not aim to create actuality speculatively, but to be explanatory of it. In this sense it is not system but method; through it one cannot deduce actuality, but only attempt to understand its structure.

## The Dialektik in the "System of Knowledge"

Schleiermacher's critical spirit is particularly evident when he approaches the question concerning the possibility of a system of knowledge. Very early he expresses doubt that a "system" of knowledge can be attained if by "system" is meant a completed and perfected whole.[1] If systematic closure was the presupposition and aim of knowledge, then knowledge could not be obtained. But then Schleiermacher questions whether such systematic closure or perfection was really the *conditio sine qua non* of knowledge (*Wissenschaft*). In his critical treatment of previous ethical theories (1803) he asks whether it is proper to view "knowledge" from this perspective or whether it is possible to treat it as method rather than system, that is, as the way by which we aim toward wholeness and specify the conditions under which we proceed. By this Schleiermacher does not wish to advocate a justification of what he calls the "rhapsodic" method in scholarly inquiry, which rejects all efforts to view things in terms of their interrelatedness and is satisfied with the gathering of isolated bits of information. This methodological approach is just as inadequate as its opposite, the dogmatic-deductive method, which attempts by pure deduction from first principles to advance to perfect cognition. While sight of the permanent and continuing structures in reality is lost in the rhapsodic method, the dogmatic-deductive method is oblivious of the reality of flux and discontinuity. Schleiermacher's rejection of "system" is therefore not equivalent to the denial of the interrelatedness or togetherness of things on the ontological level, or with the denial of the drive toward wholeness or integrity on the epistemological level. What he wishes to do is to retain the reality of the particular without evaporation of the universal.[1] He wishes to accomplish this by the employment of the heuristic method in scholarly inquiry. This method he describes as follows:

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[1] *Supra*, p. 45.

> Die dritte Methode aber ist die heuristische, und Platon der einzige Meister, der sie in ihrer Vollkommenheit aufgestellt hat. Ihr Wesen nun besteht darin, dass sie nicht von einem festen Punkt anhebend nach einer Richtung fortschreitet, sondern bei der Bestimmung jedes einzelnen von einer sceptischen Aufstellung durch vermittelnde Punkte jedesmal die Principien und das einzelne zugleich darstellt, und wie durch einen elektrischen Schlag vereinigt.[2]

General principles and specific data must be developed parallel to each other and they must qualify each other. This methodological view is expressed in Schleiermacher's praise of Plato,

> Alles bei Plato in einem gewissen Maass vorgestellt. Nichts ganz abgesondert für sich allein. Physik geht im Timaios in

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[1] *Supra*, p. 18.

[2] Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre* (*Sämmtliche Werke*, Div. III, Vol. I; Berlin: G. Reimer, 1846), pp. 336-337. Hereinafter this work is referred to as *GKS*.

> Ethik aus, Ethik geht überall auf Physik zurück. Beide stüzen sich auf die Dialektik, welche wiederum nirgends anders vorhanden ist als in Verbindung mit einem von beiden realen Zwekken.[1]

The heuristic method acknowledges that

> keine Wissenschaft kann im strengsten Sinne vollendet sein für sich allein, sondern nur in Vereinigung mit allen andern unter einer höchsten [Wissenschaft], welche für alle den gemeinschaftlichen Grund des Daseins enthält, und eine jede bestätigt durch den Zusammenhang mit allen übrigen.[2]

But it equally asserts that this "highest" discipline does not emerge independently from ethics and physics, the two main branches of scholarship under which all real knowledge is attained. This highest discipline or dialectic is logically prior to all other forms of scholarly inquiry, but not prior in the temporal sense. He expresses this quite clearly, as follows:

> Diese [höchste Wissenschaft] auch die erste sein muss der Zeit nach und jene [anderen Wissenschaften] erzeugen, welches niemand gefunden zu haben behaupten wird, oder dass die untergeordneten sich zugleich und nach gleichen Regeln in Gestalt und Inhalt der Vollendung nähern, und eben hierdurch auch jene Idee sich allmählich entwikkelt.[3]

Dialektik or the prima philosophia, though the necessary foundation of all Realwissenschaften does not emerge apart from them. Dialektik does not stand in absolute antithesis to Realwissenschaft; on the contrary, a mutual dependence must be posited. In fact, Schleiermacher says "dass jedes von beiden isolirt den Charakter der Wissenschaft verliert. . . ."[1] While concrete knowledge concentrates on the particularity of reality, as it is conditioned by space and time, speculative knowledge attempts to describe the continuous structures:

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[1] Friedrich Schleiermacher, Geschichte der Philosophie (Sämmtliche Werke, Div. III, Vol. IV, edited by H. Ritter; Berlin: G. Reimer, 1839), p. 98. Hereinafter this work is referred to as GP.

[2] GKS, pp. 339-340. This does not indicate the possibility of an absolute independence of dogmatics, but seems to necessitate some form of cultural theology.

[3] Ibid.

> Alles reale Erkennen ist historisch und sucht das einzelne durch seine Stelle in der Totalität zu verstehen. Alles philosophische [Erkennen] vernichtet das räumliche und zeitliche Auseinandersein und sucht jedes einzelne durch die Identität mit dem ganzen zu verstehen.[2]

Neither of these aspects can be neglected in scholarly inquiry; cognition of the particular requires cognition of the structures of relations by which the particular is shaped; cognition of the continuous structures does not take place in a vacuum, but in the actual world of connected particulars. Schleiermacher is quite frank in the recognition of the difficulties posed by this theory of being and knowledge, where cognition of the particular depends upon cognition of the totality of structures constitutive of the whole and vice versa. He asserts that our finite and limited cognition requires "methodological supplementation";[3] that is, incomplete cognition must be completed by hypothetical generalizations. Heuristic hypotheses or speculative generalizations must be developed and tested in the striving toward integrity of scholarship.

The development of speculative, descriptive generalizations is the specific task of the Dialektik; it concerns itself frankly and openly with the elaboration of abstract formal principles, which possess validity only insofar as they succeed in being explanatory of and supplementary to the quest for concrete knowledge in ethics and physics. What Schleiermacher says of Plato's speculative philosophy is equally applicable to his own Dialektik,

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[1] GP, p. 15.

[2] Ibid., p. 16.

[3] Ibid., pp. 29-30.

> Auf diese Weise nun ist nicht nur seine [Plato] Dialektik als formale Seite der Spiegel der realen sowohl physischen als ethischen [Seite], sondern auch das heuristische Princip der absoluten Einheit oder der Idee der Gottheit, die er [Plato] in physischen und ethischen Darstellungen immer nur voraussäzt, hier aber erwekkt.[1]

Dialektik then has as its aim on the one hand the speculative specification of the principles of interrelation or unity; that is, on the highest or most abstract level its aim is God as the ground of unity, and on the other hand it attempts to describe on the most abstract and formal level the steps implicit in any process of knowing. It is therefore both metaphysics and logic, proceeding from concrete empirical knowledge to the speculative investigation of the structures of possibility required for the process of knowing. It completes by speculative imagination that which must remain fragmentary in strictly empirical studies. Its justification cannot be made in terms of a higher principle, but only in terms of its adequacy and applicability to all areas of human inquiry. Its heart and strength lies in the formal and most general character of its principles, but it is here where its weakness lies, for it cannot be productive of concrete empirical knowledge, and if used for this purpose it loses its value as a methodological tool. Dialektik then, by its very nature, strives toward unity and universality and is therefore primarily speculative. It is that locus in the system of knowledge where a conscious speculative effort is made; it is the highest discipline in the sense that it is the most abstract discipline, but by virtue of the principle of parallelism it does not originate apart from the body of concrete knowledge nor can it retain its value apart from it. The assumption of the integrity of being and knowledge and the striving in scholarship toward it, results

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[1] GP, p. 103.

> in der Bildung . . . einer Wissenschaft von den Gründen und dem Zusammenhang aller Wissenschaften. Diese nun darf selbst nicht wiederum wie jene einzelnen Wissenschaften auf einem obersten Grundsatz beruhen; sondern nur als ein Ganzes, in welchem jedes der Anfang sein kann, und alles einzelne gegenseitig einander bestimmend nur auf dem Ganzen beruht, ist sie zu denken, und so dass sie nur angenommen oder verworfen, nicht aber begründet und bewiesen werden kann. Eine solche höchste und allgemeinste Erkenntnis würde mit Recht Wissenschaftslehre genannt, ein Name, welcher dem der Philosophie unstreitig weit vorzuziehen ist. . . .[1]

The Dialektik is the localized search for the unity of being and knowledge, and in that sense it is the key to the understanding of all other scholarly disciplines. It is not the "science of science" and not knowledge, if knowledge relates to the becoming of particularities; it investigates abstract possibilities and not concrete actualities. It posits heuristic hypotheses, which originate from a specific inquiry and must be tested in specific inquiry. It attempts to study the continuous structures of interrelatedness in actuality, and it is systematic in the sense that it attempts to account speculatively for the togetherness and separateness of things, to specify abstractly that which is given in fact. It is the conscious and deliberate reflection upon the integrity or wholeness of actuality by way of descriptive and speculative generalization.

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[1] GKS, p. 18.

Unity or relatedness and particularity or distinctness are the ultimate poles of reality; hence all inquiry must retain the integrity of this polar duality and it must specify this relationship at the same time that it cannot deduce it or prove it. We must begin with the One and the Many, but we cannot deduce either from the other. If we do not retain the tension, then

> da ist nun auf der einen Seite blosse Empirie, auf der anderen Mysticismus, blosses Brüten über dem Transcendentalen, in welchem die Form der Wissenschaft, die objektive Anschauung je länger je mehr verloren geht, aber doch die Prätension auf diese Form bleibt.[1]

This polar duality is in the final analysis inexplicable:

> Nämlich das absolute und das empirische sind irrational gegen einander, jede wahre Philosophie sieht also das vollständige Aufgehen beider in einander als eine nur indirekt zu lösende Aufgabe an. . . . Diese Irrationalität ist aber nur wenigen zu einer klaren Anschauung gekommen.[2]

The dilemma created by the compulsion toward the reduction of the complex to the simple, or polar duality to rigid singularity is described by Schleiermacher as follows:

> Diese [exclusivistische Methode] führt von Seiten des Absoluten auf das Resultat, dass man von ihm zum empirischen nicht kommt, und dass also, wenn jenes das reale ist, dieses sich nur wie der Schein verhält; von Seiten des empirischen, dass man zum absoluten nicht kommt und dass es also nur die für sich gesezte, aber so nicht objektive Gültigkeit habende Form des Aufsteigens aussagt oder dass es im allgemeinen nur Schein ist. Beides ist philosophische Verzweiflung unter verschiedenen Formen.[3]

Far from succumbing to philosophical despair, Schleiermacher asserts in fact that the very character of scholarship depends upon the striving toward a speculative integration of the vast body of information attained in specific research. In his effort to state some ideas regarding the nature of scholarship on the occasion of the founding of the University of Berlin, he asserts,

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[1] GP, p. 231. [2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 232. Cf. supra, p. 18, N. 1.

> Denjenigen hingegen, welche sich zum Behuf der Wissenschaft freiwillig vereinigen, kommt es auf ganz etwas anderes an, als allein auf die Masse der Kenntnisse. Was sie vereinigt ist das Bewusstsein von der nothwendigen Einheit alles Wissens, von den Gesetzen und Bedingungen seines Entstehens, von der Form und dem Gepräge wodurch eigentlich jede Wahrnehmung, jeder Gedanke, ein eigentliches Wissen ist.[1]

From this statement it seems easy to label Schleiermacher's thought as just another instance of the Alleinheitsphilosophie of German Idealism, but such interpretation would not be in keeping with the general tenor of his thought. Contrary to the extreme confidence of a Hegel, Schleiermacher does not regard unity as a given posession of man. It is, while an unmanageable presupposition of knowledge, that is, while not conceptually reducible, primarily the aim which constantly recedes as we attempt to grasp it, but which we nevertheless must pursue. Thus he does not speak sub specie aeternitatis as Hegel's pure Ego; he rather speaks as the empirical Ego which constantly is striving toward a microcosmic integrity of the subject, but not with the exclusion of the striving toward macrocosmic integrity, but rather simultaneously with it. Both microcosmic integrity and macrocosmic integrity as actual achievements can be no more than a temporary stoppage of an ongoing process of change. It is the effort by which we take stock of ourselves by a conceptual freezing of the movement of life, or to employ Lessing's phrase, by leaping over the chasm between the "absolute" and the historical through the use of methodological-hypothetical supplementation, that is, by way of speculation. Speculation is the method by which we aim at and temporarily achieve unity. Speculation is the striving toward unity;[1] it operates in the realm of possibilities and not in the realm of actuality. However, it would be far from accurate to regard the speculative drive as self-sufficient, nothing could distort Schleiermacher's thought more than this. Here again as elsewhere he operates in terms of a more or less, that is, in terms of the principle of relativity, as we have chosen to call it. He says,

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[1] Friedrich Schleiermacher, Gelegentliche Gedanken über Universitäten (Sämmtliche Werke, Div. III, Vol. I; Berlin: G. Reimer, 1846), p. 549.

> Zweierlei aber ist, woran sich zeigen muss, ob ein Mensch für diese höhere Bildung sich eigne, auf der einen Seite ein bestimmtes Talent, welches ihn an ein einzelnes Feld der Erkenntniss fesselt, auf der anderen der allgemeine Sinn für die Einheit und den durchgängigen Zusammenhang alles Wissens, der systematische philosophische Geist. Zusammentreffen muss beides, wenn der Mensch sich zu etwas ausgezeichnetem bilden soll. Auch das entschiedenste Talent wird ohne diesen Geist keine Selbständigheit haben. . . . Und der systematische Geist ohne ein bestimmtes Talent wird sich mit seinen Productionen in einem sehr engen Kreise herumdrehen, und sich in wunderlichen Auswüchsen, Wiederholungen und Umbildungen immer des nämlichen höchst allgemeinen erschöpfen, weil er eben keines Stoffes recht Meister ist.[2]

Scholarly production and speculative spirit are mutually dependent.

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[1] "Speculation so wollen wir immer nennen was sich von wissenschaftlichen Betätigungen überwiegend nur auf die Einheit und die gemeinschaftliche Form alles Wissens bezieht. . . ." (*Ibid.*)

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 552-553. Cf., p. 557.

> Wer keine bestimmte philosophische Denkungsart sich gebildet hat, [wird] auch nichts tüchtiges und merkwürdiges wissenschaftlich selbständig hervorbringen, . . . sondern er wird immer, bewusst oder unbewusst auch da wo er durch einen wunderbaren Instinkt erfindet, von einer speulativen Richtung der Vernunft abhängen, die sich vielleicht nur in anderen deutlich offenbart. Auch wird eines jeden philosophische Denkungsart sich in der Sprache, in der Methode, in der Darstellung, bei jedem wissenschaftlichen Werke ausprechen.[1]

While all scholarly effort according to Schleiermacher is unavoidably linked with speculation, speculation which separates itself from its concrete body, that is, from empirical knowledge, loses not only its value for the quest for knowledge, but becomes itself the exhibition of the lack of knowledge:

> Der wissenschaftliche Geist als das höchste [most abstract] Princip, die unmittelbare Einheit aller Erkenntniss kann nicht etwa für sich allein hingestellt und aufgestellt werden in blosser Transcendentalphilosophie, gespensterartig, wie leider manche versucht und Spuk und unheimliches Wesen damit getrieben haben.[2]

Nothing is more empty than such "pure" philosophy, which separates itself from concrete cognition as something which is inferior. The study of philosophy would then be no more than a waste of time, or at best a type of mental gymnastics.[3] Schleiermacher insists that "nur in ihrem lebendigen Einfluss auf alles Wissen lässt sich die Philosophie, nur mit seinem Leibe, dem realen Wissen zugleich lässt dieser Geist sich darstellen und auffassen."[4] Formal speculation separated from concrete empirical knowledge is empty and the "vermeinte Gegensaz zwischen Vernunft und Erfahrung, zwischen Speculation und Empirie [muss] vernichtet [werden] und so das wahre Wissen nicht nur möglich gemacht, sondern seinem Wesen nach wenigstens eingehüllt gleich mit hervorgebracht werde."[1] But it is equally erroneous in Schleiermacher's opinion to dispense with speculative systematization or methodological completion in favor of pure empiricism. "Jene ganze Methode die realen Wissenschaften aus dem Zusammenhang mit der Philosophie herauszureissen, und entweder auf willkürliche Theorien zu bauen, oder in blosse Empirie verwandeln zu wollen, sich unter uns wol längst überlebt hat."[2] This striving toward the interrelation of all scholarly disciplines in terms of their unity is the specific function of the university. It is not learning but cognition[3] which motivates the educational principles of the university, over and against "learning" in secondary education and specialized research in the academies of sciences.

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 559.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 561.

[3] _Ibid_.

[4] _Ibid_. Cf. pp. 567-568.

If the university as a whole is the institutional embodiment of the drive toward integrity, philosophy as a specific discipline or dialectics is the locus where the concentrated effort is made to specify by way of descriptive speculation the guiding principles embodied and operative in all other disciplines on the level of highest possible abstraction. In this sense dialectics is the highest discipline, where the common drive toward wholeness is self-consciously embodied and pursued. In the Dialektik the systematic urge is given official expression, guarding against arbitrary speculation and checking the fragmentation of scholarship, while acknowledging its essential relation to the total body of human inquiry, finding its final justification in it. *Dialektik* is not the system of knowledge; it is rather the method by which the interrelation or systematization of knowledge is to be aided.[1] It is the final effort of scholarship to be self-critical on the highest level of abstraction. It is formal and critical, while daring to provide speculative principles of integration. It does not claim finality for itself but insists that by the very nature of things its systematic closure, while necessary, is nevertheless only a tentative one. The aim of *Dialektik* is unity or relatedness, and not truth as such. The concern for truth is a broader one. *Dialektik* participates in the quest for "truth" insofar as unity is an aspect of truth, that is, of the nature of actuality; but specificity is as much an aspect of truth as relatedness, and disciplines other than the *Dialektik* concern themselves with it and hence with truth. *Dialektik* is *philosophia fundamentalis* or *Prinzipienlehre* not because in it we find the essence of knowledge, that is, not because in it we think, to speak with Hegel, the thoughts of God; it is *Fundamentallehre* because in it the most general foundations, applicable to and responsible to all disciplines or knowledge, are being specified. With Adolf Trendelenburg we could say,

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[1] Ibid., p. 572.

[2] Ibid., p. 628.

[3] Ibid., p. 603.

> Weil alle Wissenschaften insgesammt hier auf die Logik, dort auf die Metaphysik hinweisen . . . so wird diejenige Erkenntniss, welche die Wissenschaft in ihrem Wesen begreifen und Theorie der Wissenschaften sein will, die Metaphysik und die Logik gemeinsam umfassen müssen. Erst aus beiden Beziehungen lässt sich die innere Möglichkeit des Wissens verstehen und das Denken in seinem Streben zum Wissen begreifen. Man hat die Wissenschaft, welche die Betrachtung des Denkens und

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[1] *Supra*, pp. 49-50.

> Seienden als solchen einigt, mit Plato Dialektik genannt; wir nennen sie lieber . . . Logik im weiteren Sinne. . . .[1]

These words are descriptive of what Schleiermacher wished to present in his Dialektik, a philosophia fundamentalis as grundlegende Wissenschaft. The formal or speculative character of Schleiermacher's Dialektik is widely recognized, but it is often forgotten that this is only a relative dominance, which does not exclude the presence of and necessity for empirical elements.[2] To ask whether the speculative or the empirical is the essential starting point is to ignore the principle of parallelism which asserts the complex foundation of any beginning; it is the question of that philosophical position which asserts that unity requires simplicity. It can, however, be said that the very notion of parallelism, or better, relativity, is itself an empirical one; this means that space and time are regarded as metaphysical notions rather than subjective forms of intuition only. In Schleiermacher's case it expresses the rejection of a metaphysical bifurcation of actuality into two separate and absolutely different realms of actuality, one eternal and the other temporal only, just as it denies the complete separation of thought from being. Schleiermacher rejects the distinction between "transcendent" and "transcendental." For him the transcendental is the transcendent, that is, actuality is essentially one,[3] and the speculative principles expressive of unity in the microcosmic and macrocosmic sense are transcendental principles insofar as they are principles of methodological completion and in that sense transcendent. Metaphysically transcendence expresses the category of individuality, which means it is used methodologically as a category of differentiation, which by the very nature of individuality must then again be transcendental. Insofar as Schleiermacher does not attempt to go beyond empirical relativity, that is, insofar as he accepts rather than rejects the polar complexity of actuality, he is basically an empiricist and not a representative of the idealistic philosophy of identity. But insofar as he accepts also the internal relatedness or unity of the complexity of actuality and strives, at least speculatively, to specify it, he is a rationalist or an idealist.

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[1] Logische Untersuchungen, 2d ed. rev.; (Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1862), I, pp. 11-12.

[2] Supra, pp. 51-53.

[3] In this sense only could one call Schleiermacher a monist.

To judge the success or failure of Schleiermacher's efforts in terms of his success or failure in deducing plurality from oneness, misses the point insofar as his principal aim is concerned. While it may be an interesting study to investigate whether, given Schleiermacher's frame of reference, such deduction or demonstration can be attempted, it seems that Schleiermacher neither deluded himself to have achieved the solution of this ancient philosophical problem, or even more, whether he even wished to do so. If the specific concern with this problem is a center of philosophical inquiry, then Schleiermacher is not a philosopher, nor is his Dialektik very adequate. It is, however, another question whether Schleiermacher has treated the problem of relativity, that is, of relation, as well as he could have in all areas of his thought, given the insights available to him, or whether he stopped short of its fullest exploration.

The recognition of this dual foundation of Schleiermacher's thought, that is, of his empirical-rationalism was still well recognized by Georg Weissenborn[1] in his critique of Schleiermacher's Dialektik, while later interpreters tended more and more to stress the idealistic side in his thought; and if interested in his empiricism, they reduced his metaphysical empiricism to psychologism by an unfortunate concentration upon, and interpretation of, Schleiermacher's doctrine of feeling.[2]

In a later essay[3] Schleiermacher again indicates what he considers to be one of the basic errors of previous scholarship: to view everything under the antithesis of the One and the Many. This has caused a great confusion and led to misdirected efforts:

> Überall nämlich, wo um einen Gegenstand zur Anschauung zu bringen ein System von Begriffen aufgestellt wird, ist der Gegensaz von Einheit und Vielheit die herrschende Form, sei es nun, dass das Verfahren mehr so erscheine das die Vielheit unter eine Einheit gebracht, oder so dass die Einheit in eine Vielheit zerspalten wird. Ist ein Gegenstand nur als Einer vorgelegt: so ist unter der Form des Begriffes nichts von ihm zu sagen, als dass seine Erklärung aufgestellt wird; wie sehr aber und auf welche Weise das unter die Erklärung gehörige unter sich verschieden, also vieles, sein kann, das wird nicht ausgemittelt. Sieht man dagegen nur die Vielheit, so kann man zwar mit den Einzelheiten, aus welchen sie besteht, dasselbe thun wie dort; aber wie diese unter sich zusammen gehören, und von andern getrennt, also Eines sind, das kann nicht erhellen. Die wissenschaftliche Dar-

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[1] Darstellung und Kritik der Schleiermacherschen Dialektik (Leipzig: T. O. Weigel, 1847). Cf. infra, p. 94, N. 5.

[2] Infra, pp. 174-177.

[3] Über die wissenschaftliche Behandlung des Tugendbegriffes (Sämmtliche Werke, Div. III, Vol. II; Berlin: G. Reimer, 1838).

> *stellung unter dieser Form beruht also ganz auf der Gabe, Einheit und Vielheit zusammen zu schauen und in einander zu verwandeln.*[1]

Schleiermacher remarks that often the basic togetherness of unity and multiplicity is overlooked and a position emerges "welche nur Einheit überall sieht und die Vielheit für blossen Schein erklärt oder für Verworrenes und der Betrachtung unwerthes."[2] The other possible position is the one "welche nur Vielheit sieht und die Einheit für Schein erklärt oder für willkührliches Zusammenwerfen."[3] This onesidedness or arbitrary dissolution of the fundamental polarity must, in Schleiermacher's opinion, be avoided; thus, for instance, in reference to the concept of virtue he says:

> Nicht den allgemeinen Begriff der Tugend für sich und die Erklärungen der einzelnen Tugenden wieder für sich zu Stande bringen, sondern beide nur in Beziehung auf einander, so dass er [the philosopher] mit keinem allgemeinen Begriff der Tugend zu frieden ist . . . und so auch mit keiner Erklärung einer einzelnen Tugend. . . .[4]

It is Schleiermacher's aim to avoid this methodological and metaphysical onesidedness or exclusiveness, which leads either to the fragmentation of knowledge and reality or to a reductionistic philosophy of identity. Ontologically this means that for Schleiermacher spirit and nature cannot stand in absolute antithesis; epistomologically this means that ethics and physics, the two branches under which all knowledge can be subsumed, are mutually dependent and interrelated. The *Dialektik* attempts to designate speculatively in formal conceptual terms the formal conditions of the ontological possibility of the interrelatedness of reality, preserving both unity and diversity. As such it is metaphysical; but at the same time it is the locus for the development of general methodological principles, applicable to both ethics and physics and their subsequent subdivisions. As such it is logical. Insofar, however, as the Dialektik even as metaphysics purports to be no more than a speculative inquiry into the realm of possibility, spelling out the given togetherness of unity and diversity in formal terms, it is even as metaphysics cast in the form of logic.[1] Dialektik is a system insofar as it aims at the explication of unity without the exclusion of the reality of diversity. But it is not a system, if by the term "system" the claim is to be advanced that actuality has been grasped in its own pure medium, that is, pure thought. The Dialektik as system does not claim that through it actuality can be completely rationalized, that is, that actuality can be exhausted in terms of universality.

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 351-352. (Italics mine.)

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.* Cf. *infra*, pp. 83-84.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 353-354.

Unity for Schleiermacher remains a transcendent mystery, or we might say, the "why" of unity or order is not reducible to rational explanation; it is presupposition. It is as much a mystery as individuality or uniqueness! Neither is it non-rational as such, but rather unexhaustible because a living unity; both macrocosmically and microcosmically, unity or order is as much transcendent as immanent. The individual is in that sense the mirror of the universe, the ultimate reason of which, that is, the "why" of determination or specificity is inexplicable beyond itself as a given reality. Dialectics attempts to specify the fundamental order immanent in ethics and physics, "die beiden lezteren sich zur ersteren verhalten sollen, eine wie die andere, nicht aber auch Logik [or dialectics as Schleiermacher specifies] und Physik zur Ethik eine wie die andere, oder umgekehrt Logik und Ethik zur Physik."[1] While participating in the dialectical order, physics and ethics direct their attention toward the concretion of this order in particular individualities; they may concentrate on the problem of unity or interrelation or on the problem of diversity or distinctness, but whether primarily speculative or primarily empirical in their concern, both approaches encounter transcendence either in the microscopic individuality or in the macroscopic unity. The aporetic character of knowledge is evident in either case. To ignore this fundamental limitation, rooted in the inexhaustible character of living reality, leads, for Schleiermacher, to self-deception. But to reason from the aporetic character of knowledge to the necessity of absolute skepticism is equally deceptive. The insight of this self-limitation both in terms of the attainment of "absolute knowledge" and in terms of "no knowledge" at all, Schleiermacher has compressed and expressed in the principle of relative difference, or simply in the principle of relativity. We have therefore a systematic drive, consciously pursued in the Dialektik; and a concern for the particular, expressed in ethics and physics and their subdivisions in Schleiermacher. Dialectics relates to ethics and physics as form to matter; neither exists without the other, all are interrelated and interpenetrate; at best we can say that different concerns are dominant in them, which does not deny, however, their basic togetherness.[1]

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[1] Supra, p. 62.

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[1] Friedrich Schleiermacher, Über den Unterschied zwischen Naturgesez und Sittengesez (Sämmtliche Werke, Div. III, Vol. II; Berlin: G. Reimer, 1838), p. 398.

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[1] The *Dialektik* is omitted in Poul Jørgensen's schematization of Schleiermacher's "system of knowledge," "weil die Gedanken über das Wesen und die Aufgabe der Dialektik bei Schleiermacher nicht als eindeutige Grössen erscheinen. . . ." (*Die Ethik Schleiermachers*, p. 33, n. 63) It could be said that the *Dialektik* is not an "eindeutige Grösse" in the sense that it is not easy to capture its many facets in a simple formula. But it is not self-evident why coordination of its many aspects should be impossible. Jørgensen cites as incompatible the following descriptions of the *Dialektik*: "Kunst des Gedankenwechsels," "Darlegung der Weltanschauung aus einem Guss," "höchste Wissenschaft," "Ausdruck des gegensatzlosen Seins," "Totalität des Seins," and "Abbild des höchsten Wissens." The incompatibility of these descriptions is asserted, but not shown by Jørgensen. Our preceding examination of the sources, even those other than the *Dialektik* itself, suggest that a coordination of these terms is at least within the realm of the possible. Jørgensen seems to posit, contrary to Schleiermacher, the mutually exclusive character of *Wissenschaftslehre* and *Metaphysik*.

# CHAPTER III

# THE FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE AND PROBLEM OF SCHLEIERMACHER'S DIALEKTIK

The *Dialektik* has been called the key to the thought structure of Schleiermacher.[1] This analogy is misleading and it would be more proper to describe the *Dialektik* as a code which itself must be broken in order to become usable. Rather than eliminating the problems presented by Schleiermacher's thought, the *Dialektik* epitomizes them. Our effort to elucidate its fundamental structure and problem is an effort to find a key to its understanding.

The immediate point of contact in our approach to the *Dialektik* is provided by what would appear to be a central difficulty in the study of Schleiermacher's thought, namely, the divergence of scholarly opinion concerning the basic character of his thought. In spite of the existence of conflicting interpretations and judgments, we cannot assume that Schleiermacher research has been devoid of correct insights. The divergence of scholarly opinion suggests that an inquiry be made which accounts for the possibility of such widespread disagreement. The variety of opinion in the study of Schleiermacher must, therefore, be regarded as reflecting a fundamental ambiguity, if not contradiction, in the very structure of his thought. Jonas' attempt to exonerate Schleiermacher from the charge of pantheism cannot only be rooted in his attachment to his great teacher, but must reflect a genuine element in the thought of Schleiermacher himself. By the same token Halpern, who stresses the very point Jonas wants to eliminate, cannot be entirely mistaken.[1] Barth's insight into Schleiermacher's strong ethical concern cannot rule out Dilthey's and Brunner's stress of the mystical element.[2] What makes many of the interpretations of Schleiermacher less than adequate is not the absence of correct insights, but rather their radicalization. The attempt to systematize or unify his complex thought through the radicalizing of one component of his thought cannot be ours. We must accept the possibility that Schleiermacher's thought contains disrupting elements in spite of all of its organic unity. It is in this sense that the divergence of scholarly interpretations provides us with the immediate point of contact in our study of the Dialektik. By focusing upon the feature of ambiguity or possible contradiction, we may gain entry into Schleiermacher's thought, by way of elucidating the roots of this ambiguity. We are therefore concerned with the discovery of the continuous features of Schleiermacher's thought as well as with the discontinuous ones.

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[1] [C.] Sigwart, "Schleiermacher's Erkenntnistheorie," *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, II (Stuttgart: Verlag von Rudolf Besser, 1857), p. 271.

In his interpretation of Schleiermacher, Sigwart speaks of "Constructionsfehler" which "schliesslich in dem klaffenden

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[1] See Jonas' annotation to D, pp. 168-169, and the "Introduction" to HD.

[2] Infra, pp. 174-176.

Riss durch das ganze Gebäude sich rächen."[1] This basic dichotomy lies for Sigwart in Schleiermacher's separation of speculation and religion, because of which "die wissenschaftliche Form der dogmatischen Sätze sich rein negativ zu ihrem Inhalt [verhält].[2] He finds an unresolved dualism in the work of Schleiermacher, "Das Wissen ist ein in sich geschlossenes Gebiet. . . . Das relitiose Gefühl ist ein anderes Gebiet. . . . Beide sind ganz irrational gegen einander."[3] Sigwart's criticism can be summed up by saying that Schleiermacher has violated his own basic principle of construction, the axiom of relativity. We agree with Sigwart, but find that the nature of this violation is not explicated clearly and in some respects not even recognized in its depth.

Isidor Halpern in his study of the Dialektik also discovers a dichotomy in the structure of Schleiermacher's thought. In his view Schleiermacher has violated the strictly formal or epistemological character of the Dialektik through the introduction of theological elements. He finds that Schleiermacher after having elaborated the transcendental, presuppositional character of the absolute, which lies beyond the sphere of actual thought, proceeds calmly to discuss this absolute a se. Halpern regards this inconsequence, to say the least, as a common characteristic of German Transcendental Philosophy, to speak of that of which, according to one's own principles one cannot speak. He says, "Sie wirft gleichsam in die verbotenen Schattenreiche verstohlene Blicke und rechtfertigt sich vor sich selbst, indem sie das 'nicht wirkliches

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[1] "Schleiermacher's Erkenntnistheorie," p. 271.

[2] Ibid., pp. 270-271. [3] Ibid., p. 270.

Denken' nennt."[1] Schleiermacher, not satisfied with the accomplishment of his epistemological, formal task, gives in to the desire "das Transcendente in lebendige Anschauung zu verwandeln."[2] For Halpern this means "der philosophierende Theologe ist in ihm [Schleiermacher] noch mächtiger als der theologisierende Erkenntnisstheoretiker."[3] The intrusion of theological consideration disrupts the integrity of the Dialektik; the effort to go beyond the absolute as a formal, transcendental presupposition and to treat it as a "lebendige Anschauung" conflicts with his desire to retain the actuality of empirical reality. The program of joining together the relativity of actuality with the "lebendige Anschauung" of the absolute fails and a "tiefer Riss"[4] appears in the construction of Schleiermacher's system. Consequently, Halpern judges, "erreichte sein realistischer Sinn die lebendige Wirklichheit ebenso wenig, wie sein speculativer Sinn das Absolute."[5]

In his critique Halpern has pointed to the basic problem which permeates the structure of the Dialektik, and we might add the total complex of Schleiermacher's thought. But again the precise nature of the conflict is not grasped. The impression is given that the violation of the "monistic" principle is at the source of Schleiermacher's difficulties but the problem cannot be reduced to such simple terms. What Halpern would call the "dualistic" strand cannot be regarded as being basically alien to Schleiermacher's modes of thought. The principle of relativity does not permit the dissolution of the eternal contract between philosophy and religion; the solution of Hegel cannot be Schleiermacher's. But both Sigwart and Halpern have correctly circumscribed the basic problem of the dialectical structure, Sigwart by noting the apparent lack of fundamental relatedness between philosophy and religion, and Halpern by admitting a relationship, but judging the nature of it as improper.

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[1] "Der Entwicklungsgang der Schleiermacher'schen Dialektik," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, XIV, No. 7 (1901), 242-243.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 243.

[4] Ibid., p. 272.

[5] Ibid.

In the light of the above results of scholarship it is not surprising that Poul Jørgensen in his critique of Schleiermacher focuses upon the principle of relativity, declaring it to be a logical impossibility.[1] He too has discovered a fundamental disharmony in Schleiermacher's axioms. We cannot object to the truth of this observation, but we must reject his diagnosis of the problem. His assertion that the polarity of relativity "eine Unmöglichkeit ist und bleibt" and that "logisch kann ein 'sowohl-als auch' nicht gedacht werden, sondern hier muss ein 'entweder-oder' gelten," remains in Jørgensen's work simply an undemonstrated assertion.[2] But we do not wish to argue this philosophical point here. We can merely suggest that the question of relativity cannot be separated from the question of the nature of the relata. In the case of Schleiermacher, as Halpern already discovered, it is his conception of the nature of the relata which makes for the problematic structure of the *Dialektik* and not necessarily the principle of relativity. This means simply that Schleiermacher's use of the principle of relativity may be in question rather than the principle as such. The principle of relativity becomes an impossible doctrine only when we want to apply it, while at the same time exempting one of the *relata*, i.e. God, from its applicability. Insofar as Schleiermacher does exactly this, we must agree with Jørgensen's critique. Halpern, as already indicated, noticed the problematic point of transition in Schleiermacher's construction, that is, the movement from the transcendental, formal presupposition of the absolute to the conception of the absolute as a "lebendige Anschauung."

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[1] Die Ethik Schleiermachers, p. 80. For one formulation of this principle see infra, p. 83.

[2] Ibid.

The difficulties which face Schleiermacher in his speculative construction of the *Dialektik* have their origin in the juxtaposition of two equally fundamental, but conflicting insights. In accordance with the program of the *Dialektik*, Schleiermacher insists in the first version[1] of the *Dialektik* that

> anders als dass die Gottheit als transcendentes Sein das Princip alles Seins, und als transcendente Idee das formelle Princip alle Wissens ist, ist auf dem Gebiete des Wissens nichts von ihr zu sagen. Alles andere ist nur Bombast oder Einmischung des religiösen, welches als hierher nicht gehörig hier doch verderblich wirken muss.[2]

Juxtaposed to this insistence upon the strictly formal treatment of the transcendental ground of being and knowledge, we find the equally basic recognition that "das Bestreben, die transcendente Formel in eine lebendige Anschauung zu verwandeln, ist natürlich. . . ."[1] The problem of the Dialektik is posed by Schleiermacher's attempts to reconcile both these insights. In the earliest version of the Dialektik the problem is resolved rather simply, when Schleiermacher states that the content of the formal principle "God" or the "absolute" is supplied by the knowledge of the world and its increase. He puts it this way: "Wir sind im Bilden der lebendigen Anschauung der Gottheit begriffen, in dem wir an der Vervollständigung der realen Wissenschaften arbeiten."[2]

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[1] Written in 1811; cf. *D*, Beilage A.

[2] *D*, p. 328.

The same problem is restated in different terms by Schleiermacher in 1814:[3]

> Die Vorstellung, dass die Idee Gottes rein gehalten nur die Leere Einheit, also Nichts sein muss, und nur die Welt die volle Einheit sein müsste, ist schielend; Gott ist die volle Einheit, die Welt is die in sich eine Vielheit. Wodurch nichts ausser dem zusammen gehören beider gesezt ist.[4]

Here again the formal notion of God as a schema, i.e. "leere Einheit" is correlated with God as "lebendige Anschauung," i.e. as "volle Einheit." But the simple solution of 1811 does not seem to apply any more, for a distinction, though not separation, is made between God as the "volle Einheit" and the world as "die in sich eine Vielheit." The fundamental problem then, as it presents itself in Schleiermacher's formulation of the polarities which participate in the "eternal contract" is noticeable best in the question concerning the relationship of God to the world. He himself finds this when he states that it is most important to focus on this relationship, "Es gilt also . . . das Verhältnis zwischen Gott und Welt ins Auge zu fassen, worauf sich auch . . . alle speculativen Fragen reduciren."[1]

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[1] D, pp. 166-167.

[2] D, p. 328. Halpern notes this as expressive of Schleiermacher's basically pantheistic tendency, while Jonas in D, p. 168, finds that the earlier formulation is superceeded by the later ones.

[3] The version of 1814 constitutes the main body of D.

[4] D, p. 166.

Having abandoned his earlier solution Schleiermacher states the problem as he sees it in two canons. One, "Die Welt nicht ohne Gott, Gott nicht ohne die Welt"[2] which secures that "nicht die eine Idee durch die andere aufgehoben wird."[3] Two, "Beide Ideen sind nicht dasselbe"[4] which secures that the transcendental ground must be viewed as the "ursprüngliche" and not only as "die aus dem Zusammenfassen der Gegensäze entstandenen Einheit."[5] While these two canons circumscribe the problem and serve a regulative function, nothing of a substantive nature is contributed to the solution of the dilemma. We find a much keener, though finally unexploited, insight into the problem expressed in the following, "Eben deshalb sind Absolutes, Höchste Einheit, Identität des idealen und realen nur Schemata. Sollen sie lebendig werden: so kommen sie wieder in das Gebiet des endlichen und des Gegensazes hinein. . . ."[6] Here Schleiermacher seems to realize that the transformation of the formal principle of the absolute into a "living conception" of God, that is, God's participation in actuality, requires the subsumption of God under the principle of relativity. Yet he is not able to draw this conclusion, that is to say, he is not capable of applying his own principle of relativity consistently and thoroughtly. Rather than making this radical application of his constructive principle, he prefers to speak of God as a "living conception" in terms of a formal absolute; that is, he produces only a verbal but not a substantive transformation of the methodological principle of "God." Consequently we find him saying "wir haben das absolute immer nur an einem anderen,"[1] which means that all predications concerning God reflect merely the changing situation of the world, but have no reference to God as such. Our expressions are therefore inadequate, but inadequate because of their referent which is beyond predication. Their degree of adequacy can only be determined by establishing which expressions retain best the inexpressible character of God. Predications concerning God are in the final analysis meaningless, though perhaps satisfying. This situation is reflected in the Dogmatik in Schleiermacher's distinction between the dogmatical "Grundform" and the dogmatical "Nebenformen," which, as he writes to Lücke, are "streng genommen eigentlich überflüssig."[2] We conclude therefore that Schleiermacher did not succeed in transforming the formal principle "God" into a "living conception"; his verbal transformation which he mistakes for an actual one, is not a sufficiently strong base from which to proceed, and therefore we find a fundamental disharmony in his structure of thought. Contrary to Jørgensen, we find that the failure to apply the principle of relativity consistently and radically enough is at the root of Schleiermacher's constructive problems rather than this principle as such and *a priori*. The principle of relativity loses its potential usefulness when one of the *relata* in the polarities, i.e. God in the polarity God-World, is exempted from it. Having stated in brief the heart of the problem, we shall now examine Schleiermacher's fundamental structure and problem more closely.

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[1] D, p. 167

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] D, p. 168.

[5] Ibid.

[6] D, p. 158.

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[1] D, p. 159.

[2] Infra, p. 168.

The theme of Schleiermacher's dialectical program is a rather simple one, but the thematic execution is a complex and involved variation of this theme. This theme can be stated teleologically and problematically. If stated teleologically it can be described as the search for the absolute, that is, for the ground of knowledge or the transcendental ground. While correct, this formation does not bring out the distinct nature of this quest. It seems therefore, more appropriate, because more explanatory, to describe the theme of the *Dialektik* in terms of the problem which it is designated to treat, if not to solve. It would not be wrong to say that this problem is an empirical one. Schleiermacher is faced with the given actuality of diversity and unity, and he endeavors a speculative explanation of this given actuality. His effort is not to create the polarity of actuality, beginning with the abstract notion of relativity, but he rather develops his principle of relativity as a descriptive notion.[1] The dialectical program purports to be an investigation in the area of possibility rather than in the area of actuality. It wants to explain in speculative terms that which is given in actuality; it is therefore also an exercise in self-consciousness. While not attempting to deduce actuality from an abstract principle, it attempts to penetrate actuality with self-consciousness in order to provide an organon or tool for the acquisition of actual knowledge. It is in this sense that the *Dialektik* is "Kunstlehre" or method or "Wissenschaftslehre" rather than "Wissen des Wissens." It can therefore also be called an exercise in logic or an exercise in the area of speculative reasoning. The problem which the *Dialektik* intends to treat primarily is: how to retain polarity or relativity, that is, how to retain unity without denying the actuality of diversity or vice versa. It wants to explain in terms of possibility the actuality of an "eternal contract." The problem in the words of Schleiermacher can be put as follows, "Gegensatz des Allgemeinen und Besonderen: Letzteres das im Denken nicht rein Darstellbare, ersteres das im Sein nicht rein Gegebene. Die Auflösung: *Beide konstituieren die beides Asymptoten des Wissens*."[1] The actuality of antitheses and the actuality of wholeness is a given empirical datum, but the problem, as Schleiermacher sees it, is to find an adequate modus of expression for the puzzling phenomenon of integrity within individuality.[2] In simple terms Schleiermacher asks, what is the source of cohesiveness in a world which exhibits difersity? How can one account for the togetherness of antitheses, that is, for genuine relatedness? What makes an actual plurality out of an atomistic multiplicity? Can this problem be treated speculatively in any other way than by reducing the plurality of the world to simple identity or by simply accepting sheer discontinuity? The source of togetherness or togetherness itself is for Schleiermacher the transcendental ground or presupposition, the absolute. Thus the problematic approach converges with the teleological approach.

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[1] *Supra*, p. 55; cf. *infra*, pp. 93-94.

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[1] *HD*, p. 143. The *HD* version contains material not available in *D*. Halpern has incorporated the fragments gathered by Weiss in the appendix to his article, "Untersuchungen über Schleiermacher's Dialektik." (Italics mine.)

[2] *Supra*, pp. 64-65.

For Schleiermacher sheer identity and sheer multiplicity are equally unsound notions; both dissolve actuality as he views it. Simple identity is nothing but a formal abstraction, which if given ontological status destroys the order of the world. Both notions are a-cosmic.[1] Actuality as experienced is neither chaos nor simple identity, it is a "pluralistic cosmos." Chaos and simple identity are "Denkgrenzen"--"Asymptoten"--pure abstractions, but not thought proper. They are in this sense transcendental. Schleiermacher searches for the source of relativity, that is, for the ground of togetherness and separateness, which is the transcendental ground of knowledge and therefore also the ground of being. This transcendental ground or transcendent ground[2] is the presupposition of the possibility of knowledge, and Schleiermacher affirms this possibility. For him "faith in knowledge" is the "Princip alles philosophischen Strebens."[3] The whole enterprise of the Dialektik is based upon this principle. Without faith in a world, without faith in continuity within discontinuity, we cannot have knowledge. Therefore Schleiermacher can say, "Das absolut höchste Sein und Denken in seiner Identität ist nicht ein blosses Postulat, sondern es ist in jedem einzelnen Akt des Wissens das allein Reale und Gewisse."[1] Yet this transcendental ground when verbalized is a "mere formula"; "absolute unity" is the formula which designates the "Urquell des entgegengesetzten und gespalteten. Dies aber ist kein wirkliches Denken, weil alles Reale darin nur negativ gesetzt ist."[2] There can be no deduction of the plurality of actuality from the "transcendent formula,"

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[1] Supra, p. 65.

[2] Schleiermacher does not distinguish between "transcendent" and "transcendental"; "Man hat . . . einen Unterschied gemacht zwischen transcendent und transcendental, von dem wir aber ganz abstrahieren." (D, p. 38.)

[3] D, p. 33.

> Der Übergang von der blossen transcendenten Formel, von der absoluten Einheit des Seins zur Darstellung des Realen als Entwicklung des Gegensazes aus dem Absoluten, geschieht immer ebenso durch einen Sprung . . . ist also unzureichend.[3]

The absolute is the formula which expresses the "Zusammensein der Gegensätze"[4] upon which knowledge depends. Speculative philosophy or dialectics attempts to explicate the continuous structure[5] in a formal manner, its formalistic nature is therefore of the essence. While absolute identity and absolute diversity are the formal Denkgrenzen, the true nystery or transcendental ground is their togetherness, which if expressed becomes the transcendental formula, presupposed in all knowledge and formally sought in the dialectical program as the idea of knowledge. It is the Unconditioned because it is the very prerequisite of knowing. All particular actualities depend upon it, while it itself depends upon no single one, yet it could not be thought apart from the existence of the plurality of existence.

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[1] HD, p. 136.

[2] D, p. 472.

[3] Ibid.

[4] HD, p. 138.

[5] D, p. 387.

Though cautious in the application of the term "God," Schleiermacher does occasionally call this absolute ground "God." It is unfortunate that he does, for it leads him to the introduction of matters outside of the scope of the *Dialektik*, as first conceived.[1] But in the light of the above the following illustrates Schleiermacher's position; he can say and we can now understand, when he states,

> Gott ist kein Postulat, was gegeben werden müsste um reales Wissen wirklich zu Stande zu bringen. Man könnte gar kein reales Wissen haben, oder gar kein Mittel im einzelnen das Wissen vom Nichtwissen zu unterscheiden, und die Gewissheit Gottes wäre dieselbe, weil sie in der Idee des Wissens liegt.[2]

Therefore the explication of the *Dialektik* is not demonstration, because "das Erkennen Gottes aber ist das ursprünglich allem anderen zum Grunde liegende."[3] The absolute or God is therefore not only a regulative idea but also a constitutive one.[4] It is the presupposition through which dialectical thought can accomplish in the end no more than to show that its presupposition is a true presupposition, namely, that it cannot be conceptually captured. It is a formal constitutive condition for actuality but not an individual "thing"; it is a formal absolute. We can sum up the problem of the Dialektik in Schleiermacher's procedural or methodological canon: "Kein Gegensaz [ist] absolut, sondern nur relativ. Ein Denken, welches einen absoluten Gegensaz isolirt, stellt nichts wirkliches vor."[1] Or, put differently: "Der Satz des Widerspruchs ist wohl nur eine Limitation der allgemeinen Form des Zusammenseins der Gegensätze."[2] The Dialektik then, while moving from and toward the transcendental ground, explicates only the polarities of actuality under the guidance of the principle of relativity. Its constancy breaks down only when the final polarity "God-world" is reached.

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[1] The *Dialektik* was to be primarily *Wissenschaftslehre*.

[2] *D*, p. 320.

[3] *Ibid*.

[4] *D*, pp. 171-172.

[5] *D*, p. 335. (Italics mine.)

The method and the structure of the Dialektik is rooted in Schleiermacher's abiding trust in the actuality of the empirical world on the one hand[3] and his faith in the cosmic character of actuality on the other hand. The world as man confronts it is actual and not phenomenal in either the Platonic or Kantian sense. This trust is the trust in the actuality of individuality and particularity. Individuality and particularity retain a thoroughly positive quality and are not negated by either Spinoza's principle, determinatio est negatio, or by Hegel's reversal of it. But this trust in the actuality of the empirical world is not predicated upon the denial of the interconnectedness or relatedness of the empirical world. Schleiermacher assumes both, the actuality of individuality and the actuality of universality. The individual is a structured whole just as the world possesses structural integrity. Expressed in other words this means that for Schleiermacher individuality is not substantial but relative. Individuality does not exist simply as a substance, but is rather a particular integral constellation of relations in a common world. It emerges from the continuous structures of actuality and participates in them. The unity of actuality, and if we wish, the oneness of actuality, is affirmed as strongly as the actuality of individuality or particularity. We can call this trust the faith in the actuality of world. It is this faith which determines the method and structure of the _Dialektik_. Formally expressed this means that the _Dialektik_ is built upon the presupposition that relativity, no matter how undemonstrable, describes accurately the basic feature of actuality. Relativity points at the same time to the actuality of distinctiveness or _für sich sein_ and to the actuality of relatedness or _gemeinsam sein_, but it also designates the mystery of the togetherness of these polarities. It is in this last sense that it is the presupposition of the dialectical enterprise and its aim as the undemonstrable absolute of actuality.[1]

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[1] D, p. 335. (Italics mine.)

[2] HD, p. 138.

[3] Infra, p. 85.

This view of actuality is so fundamental to Schleiermacher that he does not even attempt to demonstrate it by deduction. He writes to Brinkmann concerning his philosophical position "indessen weissage ich mir freilich, dass ich gänzlich werde missverstanden werden, weil weder der Idealismus, noch die wirkliche Welt, die ich mir doch auch wahrlich nicht nehmen lassen will, ausdrücklich und förmlich deducirt worden sind."[1] We do not proceed toward the world from some abstract principle, but on the contrary, "wir sind an die Erde gebunden. Alle Operationen des Denkens, auch das ganze System unserer Begriffsbildung, muss darin gegründet sein."[2] He makes his trust in the actuality of the world abundantly clear, when he says, we cannot talk "als ob das endliche Sein ein Abfall vom Gott wäre."[3] He rejects Schelling's position[4] and denies that "das Sein als wirkliches sei ein Abfall vom absoluten, eine Verminderung desselben (im Emanationssystem wird diese [Verminderung] als eine allmählige gesezt und durch Abstufungen bis zur blossen Materie geführt). . . ."[5] If we do hold to such a position then "ist das Dasein Uebel, und der Tod (als solcher) Rükkehr, Seeligkeit."[6] But this is for Schleiermacher "ein inconsequenter Mysticismus, in welchem sich die Speculation von der Mühe der Anschauung zurükksehnt nach dem bequemen Treiben der Abstraction."[7]

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[1] _Supra_, pp. 55-56.

Schleiermacher's conception of time and space is therefore not surprising:

> Raum und Zeit sind die Art und Weise zu sein der Dinge selbst, nicht nur unsere Vorstellungen, welches aus unserer Hauptansicht des Wissens folgt, weil alles reale Wissen zugleich ein quantitatives ist. Beide Formen sind also in der Vorstellung sowohl als in den Dingen, und die Frage, welches von beiden sie seien, ist leer.[8]

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[1] __LB__, IV, p. 55.

[2] __D__, p. 333.

[3] __D__, p. 334.

[4] __D__, p. 166.

[5] __D__, p. 167.

[6] __D__, p. 334.

[7] __Ibid__.

[8] __D__, p. 335.

The question whether there is absolute space depends upon the hidden assumption that there is an absolute or "empty space," but according to Schleiermacher, "there is none."[1]

His trust in the actuality of the empirical world affirms individuality and particularity as the irreducible, given components of actuality. His faith in actuality as an interconnected whole affirms community and universality as equally basic characteristics of actuality. Therefore actuality can be described in terms of change and permanence: "Es ist also eben so wahr, dass das ganze Sein steht, als dass das ganze Sein in beständigem Fluss ist."[2] Both factors are required for adequate description, "die Welt ist also offenbar nur in beiden zusammen gegeben; jedes für sich ist halb und unverständlich."[3] Unity and diversity therefore require each other rather than exclude each other. Nothing expresses Schleiermacher's faith in the cosmic character of actuality more than his willingness to take up the dialectical task. The Dialektik searches for and attempts to explicate the "principles of philosophizing,"[4] and philosophy is "die innerste Tiefe der menschlichen Erkenntnis, weil sie die gemeinsame Begründung und den gemeinsamen Zusammenhang alles anderen giebt, und wer philosophiert, sucht diesen Zusammenhang und diese Begründung."[5]

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[1] D, p. 336. [2] D, p. 129.

[3] D. p. 130. Cf. "Am consequentesten hat Herakleitos der ephesische die Lehre durchgeführt, dass alles Sein in beständigem Fluss sei. Aber er hat doch feste Punkte angenommen, nur dass er sie untergeordnet hat und angesehen als Hemmung des Wechsels. Die Ansicht ist einseitig. . . . Wenn nichts beharrliches gesezt wird im Sein: so wird überhaupt nichts gesezt, denn alles verschwindet sogleich und das ganze Sein wird negativ; das positive bleibt bloss das denkende Ich. Weil aber das Denken schwindet: so schwindet auch das Ich, und so ist das ganze Sein eine blosse Negation." (D, p. 130).

[4] D, p. 2; cf. pp. 8 & 376. [5] D, p. 4.

The philosophical task depends upon the presupposition of a "common world"[1] of which particularity is an integral component. This view is expressed in the assertion that being or actuality "ist ein relativ auseinandergetretenes in allgemeinem Zusammenhang."[2] This means that

> jeder einzelne als solcher ist nur in der Identität und Differenz zu den anderen, und wie in der einzelnen Lebenseinheit beides in einander ist, so ist auch in jedem Act als einem Moment dieses Lebens. Daher ist in jedem Denken Allgemeingültigkeit und Besonderheit nur in verschiedenem Mass.[3]

Complete isolation just as complete identity are sheer abstraction;[4] "das gänzliche Auseinandersein kommt nicht vor. . . . Und hieran liegt die Autorization die Idee des Wissens festzuhalten. . . ."[5] Dialektik presupposes the actuality of a world[6] and all actual thought presupposes the "Zusammengehörigkeit der Dinge, in welchen die Gesammtheit des Seins ist und [die Zusammengehörigkeit] der Begriffsanfänge in welchen der Umfang des Denkens ist."[7]

The affirmation of the actuality of identity and difference, as the two transcendental roots of thought and actuality, provides the foundation for Schleiermacher's work. The problem emerges when they are to be affirmed at the same time, that is, when their togetherness is being claimed. This problem we have designated by the term "relativity." Relativity is the presupposition from which the Dialektik proceeds and which it attempts to demonstrate as a true presupposition.[1] This means that the Dialektik must describe all phenomena in terms of polarities while striving toward its aim, showing the irreducible nature of each pole, rejecting simplicity in favor of complexity as the basis of actuality. It attempts to describe actuality on the highest possible level of abstraction, bringing to self-consciousness the very structure of actuality. This accounts for its formalism. Life as Schleiermacher views it confronts him with the unity of antitheses, with difference and identity. Of these antitheses or poles Schleiermacher says, "Kein Gegensaz darf so construirt sein, dass er eine positive und negative Seite hat. Man ist dann aus dem Gebiete des Lebens heraus. . . . Dies wird leere Abstraction."[2] The focus of knowledge is life: "Besonders und vorn muss ausgeführt werden, dass das Leben das eigentliche Object des Wissens ist."[3] The Dialektik in Schleiermacher's "system of knowledge" corresponds to relativity as the overarching presupposition which holds the poles of identity and difference together. Just as relativity is a formal notion, so is the Dialektik when seen in its relation to physics and ethics. It is the formal presupposition of concrete knowledge ("des realen Wissens").

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[1] D, p. 490; cf. p. 71.

[2] D, p. 508. (Italics mine.)

[3] D, pp. 393-394.

[4] "Das Sezen einer absoluten Einheit des Seins und das Sezen einer absoluten Mannigfaltigkeit des Erscheinens ist kein Denken, da es weder Begriff noch Urteil ist; aber beides sind die transcendentalen Wurzeln alles Denkens und also auch alles Wissens." (D, p. 92).

[5] D, p. 395.

[6] D, p. 162.

[7] D, p. 497.

The dialectical structure attempts to elucidate the form of knowledge. The approach to knowledge can be made either from the side of dialectics or from the side of mathematics. By this Schleiermacher means that we can approach reality in terms of permanence or in terms of change. He employs the term "mathematics" because change indicates quantity to him, hence measurement. This term may be misleading, but it serves his purpose. In keeping with his assumption of relativity, that is, as used here in keeping with the assumption of identity and difference and their togetherness, Schleiermacher states,

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[1] Supra, p. 83.

[2] D, p. 355. (Italics mine.)

[3] HD, p. 240; cf. supra, p. 20.

> Die Idee des Wissens unter der isolirten Form des besonderen ist die Mathematik. In jedem realen Denken ist daher so viel Wissenschaft als darin ist Dialektik und Mathematik.[1]

All areas of knowledge therefore contain the universal, that is, the speculative element and the particular or empirical element as well. Methodologically, empirical knowledge precedes and makes possible the dialectical task.

> Wie das Denken technisch behandelt werden kann, das gewöhnliche verworrene Denken, was Erfahrung werden will, bestimmt muss geordnet sein. Diese innere Ordnung aber ist die Frucht der Mathematik, die also in sofern die Möglichkeit eines dialektischen Verfahrens bedingt, wie das empirische immer dem speculativen vorangeht.[2]

The absolute philosophical aim, that is, philosophy as "Weltweisheit" is the complete interpenetration of the empirical and speculative.[3] The Dialektik attempts to set forth the formal interpenetration of the empirical and the speculative, that is, their relativity, but it does not do this concretely or actually. Therefore it is method ("Kunstlehre") and "Transcendentalphilosophie." "Die Säze, welche die Dialektik als Kunst aufstellt, beziehen sich auf alles Wissen ganz allgemein."[1] All scholarly disciplines may focus on either identity or difference; respectively they will be more speculative or more empirical, but neither can escape involvement in the other. The *Dialektik* attempts to set forth the principles which will guide this relationship, its basic concern being to assist in the production of concrete knowledge; knowledge with all its specificity takes account of its relationship to all other forms of knowledge. The concern of the fundamental dialectic principle then is to describe modes of relations, to keep in unity "Fürsichgeseztsein" and the "Zusammensein."[2]

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[1] D, p. 309

[2] D, p. 312.

[3] D, p. 142.

For analytical purposes it is possible to distinguish within the *Dialektik* two separate concerns: (1) the concern with the transcendental ground as the formal presupposition of knowledge and being, that is, with relativity as the formal absolute, required as the foundation of knowledge and actuality; (2) the concern with the transcendental ground as the equivalent of the divine. It is this latter concern which Halpern regards as an intrusion, spoiling the integrity of the philosophical task.[3] The transition from the transcendental ground as the formal absolute to the transcendental ground as the living God leads to what in theological language is called the relationship of God and world. It is precisely at this point where Schleiermacher moves from one concern to the other that his difficulties appear. The evaluation of the Dialektik depends upon whether we regard his theological concern as a legitimate one or not. If not, then the battle with the problem of the relationship of God to the world is irrelevant. The solution to this problem is then already rendered in the first discussion of the transcendental absolute, that is, it is absorbed by it. The formal principle of the transcendental ground when transformed into the "living conception" of God becomes simply the totality of actuality or the world. Schleiermacher, while being led to this conclusion in the first version of the Dialektik (1811), rejects it subsequently. But it is for this reason that Halpern says of the Dialektik of 1814, "Sachlich ist diese Fassung die schwächste von allen, da sie mit dem Dualismus hervortritt, während ein Identitätssystem gegeben sein soll."[1] The solution which Halpern suggests, i.e., the reduction of relativity to identity, does simplify matters, but it happens not to be Schleiermacher's solution. The intrusion of the "dualistic" strand is not necessarily due to an unfortunate influence of Kant, as Halpern thinks,[2] but it expresses more likely Schleiermacher's conviction of the genuineness of religious phenomena. Beyond this it relates to his fundamental view of actuality as polar rather than simple. What Halpern views as dualism is really an expression of relativity or polarity. The aim of Schleiermacher is not "ein Identitätssystem." If we reject the mode of transition from the formal absolute to the living God suggested by Halpern, we must examine Schleiermacher's own efforts, determining the reasons for his failure to give adequate expression to his own ideas. We shall develop Schleiermacher's concern for the transcendental ground as the formal absolute before entering into a discussion of Schleiermacher's treatment of the transcendental ground as the divine.

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[1] *D*, p. 310.

[2] *D*. p. 312.

[3] *Supra*, pp. 71-72.

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[1] "Der Entwicklungsgang der Schleiermacher'schen Dialektik," p. 220.

[2] Ibid.

## The Transcendental Ground as the Formal Absolute

Schleiermacher's treatment of the transcendental ground as the formal absolute embodies his philosophical concern. The major part of the Dialektik is therefore devoted strictly to metaphysical and epistemological issues. In his discussion Schleiermacher assumes that there is knowledge and that knowledge presupposes the relationship of thought and being. The transcendental ground epitomizes and symbolizes these assumptions. If we ask what is the transcendental ground and what function does it serve in the Dialektik, the answer is: it is its presupposition and end. It is the beginning and the end, one justifying the other, bearing witness to the circular character of philosophical thought as Schleiermacher understands this character.[1] It is in this form that the theological notion of apokatastasis underlies the Dialektic. The aim of the Dialektik is accomplished when the presuppositional character of the beginning is justified. We must come to the realization that the formal absolute cannot be particularized either as a concept or judgment, but must emerge, as was assumed from the start, as the necessary ingredient of knowledge and actuality itself. The transcendental ground is absolute precisely because it is the prerequisite of knowledge itself. But because it is absolute, it is also formal, that is, it cannot be known or particularized. As the absolute it has no content, which would mean it is itself without antithesis, and therefore it is transcendent, "transcendent" meaning here no more than that it cannot be particularized. It is this that the notion of the formal absolute wants to convey.

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[1] "Der erste Kreis der Philosophie, dass man das Wissen kritisieren muss, bevor man weiss, der letzte, dass die formale Philosophie zugleich vor der realen hergeht und zugleich die reale beschliesst als letztes Resultat derselben." (HD, p. 46; see also D, p. 315.)

This formal absolute is a "given" which cannot be deduced. It is given with the very idea of knowledge, but by virtue of its absolute and formal character no concrete knowledge can be deduced from it. It is not the first principle in a deductive scale, but it rather makes a beginning possible.[1] As a given it is discernible with the polar character of actuality and through it we attempt in a formal, speculative manner to describe that which is actual in terms of possibility. The formal absolute emerges as an abstraction from actuality and attempts to be descriptive of it. We might also call it a pure abstraction. While presupposing it and moving toward it, the Dialektik cannot speak of it as such; it can only speak of the polarities of actuality for which the formal absolute is the ground or presupposition. While it makes the Dialektik possible, it does not tell tales as to how the Dialektik must actually be structured. Schleiermacher asserts,

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[1] Supra, p. 59.

> *Diese Grundvoraussetzung von der Zusammengehörigkeit beider Pole und der Beziehung jedes Etwas in dem einen, auf ein Etwas in dem anderen ist keines Beweises fähig. Wer sie anfechten will muss das Denken aufgeben; denn in jedem Denken geht er von ihr aus.*

The transcendental ground is therefore not an "erstes Wissen" from which the *Dialektik* or a system of knowledge can be deduced.[2] It is

> dasjenige, was wir uns nur als eines nothwendig anzunehmenden bewusst werden können, so dass uns die allgemeine Einheit des Seins hier völlig hinter dem Vorhang bleibt. Angegeben haben wir sie, aber nicht erklärt, und wollten wir sie erklären: so würden wir von unserem Wege abgehen und entweder poetisches oder rhetorisches aufstellen. . . . Also können wir auch nicht sagen, dass wir die Identität jener höchsten Differenz wissen, sondern wir sezen sie nur voraus zum Behuf des Wissens.[3]

Schleiermacher has no objection to calling this a notion of faith if this is meant to designate a certainty which "*der lezte Grund aller Thätigkeit ist*."[4]

Where does the *Dialektik* begin, if not with a first principle? It starts with reflection upon the actuality of knowledge.[5] The dialectical task presupposes that "ein anderweitig, also

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[1] *D*, p. 457. (Italics mine.)

[2] *D*, p. 35. Cf. pp. 19, 21, 484.

[3] *D*, p. 78.

[4] *Ibid*. (Italics mine.)

[5] *D*, p. 37; cf. p. 30. Sigwart writes, "Der bei aller dialektischen Formalistik doch rein empirische Ausgangspunkt, der Respect vor der lebendigen Gegenwart und ihrem unmittelbaren Bewüsstseyn der Protest gegen jeden Versuch, diesem ein höheres, es schlechthin aufhebendes Wissen gegenüberzustellen, dies ist der tiefste Unterschied Schleiermacher's von der idealistischen Philosophie, und dies hat ihn auch zum Theologen gemacht--oder vielmehr, weil er Theolog war, und in seiner ganzen Persönlichkeit das unmittelbare Leben nicht entbehren konnte, hat er es auch mit seiner sonst so scharfen und zersetzenden Reflexion nicht angetastet. ("Schleiermacher's Erkenntnistheorie," p. 293.) Cf. *supra*, pp. 64-65.

kunstlos, entstandenes Wissen vorhanden sei, in welchem das Verfahren könne beobachtet werden."[1] The Dialektik cannot and does not intend to produce concrete knowledge, it merely intends to bring to self-consciousness the features characteristic of knowing. Its purpose is, no doubt, to aid in further processes of knowing. It wishes to bring to self-consciousness, to make methodical, the procedure of knowing and in doing this, to present a "system of instructions."[2] The theory of knowledge succeeds the actuality of knowledge. Schleiermacher indicates this character of the Dialektik when he describes it as "Kunstlehre" or method; this means

> offenbar etwas ziemlich überraschendes, nämlich dass dasjenige, was wir als Gesez zum Wissen zu gelangen suchen wollen eigentlich nichts ist als das, wonach alle Menschen von selbst verfahren, nur das die Abnormitäten im natürlichen Prozess durch klares Bewusstsein über denselben weggeschafft werden. Was wir also als Kunstregel suchen muss auch Naturgesez sein, so dass auch hier gibt, was sonst überall, dass das Kunstwerk früher ist, als die Kunstregeln im Bewusstsein klar sind. . . .[3]

The movement from practice to theory involves speculation for, "der Übergang aus jener [unconsious use] in dieses [conscious use] ist also der Anfang der Speculation."[4] Method or "Kunstlehre" is "jede Anleitung bestimmte Tätigkeiten richtig zu ordnen, um ein Aufgegebenes zu erwirken."[5] Schleiermacher is quite conscious of the hazards involved in the construction of such an "instructional system." He guards himself against them by denying that he can give a presentation "welche für alle Zeiten ausreichte und auch im Raum überall hin sich verbreiten würde. . . ."[1] The particularity of even the *Dialektik* is rooted in the fact that in spite of unity in actuality there is difference.

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[1] D, p. 24.

[2] D, p. 21; cf. p. 482.

[3] D, p. 24.

[4] D, p. 446.

[5] D, p. 577.

Language has a space-time reference; therefore "[hat] jede Sprache von einer andern geistigen Eigenthümlichkeit aus eine andere Natur und Geschichte zu betrachten."[2] It applies to the *Dialektik* that "jedes speculieren muss auf Ethik und Physik hinaus und jede Erfahrung ebenfalls . . . und . . . keine Formel ist lebendig, wenn uns nicht der Umfang ihrer Anwendung auf dem Gebiet der sinnlichen Eindrükke mit vorschwebt."[3] For Schleiermacher "jede speculative Philosophie muss eine Ethik und Physik wenigstens machen wollen."[4] The *Dialektik*'s purpose is not "das Reale von dem Transcendenten abzuleiten,"[5] it is rather to be an organon or tool which can aid in the production of concrete knowledge, but not produce it by itself.[6] The *Dialektik* is concerned with the idea of knowledge, but not with concrete knowledge as such. Dialectical principles cannot tell us whether certain scientific data are correct or not.[7] The *Dialektik* as a whole reflects the strictly formal character of the transcendental ground; its principles can only be validated through concrete knowledge for apart from it they have no meaning.

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[1] *D*, p. 580.

[2] *D*, p. 581.

[3] *D*, p. 379.

[4] *D*, p. 25.

[5] *D*, p. 20.

[6] "Die Wahrheit entsteht nur aus dem Zusammentreffen des Bekannten realen Inhalts, z.B. für die Natur mit dem speculativen Geist. Die dialektischen Vorschriften können nicht die Wissenschaft hervorbringen, sondern nur leiten." (*HD*, p. 32.) This means that just as we cannot deduce physics from the *Dialektik*, we cannot deduce dogmatics from it either.

[7] *D*, p. 21.

From the above it might appear that the Dialektik is merely a form of logic, but this is true only to a limited degree. The Dialektik as a theory for scientific construction is strictly formal in its character, but it is also metaphysical because for Schleiermacher the order of knowledge depends upon the order of actuality.[1] The very notion of knowledge necessitates for Schleiermacher the relatedness of thought and being. He says, "Denn um richtig zu verknüpfen, kann man nicht anders verknüpfen, als die Dinge verknüpft sind, wofern wir keine andere Bürgschaft haben, als den Zusammenhang unseres Wissens mit den Dingen."[2] In this he expresses merely his transcendental presupposition, but we can find certain addenda to this presupposition in his assertion that "der nächste Grund zur Aufeinanderbeziehung von Denken und Sein in uns selbst liege. In uns selbst nämlich ist unmittelbar eine Itentität von Sein und Denken gegeben. . . ."[3] We find that man is both "denkendes Sein" and "seiendes Denken,"[4] and "die ursprüngliche Gewissheit der Dinge ist aber die ursprüngliche Gewissheit des Leibes."[5] No proof of this assumption is possible in principle, for such proof would be the same as to prove the transcendental presupposition. The Dialektik attempts to provide us with schemata or formulas descriptive of the "how" of actuality without necessarily presenting the "what" of actuality. To give the "how" of actuality prior to the "what" of it, means to present a speculative foreclosure, based upon the trust that there is unity or continuity in actuality.[1] Speculative inquiry does not yield a "Wissen des Wissens," on the basis of which we can forego empirical studies as insignificant or secondary. The Dialektik as "Wissenschaftslehre" depends for its beginning upon the givenness of knowledge and strives toward the increase of knowledge through the inquiry of physics and ethics.[2] It is not an aim in itself, "das heisst, es gibt keine Trennung des Wesens der Dinge von ihrer Erscheinung."[3] "Wissens des Wissens" comes only through the triad of dialectics, physics and ethics,[4] that is, through the interpenetration of the empirical and speculative, which is an infinite process because of the actuality of particularity, which signifies the dynamic and changing character of actuality. It is because of its dominant concern with structure or form, that the Dialektik is described by Schleiermacher as metaphysics in the form of logic.[5] It is not merely logic, just as it is not a metaphysical logic in the Hegelian sense, because it purports only to describe structures of being. But this description speculates on the most general forces of the process of concretion; it probes structures of possibilities, but not actual processes of concretion.[1] Thus it cannot emerge apart from concretion, neither can it exist by itself. Schleiermacher's conception of the Dialektik reflects the principle of relativity in the polarity of metaphysics and logics, with the stress being placed upon the logical pole.

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[1] Supra, p. 95.

[2] D, p. 7.

[3] D, p. 517; cf. 514.

[4] D, p. 460.

[5] HD, p. 101.

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[1] Supra, pp. 52-53.

[2] D, pp. 19-20.

[3] D, p. 99.

[4] D, p. 16.

[5] Supra, p. 55.

Just as the Dialektik as a whole reflects the "Duplicität des entgegensezten Primates"[2] or the indifference toward the priority of any one pole in an antithesis,[3] so does the internal structure of the Dialektik. The proposed dialectical task requires the development of comprehensive antitheses, descriptive of the totality of knowledge and being. In constructing and explicating these antitheses, Schleiermacher must show the mutual relatedness of the positive, antithetical poles in any given case; this means, the irreducible character of polarity must emerge.

## The Activities of Thought

The Dialektik contains a complex system of antithesis which need not be developed in detail for our purposes. It suffices to point out that Schleiermacher begins his treatment with an analysis of the nature of thought or knowledge. All knowledge is thought, though not all thought is knowledge.[4] Thought or knowledge can be exhaustively described by its two functions or components, the organic and the intellectual; or we might say knowledge has two poles, one physical and the other mental. For Schleiermacher "alles wirkliche bestimmte Denken ist also in das Zusammentreffen der Tätigkeit beider Pole eingeschlossen."[1] The organic activity is the source of multiplicity, the intellectual activity is the source of unity and plurality, "Was jede von ihnen beiträgt, lässt sich nicht isoliren, ohne das reale Denken zu zerlegen, also etwas zu erhalten, was für sich nicht nachgewiesen werden kann."[2] Without the duplicity of this activity we have only sheer determination on the one side and sheer undetermined multiplicity on the other side. In isolation neither activity is actual thought, for the intellectual function of thought must supply definiteness and the organic function of thought must supply life ("Belebung").[3] "Durch die erste wird jedes Ein Denken, durch die andre wird jedes ein Denken."[4] Thus Schleiermacher states, "Also wer überhaupt die Anschauung des Lebens will, muss diese Duplicität wollen."[5] The separation of these poles takes us out of the realm of actual thought, leaving us with two abstractions, absolute identity and chaos.[6] The transcendental ground is "die Voraussezung des Füreinanderseins beider Funktionen, und also auch dessen was sie beide repräsentiren, des Seins und des Denkens. Ursprünglich ist . . . uns beides als eins gegeben in unserem eigenen Sein; aber wir müssen diese Identität auch voraussezen als Resultat der Totalität des wirklichen Denkens. . . ."[1] Thought can therefore be described in a threefold manner: (1) thought proper in which the intellectual activity predominates, (2) perception in which the organic activity leads, (3) intuition in which we postulate an equilibrium of both activities of thought. The functions of thought symbolize the concern for universality on the one hand and the concern for particularity on the other hand. Intuition in its purity is an abstraction, for in actuality we find only the oscilation between thought proper and perception, but never their actual equilibrium.[2] Given these two functions of thought, we must affirm the relativity of knowledge, since through the organic root of thought particularity is introduced as an essential component of knowledge.[3] The process of knowing by virtue of its two functions is of necessity an infinite one, since the organic root as the source of particularity is also the source of change, neither particularity nor the change which emerges from it can be exhausted. Absolute knowledge remains therefore an ever receding aim, but becomes never a possession.[4]

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[1] "Jeder hypothetische Gedanke endlich bezieht sich auf ein Sein, und wir sezen eine mögliche Übereinstimmung. Aber so lange wir sie nicht als wirklich sezen, ist auch kein Wissen, sondern nur ein Verfahren, das zum wissen führen soll." (D, p. 51.)

[2] D, p. 454; cf. pp. 492-494.

[3] D, p. 67.

[4] D, pp. 39-40.

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[1] D, p. 387; cf. pp. 498 & 61.

[2] D, p. 63.

[3] D, p. 64; cf. pp. 475 & 455ff.

[4] D, p. 64.(Italics mine).

[5] D, p. 77.

[6] D, pp. 388-389.

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[1] *D*, p. 500.

[2] *D*, pp. 61-62; cf. pp. 501-502.

[3] "Steht nun das individuelle in gar keiner Beziehung zur Idee des Wissens? Das müssen freilich alle behaupten, die nicht ausgehen von dem Wissen als Thatsache in den einzelnen, sondern vom Wissen schlechthin, weil sie das Einzelwesen als solches für schlechthin zufällig und alles was von da ausgeht für Unwissbar halten. Aber was sie so von der Idee des Wissens ausschliessen, müssen sie nachher durch eine Hinterthür doch wieder hereinlassen, und so sollten sie mit uns nur behaupten, dass sich das individualle nicht gar nicht sonders nur auf andre Weise auf die Idee des Wissens beziehe, als das universelle." (*D*, p. 71.)

[4] *D*, p. 196.

### The Modes of Being

The process of thought is described in terms of its two antithetical activities, which are rooted in actuality. The corresponding antithesis in being is the antithesis of the ideal and the real.

> Da nun die Vernünftthätigkeit [intellectual activity] gegründet ist im idealen, die organische aber als abhängig von den Einwirkungen der Gegenstände im realen: so ist das Sein auf ideale Weise eben so gesezt wie auf reale, und ideales und reales laufen parallel neben einander fort als Modi des Seins.[1]

The unity of the ideal and the real is the transcendental presupposition which cannot be grasped in thought or knowledge, but it is presupposed for the purpose of knowledge. The assertion that both modes are parallel to each other is used to indicate that neither of them can be reduced to the other; the parallelism of the modes of being describe the duplicity or polarity of actuality, but must not be used for speculation concerning the abolition of polarity in an absolute substance.[1] Insofar as the terminology which is used to describe the polarity of being is concerned, Schleiermacher declares, "Die Terminologie ist gleichgültig; diese aber ist die einfachste vom Haupttypus der Denkfunktionen hergenommen."[2] The modes of being, "ideal" and "real," do not indicate either a dualism[3] or an absolute identity of substance in which they vanish. The sole point of this formulation is to retain unity with polarity, no matter how inexplicable it may seem to be.[4] Schleiermacher's description emerges from the basic presuppositions which guide him, according to which neither the actuality of difference nor the actuality of unity can be rejected. He does not answer or deal with the question of the "why" of unity in antithesis; he cannot conceive of actuality as dualistic,[5] but it is equally impossible for him to deny the actuality of difference for the sake of unity. The transcendental ground as a formal absolute is strictly outside the realm of knowledge. Duplicity or polarity is not derived from oneness; in fact, Schleiermacher ignores or refuses to discuss the philosophical problem of how the many can be deduced from the one.[1] It seems an oversimplification to conclude from Schleiermacher's position that he did not succeed in escaping dualism because he was unable "die lebendigen Unterschiede der wirklichen Welt aus seinem Absoluten zu erklären."[2] Criticism of this type ignores Schleiermacher's basic position, and assumes that the problem must be reduced to either the problem of difference or that of identity, while Schleiermacher wants precisely to avoid this "either-or" thinking. It is another question whether he successfully executed his task and whether he did it in the best manner.

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[1] *D*, pp. 75-76. This particular formulation of Schleiermacher has been used to relate him closely to Spinoza. His use of the terms ideal and real as the modi of being and their parallelity does remind one directly of Spinoza's formulation in the *Ethics* (Pt. II, propositions 1 and 2) where the attributes of thought and extension are used to describe substance. Likewise we find that the parallelity of the modi of Schleiermacher reminds us of Spinoza's dictum, "ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum"(*Ethics*, Pt. II, proposition 7). But this affinity in expression cannot be interpreted as an identity of substance. This is the case here as it is in reference to the terminology used in the description of the functions of thought. Schleiermacher seems to have repeated what Kant said, "Soviel scheint zur Einleitung oder Vorerinnerung nöthig zu sein, dass es zwei Stämme der menschlichen Erkenntniss gebe, die vielleicht aus einer gemeinschaftlichen aber uns unbekannten Wurzel entspringen, nämlich Sinnlichkeit und Verstand durch deren ersteren uns Gegenstände gegeben, durch den zweiten gedacht werden." (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft* [1st and 2d editions; Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1956], pp. 58-59.) Or, "Der Verstand vermag nichts anzuschauen, und die Sinne nichts zu denken, nur daraus, dass sie sich vereinigen, kann Erkenntniss entstehen." (*Ibid.*, p. 95.) The indebtedness of Schleiermacher to Kant need not be disputed, but here again simple identity of substance cannot be postulated because of an affinity of terminology or formulation.

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[1] D, pp. 76-77. Cf. supra, pp. 62-63.

[2] Ibid.

[3] "Inconsequenzen sind die Frucht von dem absoluten Gegensätze von Geist und Materie," GP, p. 280.

[4] Cf. on this Weiss, "Untersuchungen über Friedrich Schleiermacher's Dialektik," LXXIV, pp. 66-68.

[5] "Es ist unmöglich sich den Urgrund des Seyns und des Wissens dualistisch zu denken." (Ibid.; Weiss quoting Schleiermacher.)

## The Forms of Knowledge and the Boundaries of Knowledge

The process of knowing takes place in two forms, by the formation of concepts and judgments. Both forms are interdependent. Concepts require determination through predication, that is, they require judgments. Judgments equally are in need of determination, that is, they must have a referent or subject in order to attain specificity. In either case the process of concept formation and judgment formation moves from indetermination to determination. Consequently we find that two possible boundaries delimit the formation of concept and judgment, one lower and one upper. The lower boundary is constituted by minimal determination and the upper boundary by maximal determination. The lower boundary may also be described as the minimal union of the organic and intellectual activity and the upper boundary as their maximal union.

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[1] "Die Zweiheit selbst wird empirisch [von Schleiermacher] aufgenommen, sie wird wohl auf eine Einheit als Vorausgesetzte Grundlage reducirt, aber nicht aus derselben erklärt." (Lipsius, "Studien über Schleiermacher's Dialektik," p. 31.)

[2] Lipsius, *ibid.*, p. 61; cf. "Das durchaus auf eine monistische Weltbetrachtung angelegte System löst sich also schliesslich in einen absoluten Dualismus auf, welcher die beiden Kantischen Stämme aller Erkenntniss als zwei einander schlechthin ausschliessende metaphysische Principien nebeneinander hat." (*Ibid.*, p. 62.) Cf. Julius Schaller, *Vorlesungen über Schleiermacher* (Halle: Lippert und Schmidt, 1844), pp. 166-171; and Weissenborn, *Vorlesungen über Schleiermacher's Dialektik*, p. 269.

The concept describes actuality as being, that is, statically. The judgment descibes it as a process of interaction, that is, dynamically. At the lower boundary of concept we have the multiplicity of distinct concepts, which means we have with a maximum of separation a minimum of determination. At the upper boundary of concept and multiplicity of distinct concepts is gathered up into one concept, absolute being, which means we have arrived at the maximum of determination. At the lower boundary of judgment we have the multiplicity of predicates, which means we have a maximum of togetherness with a minimum of determination. At the upper boundary of judgment the multiplicity of indetermined predicates have found their referent, the absolute subject, which means we have again arrived at the maximum of determination. The lower and upper boundaries of concept and judgment coalesce, since the difference between them reflects merely the difference of focus in our apprehension of actuality. The multiplicity of concepts represents maximal separation or particularity with a minimal togetherness or universality. The multiplicity of predicates reflects maximal togetherness or universality with minimal separation or particularity. In absolute being and in the absolute subject we have come to the maximal union of particularity and universality, that is, we have arrived at complete determination.

In the above description we have come very close to leaving the sphere of concept and judgment, because we were approaching on either side absolute multiplicity and absolute identity. But in the delineation of the Begriffsgrenzen and Urteilsgrenzen this must be avoided. The lower and upper boundaries of concept and judgment can be designated as the immanental boundaries, which are never actually reached and could therefore also be called transcendental boundaries. But they are not transcendental boundaries in the sense that they transcend the realm of concept and judgment by necessity. The polarity of actuality is not dissolved at either boundary line. Having reached the boundaries of knowledge, we have reached the boundaries of the world, but not the absolute as the transcendent ground, for we have not left the realm of relativity itself.

If we proceed beyond the boundaries of concept and judgment we can reach what might be designated as the boundaries of thought (Gedankengrenzen) or the transcendent boundaries.[1] This step necessitates the breaking of the polarity of actuality, and we find ourselves confronted at the lower boundary of thought with the notion of chaos, or sheer indetermination and multiplicity and at the upper boundary with the notion of sheer identity devoid of all determination. But here again we have not reached the absolute which is the ground of knowledge and being, we have merely postulated two abstractions, which cannot serve as the transcendental presupposition. Neither one of these abstractions is rooted in actuality, nor can either of them adequately describe actuality.[1]

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[1] D, p. 92.

## The Forms of Being and the Boundaries of Being

Concept and judgment as forms of thought or knowledge refer to being which must parallel the description of the structure of thought. Being can therefore be characterized either statically or dynamically for "es ist also ebenso wahr, dass das ganze Sein steht, als dass das ganze Sein in beständigen Fluss ist."[2] Viewed statically, being can be described as a system of power and manifestation; viewed dynamically, it is seen as a system of cause and effect. Power and manifestation just as cause and effect are correlative and inseparable. We can only speak of power when we have its manifestation, and we have only a cause when we have an effect. Power indicates also self-action or freedom, while cause refers to interaction or necessity.[1] If we grade being in terms of these polarities, we find at the lower boundary of the scale the multitude of particular manifestations and effects, which means being in terms of difference. At the upper boundary we have the maximal power and the maximal cause, which means we describe being by way of unity. Thus we can treat being as a system of substances or as a system of causalities, both of which describe actuality, once in terms of permanence and then in terms of change. The immanental boundaries of thought are reduplicated in the immanental boundaries of being. Highest power or substance is in the totality of its manifestation and vice versa. Highest cause is in the totality of effects and vice versa. We can therefore say, "Alles endliche Sein geht also eben sowol auf in dem System von Ursachen und Wirkungen, als in dem System der substantiellen Formen, und es ist dasselbe Sein, welches der Form des Begriffs und welches der Form des Urtheils entspricht.[2] Both systems require each other, just as concept and judgment presuppose each other, "Die Welt ist also offenbar uns in beidem zusammen gegeben; jedes für sich ist halb und unverständlich."[3]

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[1] Schleiermacher's treatment of the boundaries of concept and judgment and their relationship to the transcendental ground or absolute is confusing, particularly the terminology which he employed. The question remains open, insofar as the treatment of Schleiermacher is concerned, whether we must say that he himself was confused or whether we are simply dealing with lack of precision in terminology. We find that Schleiermacher is not able to delineate the distinction between Begriffsgrenzen and Urtheilsgrenzen and Gedankengrenzen clearly. At points he makes it appear as if the immanental boundaries coalesce with the transcendental boundaries, and that in reaching the notions of absolute being and absolute subject we have come to the transcendental ground. But when we realize that absolute being and absolute subject, contrary to D, paragraph 183, p. 113, are said to be the equivalent expressions for the boundary of being as stated in D, paragraph 200, pp. 134-35, then we must assume that in the discussion of the boundaries of concept and judgment we have not reached the transcendental ground. Given this ambiguity we have reconstructed the material in a manner which seems consonant with the basic structure of the Dialektik. Cf. Jonas' notes in D, pp. 115-16 and pp. 144-46. See also Lipsius, "Studien über Schleiermacher's Dialektik," pp. 46-47.

[2] D, p. 129.

If we proceed beyond the immanental boundaries, which circumscribe being as natura naturans and natura naturata, we come to the transcendental boundaries at which point we again break the polarity which characterizes actuality both as thought and being.

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[1] D, pp. 420-21.

[2] D, p. 127.

[3] D, p. 130; cf. pp. 128-129.

We then arrive at the abstract notion of chaos, that is, absolute difference, and at the abstract notion of oneness, that is absolute identity. Neither the immanental boundaries nor the transcendental boundaries have brought us to the transcendental ground as the formal absolute. Highest power and highest cause cannot be thought apart from the totality of manifestations and effects; they are therefore not absolute but subject to relativity. They signify the system of correlation, and are not its ground. "Absolute identity" whether viewed as "absolute power" or "absolute causality," both terms being improper in the strict sense, expresses absolute self-identity, but not the togetherness ("Füreinandersein") of poles in the unity of polarity. They are not the transcendental ground of knowledge and being, for instead of being the absolute foundation of relativity they abolish relativity. Hence it is proper to say that the analysis or description of the forms of thought and being in their sequential progression toward their boundaries shows that the transcendental ground is beyond our grasp, revealing its presuppositional character as the absolute foundation of actuality. In the treatment of the forms of thought and being, we have circumscribed the idea of the world, or the terminus ad quem as the principle of the actuality of knowledge. This description presupposed the terminus a quo or the principle of the possibility of knowledge, which itself, while the foundation of knowledge, could not be an object of knowledge.[1] The transcendental ground as an absolute is a formal notion, designating formally that which is given actually, i.e., the unity with antithesis, or to put it another way, the absoluteness of relativity, by which the actuality of particularity and universality as equally fundamental characteristics of actuality is asserted. It is the ground of everything which is actual, without discrimination, be it "good" or "evil." It is itself not a principle of discrimination, though it is the ground of discrimination. The transcendental ground is therefore not a religious or theological notion, but rather an epistemological, and for Schleiermacher, therefore a metaphysical formula or schema. By its very definition it is "transcendent" and "unknowable," that is, it is an absolute.

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[1] D, p. 164.

What has Schleiermacher accomplished in his discussion of the transcendental ground as the formal absolute? He has shown that knowledge is restricted to the sphere of relativity and that the absolute accounts formally for the possibility of knowledge. As the immanent ground of knowledge the absolute cannot become itself knowledge; the transcendental ground is absolutely transcendent because it is absolutely immanent. The absolute is therefore not to be separated from actuality as we encounter it, but is rather the absolute form of actuality, that is, relativity or the principle which asserts that difference and identity, both equally actual, constitute in their togetherness or duality the shape of actuality. The formal absolute, as Schleiermacher conceives of it, cannot be identified with either the whole of actuality as such, that is, with the sum of its parts nor with abstract oneness. The whole, whether conceived as causality or as power, is subject to relativity; oneness, on the other hand, eliminates relativity. Thus neither of the two notions fulfills the requirements set for the transcendental ground. We are left with a formal principle of which nothing but absoluteness can be predicated. The difficulty with this position becomes apparent when we wish to escape its deadly formalism, which makes it appear that much of what Schleiermacher has to say is sheer sophistry. Schleiermacher faces up to this difficulty when he feels compelled to introduce the notion of God into the formalistic scheme of the Dialektik.

## The Transcendental Ground as the Divine

Schleiermacher finds it as necessary to assert the absoluteness of the transcendental ground as to claim, "soll nun der transcendente Grund gedacht werden, so ist es schlechthin unmöglich, ihn als ein Totes zu denken."[1] The inevitable question arises, is it possible for Schleiermacher to transform the transcendental ground in its absoluteness, which is embodied in the epistemological and metaphysical presuppositional formula, into a living conception? And if possible what is the modus operandi employed by which this task is to be accomplished? Schleiermacher does not doubt the necessity of the task, but he is less firmly convinced of its possibility, or at least he is conscious of its difficulty. The necessity of the task rests upon Schleiermacher's conviction that the transcendental ground in its absoluteness or, as he also calls it, the absolute must be co-terminous with the notion of God or with the transcendental ground as a living conception. He states very simply, "Nur aus Missverstand hat die Ansicht entstehen können, als ob Gott etwas anderes sei als das absolute."[1] He does, however, recognize that both terms originate in different areas of concern: God is "der ursprünglich religiöse Ausdruck," while the absolute expresses "das speculative Streben,"[2] but their referent is assumed to be identical. The dilemma which Schleiermacher faces in the effort to transform the transcendental ground in its absoluteness into a living conception, that is, to go beyond the presuppositional formula or schema is described by himself. He says to attempt this, that is, "nach einer anderen Art der Existenz des Absoluten fragen heisst in das absolute Nichts gehen, und [das Nichts] ist das eigentlich Transcendente. Es wird notwendig jeder Versuch dieser Art indem er Erweiterung sein will, Beschränkung."[3] Speculation has produced a formula, but religion demands a living God and therefore a living conception, but to go beyond the formula leads to the relativization of the absolute. We can therefore say that speculation and religion share a common dilemma, if the absolute and God are co-terminous; one has no access to its referent because predication ceases in absoluteness, the other has no access because its predication relativizes. Neither of the two approaches is preferable: one preserves absoluteness, but loses "life"; the other gains "life" but loses absoluteness.

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[1] D, p. 530.

The problem which Schleiermacher created for himself depends upon two assumptions, neither of which is really incumbent upon the structural force of the Dialektik. The transcendental ground which is posited as a presuppositional formula in the Dialektik describes the togetherness of identity and difference, that is, it describes the phenomenon of relativity. Relativity in this sense is the absolute presupposition upon which the Dialektik is predicated. Without it we have complete chaotic difference and abstract identity. The absolute which Schleiermacher has posited must express this formula, i.e., relativity, and not abstract identity. To treat this presuppositional formula simply as the absolute means for Schleiermacher to treat it as something other than it is in the Dialektik, namely the presuppositional formula. The simple absolute or abstract identity cannot sustain the dialectical task, for it is a caput mortuum. Absoluteness qua absoluteness yields nothing. Upon it we could not build the Dialektik and certainly the very idea of a living conception of it is nonsensical. The notion of abstract identity is not only not required by the Dialektik, but in contradiction with it. Nevertheless we find that Schleiermacher, at the point of transition from the transcendental formula to the notion of God, treats the transcendental ground simply as the absolute. Why? No reason for this metamorphosis can be adduced from the Dialektik itself, but it seems that Schleiermacher feels compelled to equate absoluteness and God. God must be the absolute, the transcendental ground must be identical with God, and suddenly the transcendental ground which was posited as the presuppositional formula becomes the absolute and the structure of the Dialektik is being ruptured.

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[1] D, p. 527; cf. pp. 528 & 533. [2] D, p. 475.

[3] HD, p. 223.

The transcendental formula of the Dialektik can be transformed into a living conception, and if this formula is to be identical with God, we can escape through this transformation the formalism of the *Dialektik*, which though not disturbing to the speculative mind, is not satisfactory to the religious mind. Schleiermacher pursues this course early in the development of the *Dialektik*, but shrinks from its consequences as theologically unacceptable to him.

In the version "A" of the *Dialektik*, that is, in the draft of 1811, we find Schleiermacher much more concerned with preserving the integrity of the dialectical task and much less open to the introduction of religious concerns. Identifying the transcendental formula with God, he asserts,

> anders als dass die Gottheit als transcendentes Sein das Princip alles Seins, und als transcendente Idee das formelle Princip alles Wissens ist, ist auf dem Gebiet des Wissens nichts von ihr zu sagen. Alles andere ist nur Bombast oder Einmischung des religiösen, welches als hierher nicht gehörig hier doch verderblich wirken muss.[1]

The formal absolute and God are co-terminous and speculation as well as religion come equally to nought before this absolute and final aporetic formula. The formulation of the transcendental formula exhausts the treatment of the absolute or God *a se*. The transformation of the formula into a living conception leads us away from "aseity," which is identical with sheer "formality." But Schleiermacher is willing to treat God as a living conception. He states simply, "Wir sind also im Bilden der lebendigen Anschauung der Gottheit begriffen, in sofern wir an der Vervollständigung der realen Wissenschaften arbeiten."[2] This means that the movement from the formula of the absolute or from God to a living conception is the movement from God to the world. God and formula are equivalent terms, their concretion is the living organism of the world. Apart from the formula of the absolute

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[1] *D*, p. 328.

[2] *Ibid*.

> giebt [es] keine isolirte Anschauung der Gottheit, sondern wir schauen sie uns an in und mit dem gesammten System der Anschauung. Die Gottheit ist eben so gewiss unbegreiflich als ihre Erkenntniss die Basis aller Erkenntniss ist.[1]

The transcendental formula comes to life in the "Totalität des einzelnen"[2] and because of this we can say,

> Unser Wissen um Gott ist also erst vollendet mit der Weltanschauung. Sobald von dieser eine Spur ist, finden sich auch die Grundzüge von jener ein. In dem Maass als die Weltanschauung mangelhaft ist, bleibt die Idee der Gottheit mythisch. Oder wenn sie doch abgesondert von jener unter die strenge Form des Denkens gebracht werden soll, wird sie unhaltbar.[3]

We can therefore say that "das absolute und das totale Zusammensein aller einzelnen Dinge eins und dasselbe ist."[4] In order to avoid confusion we must make a clear distinction between the absolute _a se_, which is the transcendental formula and not the _natura naturans_ or "höchste Kraft," and the absolute as a living conception, which is the organism of the world. This distinction must be made even though Schleiermacher himself seems to ignore it at points, giving the appearance as if the absolute is not the formula but the _natura naturans_, expressed in the _natura naturata_.

Schleiermacher can designate by the term God either the formula of the absolute or the living conception of this formula. If he does the first, God is no more than the formal epistemological and metaphysical presupposition, that is, an abstract formula or schema, and traditional theological terminology with reference to it can only be designated as mythology or rhetoric. If he chooses the second alternative, God and world are simply equivalent terms and knowledge of God is knowledge of the world. Here too, theological terminology becomes deceptive if it ignores the fact that it is a modification of piety. In either case the question concerning the relationship of God to the world is strictly speaking meaningless. God as formula is related to the world in the same manner as the transcendental presupposition is related to actuality. There is no "actual" relationship between transcendental formula and actuality, the relationship is a purely logical one. To discuss the relationship of God to the world beyond the discussion of the relationship of the formula of the absolute to actuality would not only be a reduplication, but issue in confusion. Schleiermacher's theologizing effort to discuss the relationship of God to world separately from the problem proper of the Dialektik seems therefore out of place.[1] God as the living conception is identical with the world; the question of the relationship of God to world should therefore not even arise. Thus we can say that for Schleiermacher theology is strictly speaking cosmology, if more speculative, or the total body of scholarly inquiry, if more empirical, for "das absolute ist nichts ohne diese Totalität des realen Wissens, und diese nichts ohne jene. Die Identität von jenem muss die Totalität von diesem vermitteln, und die Realität von diesem muss die Identität von jenem erfüllen."[1] We can say that Weltaufgeschlossenheit is Gottaufgeschlossenheit, the life of God is the life of the world. This conclusion need not disturb Schleiermacher the dialectician, but it does disturb Schleiermacher the theologian, and we find him searching for an escape from the power of his own logic.

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[1] _D_, p. 322.

[2] _D_, p. 319.

[3] _D_, p. 322.

[4] _D_, p. 325.

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[1] D, pp. 328-331. Cf. Halpern, "Der Entwicklungsgang der Schleiermacher'schen Dialektik," p. 218.

Beginning with the draft of 1814,[2] Schleiermacher attempts to modify his earlier position. The changes which he proposes do not basically alter the fundamental structure of the Dialektik. They constitute merely an expansion. What is changed is the treatment of the problem of the relationship of God to the world. He develops more precisely the doctrine of the transcendental ground as the formula of the absolute, which as he asserts cannot be identified with any of the boundary notions. The formula of the absolute does neither signify "highest power" nor "highest cause," both lying within the realm of relativity or antithesis. The formula of the absolute is therefore neither substance nor causality, but transcends both these notions. Thus far there is no change in his treatment of the transcendental ground; on the contrary, the transcendental ground emerges more clearly as a formula or schema. In proceeding to the problem of the relationship of God to the world he faces a dilemma or crisis. The only absolute which he is able to postulate is a formula; God is still being viewed as the absolute, but must be more than an epistemological and metaphysical schema. But any effort to develop the "more" infringes upon absoluteness and leads into the realm of antithesis.

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[1] D, pp. 346-47.

[2] Supra, p. 75, N. 3.

The previously made effort to treat the "more" than formula aspect of the absolute as the world is unacceptable, since it identifies God for all practical purposes with the world. And it is precisely this which Schleiermacher wants to avoid. Is there a way out? Schleiermacher searches for one; whether he succeeds, we will have to judge for ourselves.

It is the judgment of this writer that he is not successful in presenting an adequate solution of the problem of the relationship of God to the world. In this we agree with the major critics of Schleiermacher. But contrary to their conclusion that the failure in achieving a satisfactory solution to the problem resides necessarily within the fundamental structure of Schleiermacher's speculative thought, we claim that this is not necessarily so. The problem as we see it resides not within the structure of the *Dialektik* as such, but is brought about by the introduction of extraneous assumptions which are themselves not necessitated by the *Dialektik* itself. As previously indicated, it by no means follows from the dialectical structure that the formula posited for the transcendental ground is "the absolute"; on the contrary, the *Dialektik* militates against the interpretation of the formula of the absolute as abstract identity, for it is this which absoluteness *qua* absoluteness must be. It does not seem to follow from the presuppositional formula that "was wir eigentlich suchen als das der transcendenten Voraussezung entsprechende im Sein, das ist das unbedingte Sein (Gottheit, höchstes Wesen, absolutes, auch Nichts)."[1] The formula describes rather that which is the necessary prerequisite of actuality as encountered by man, that is, the phenomenon of the unity of difference and identity or relativity. As such it is unconditional and absolute, because we are unable to go beyond it or to ignore it within the dialectical structure.

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[1] *D*, p. 416

Furthermore, it does by no means follow from the dialectical structure that God must simply be equated with absoluteness. But Schleiermacher does wish to identify the transcendental formula with God. God is being interpreted as absoluteness, which means that the formula must be treated simply in terms of absoluteness. If God is not defined as absoluteness, then the formula need not be treated as such, but can be treated as the absolute formula of relativity. This being the case, the identification of formula and God is possible without restricting ourselves to absoluteness in a discussion of God. God then is both absolute in the sense that the formula is absolute, but also subject to the formula; and in this sense God and formula are not simply coordinate terms, but the formula is logically superordinated, while God, really being the equivalent term for a living conception, is actually subordinated. Schleiermacher by treating of God simply as the absolute breaks with the methodological principle of the Dialektik, which means that since this methodological principle by force of its own character is also a metaphysical principle, he breaks, in his discussion of God and the relationship of God to the world, with his own fundamental position.

Schleiermacher asserts of the transcendental ground,

> Alles andere ist abhängig von diesem transcendenten Grunde alles Wissens, der nicht Wissen in uns ist, auf den aber alles

> Wissen bezogen werden muss und der unser gesammtes Wissen begleitet. So weit also haben wir auf diesem Wege den transcendenten Grund der Wissens gefunden. Indem wir ihn gleich gefunden haben als etwas, das nicht vollzogen werden kann: so haben wir auch keine Aussicht noch mehr davon zu finden. Desto nothwendiger aber ist es, dass wir ihn uns rein erhalten und uns hüten ihm wissentlich oder unwissentlich etwas zu substituiren, was noch im Bereiche des Wissens selbst liegt, schon um das formale Princip nicht zu verfehlen, das wir ihm gleichgesezt haben.[1]

We posit the absolute "in der Formel einer nothwendigen Voraussezung, die wir aber nicht vollziehen können."[2]

The same presupposition which underlies knowledge underlies the will[3] and the identity and difference between knowledge and will, that is, their relative unity is rooted in the transcendental presupposition. The relative unity of knowledge and will, is formally presupposed, just as the unity of any other polarity is presupposed. But in this particular case Schleiermacher chooses to describe this presupposition as feeling: "Dem gemäss nun haben wir auch den transcendenten Grund nur in der relativen Identität des Denkens und Wollens, nämlich im Gefühl."[4] He says,

> Betrachten wir das Leben als Reihe: so ist es ein Übergang aus Denken in Wollen und umgekehrt, beides in seinem relativen Gegensaz betrachtet. Der Übergang ist das aufhörende Denken und das anfangende Wollen, und dieses muss identisch sein. Im Denken ist das Sein der Dinge in uns gesezt auf unsere Weise, im Wollen ist unser Sein in die Dinge gesezt auf unsere Weise. Also, sofern nicht mehr das Sein der Dinge in uns gesezt wird, wird unser Sein in die Dinge gesezt. Aber unser Sein ist das sezende, und dieses bleibt im Nullpunkt übrig, also unser Sein als sezend in der Indifferenz beider Formen. Dies ist das unmittelbare Selbstbewusstsein = Gefühl, welches ist 1. Verschieden von dem reflectirten Selbstbewusstsein = Ich, welches nur die Identität des Subjects in der Differenz der Momente aussagt, und also auf dem Zusammenfassen der Momente beruht, welches allemal ein

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[1] D, p. 101.

[2] D, p. 144.

[3] D, p. 150.

[4] D, p. 151.

> vermitteltes ist; 2. Verschieden von der Empfindung, welche das subjective persönliche ist im bestimmten Moment, also mittelst der Affection gesezt. Von der Empfindung wird Niemand sagen, das sie die Identität von Denken und Wollen sei, sondern sie ist nur das Keins von beiden. Im Gefühl sind wir uns die Einheit des denkend wollenden und wollend denkenden Seins irgendwie, aber gleichviel wie, bestimmt. In diesem also haben wir die Analogie mit dem transcendenten Grunde, nämlich die aufhebende Verknüpfung der relativen Gegensäze. . . . Diese transcendente Bestimmtheit des Selbstbewusstseins nun ist die religiöse Seite desselben, oder das religiöse Gefühl, und in diesem also ist der transcendente Grund oder das höchste Wesen selbst repräsentirt.[1]

Does "feeling" then provide more than knowledge? Definitely not, for feeling *qua* feeling is an unexecuted (*unvollzogen*) immediate awareness and as such an abstraction. It is the subjective equivalent of the transcendental formula. Religion can achieve no more than philosophy, for feeling in its purity is always unexecuted, just as the thought of the transcendental ground must always remain unexecuted, being no more than the immediate and necessary "impulse."[2] The difference seems to be that the religious mind treats the transcendental ground not as a mere presuppositional formula, but posits it as "living actuality"[3] and is inclined therefore to execute the "immediate awareness" or feeling. Schleiermacher claims therefore,

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[1] *D*, pp. 428-430.

[2] "Die Art das transcendente zu haben im religiösen Gefühl ist keine höhere. Denn der ursprüngliche Gehalt ist nur, dass das die Wahrheit des Denkens und die Realität des Wollens bedingende ausser unserer Selbstthätigkeit gesezt ist. Die positive Voraussezung, dass etwas sei, worin sie gesezt wird, ist uns indirect gegeben, aber sie bedingt unmittelbar die Wahrheit des Lebens, und da unser Selbstbewusstsein das Denken = wollen und Wollend = denken ist: so identificirt sie sich unmittelbar und von selbst mit der speculativen und der ethischen, und sie thut dies im Übergewicht der Unmittelbarheit, so dass sie ihnen den Namen giebt, und Gott, der ursprünglich religiöse Ausdrukk überall vorkommt." (*D*, p. 475.)

[3] *D*, p. 529.

> Wenn nun das Gefühl von Gott das religiöse ist: so scheint deshalb die Religion über der Philosophie zu stehen, wie auch viele behaupten. Es ist aber nicht so . . . Vollkommenheit und Unvollkommenheit sind in beiden gleich vertheilt, nur nach verschiedenen Seiten. Die Anschauung Gottes wird nie wirklich vollzogen, sondern bleibt nur indirecter Schematismus. Dagegen ist sie unter dieser Form völlig rein von allem fremdartigen. Das religiöse Gefühl ist zwar ein wirklich vollzogenes, aber es ist nie rein, denn das Bewusstsein Gottes ist darin immer an einem anderen. . . .[1]

The executed religious feeling is reflection upon immediate awareness, "Abbildung desselben."[2] Neither philosophical inquiry nor religious inquiry can execute the "Gedanken des höchsten an und für such."[3] The struggle for the primacy of religion or philosophy is in this respect senseless;[4]

> Es ist wahr, wir konnten das höchste im Gedanken nicht vollziehen. Warum nicht? Wir konnten es nur suchen unter der Form des Begriffs und des Urtheils. Bleiben wir beim Begriff: so konnten wir immer nicht genug besonderes abstreifen; beim Urtheil: so konnten wir nicht genug combiniren. Streiften wir aber genug ab: so kamen wir aus dem Begriff heraus; combinirten wir genug: aus dem Urtheil. Wir konnten also das absolute als Begriff und Urtheil nicht finden; nur in negativer Form konnten wir es aufstellen, und das ist unser Nichthaben.[5]

Then he asks, "Wie ist es nun mit dem haben im religiösen Bewusstsein?" And he replies,

> Allerdings ist in demselben das absolute, *aber nicht an und für sich*, wie wir es in der Speculation suchten, *sondern immer nur an einem andern*, an einem Bewusstsein des Menschen von sich selbst, von bestimmten menschlichen Verhältnissen usw. Wollen wir das Bewusstsein Gottes isoliren: so gerathen wir in ein bewusstloses Brüten, und *wir müssen immer sagen, das Bewusstsein Gottes sei um so lebendiger, je lebendiger ein*

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[1] *D*, p. 152.

[2] *Ibid*.

[3] *D*, p. 154.

[4] *D*. p. 152.

[5] *D*, pp. 152-53. Cf. *supra*, pp. 104-107.

> anderes dabei ist. . . . *Im religiösen Bewusstsein, wenn es in seiner Natur bleibt und nicht damit experimentirt wird, ist das Bestreben das Bewusstsein Gottes zu isolieren gar nicht*; der religiöse Mensch hat kein Arg daraus, das Bewusstsein Gottes nur zu haben an dem frischen und lebendigen Bewusstsein eines irdischen. Das philosophische Bestreben will es aber rein für sich haben, und es genügt ihm, sich desselben an und für sich als einer nothwendigen Voraussezung bewusst zu sein, so dass es jedem nachweisen kann, so gewiss man wissen wolle, so gewiss bedürfe man dieser Voraussetzung des absoluten, in welcher allein das Wissen begründet und aus welcher allein die Regeln für das Wissen abzuleiten seien.[1]

If the absolute of which Schleiermacher talks were something other than the formula, it would not be possible to regard it as the foundation of knowledge, for abstract identity would yield nothing. Here, as previously, Schleiermacher assumes that the absolute is beyond our reach, that is, it is available only as a formula. But this formula is also regarded as "highest actuality" or God, but what ever this actuality is, it cannot be apprehended, that means, no living conception of it as such is possible. But nevertheless

> das Bestreben, die transcendente Form in eine lebendige Anschauung zu verwandeln, ist natürlich, aber klar ist auch, dass alles wirkliche Denken über sie, d.h., also alles anschauliche, inadäquates enthält. Die eigentliche Wahrheit darin ist nur das Interesse an der Sache. . . .[2]

The actuality of the absolute is, however, not any more the actuality of the world, it is, we might say, actual in its aseity, though we possess this aseity only as a formula. Schleiermacher's transformation of the formula into something more than formula, whatever this might be, for we don't know and can't know, is no more than transformation by way of verbal substitution. The formula cannot yield a "more" therefore verbal substitution, i.e., God instead of formula, is illegitimate and accomplishes actually nothing. Simple verbal substitution as a mode of transition is legitimate only if the new term which takes the place of the old term adds no further meaning to it. If more is to be accomplished through the introduction of a new term, we must explore the possibility of the "more." The term God as used by Schleiermacher carries with it meaning not previously covered by the notion of the transcendental ground as the formula of the absolute. Yet the formula, interpreted in terms of absoluteness alone, provides no mode of transition, and it is in terms of absoluteness that Schleiermacher reads the formula when he wishes to transform it into the notion of God. The transformation is probably explicable only in terms of Schleiermacher's religious conviction which prevents him from treating God as sheer formula and forces him to say that God is "more," though he remains faithful to the denial that the "more" is available in any form as such. It is the same religious conviction which does not let him rest with the idea that the "more" is simply the world. In this procedure Schleiermacher contradicts himself, for he has in effect made of God something absolutely other in his actuality. Yet the guiding principle of the whole Dialektik, that is, the substance of the transcendental formula, asserts that there is no absolute antithesis.[1] Why is the notion of God made exempt from the principle of relativity? Why must God be viewed only under the perspective of absoluteness? The structure of the *Dialektik* supplies no answer to this question; the treatment of God as *the absolute* is alien to the implicit structure of the *Dialektik*, though not alien to Schleiermacher in other respects. It seems that at this point Schleiermacher was unable (maybe necessarily so) to remain in step with his own movement in the *Dialektik*; he falls prey to inherited thought patterns which in many respects are essentially foreign to his philosophical thought. This can be shown further in his treatment of the relationship of God to world, where he stubbornly insists on their necessary correlation.

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[1] *D*, p. 153. (Italics mine.) [2] *D*, pp. 166-67.

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[1] Supra, p. 83.

## The Relationship of God and World

Schleiermacher insists upon five things: (1) the absolute, which is posited as formula, is not simply schema; (2) the absolute is the divine or highest actuality; (3) the actuality of the formula, that is, God is not identical with the actuality of the world; (4) God in his actuality of absoluteness is neither available to philosophy nor to religion; (5) God and world are inseparably related and this relationship is not simply the relationship posited between transcendental formula and the actuality of the world.

He is relentless in his conviction that man cannot possess the divine *a se*. The aseity of God is only available as the transcendental formula. Immediate awareness or religious feeling, though positing and treating the *asietas dei* as "highest actuality," does not posses it as such. Negatively this means, from the religious perspective, that the world is not identical with the "life of God." The possession of God is non-possession. Therefore Schleiermacher is equally adamant about the fact that God is available only "with an other." "Der religiöse hat es im Leben, der speculative in der Betrachtung, aber beide haben es nur an etwas anderem."[1] He asserts, "Wir wissen nur um das Sein Gottes in uns und in den Dingen, gar nicht aber um ein Sein Gottes ausser der Welt oder an sich."[2] However,

> Der nur schematisch construirte Begriff [the formula of the absolute] will auch real werden und kann es nur, indem er einseitig und relativ wird. Man weiss aber dann, dass das Schema nicht ausgefüllt wird, worüber sich die bloss religiösen leichter täuschen.[3]

From this it follows that theological concepts are reflections upon piety, which has its ground in the relationship of God to man and the world. Schleiermacher puts it as follows:

> Das die höheren Zustände des Selbstbewusstseins begleitende Bewusstsein Gottes in Gefühl [immediate awareness], also das religiöse hat Reflexionen über dies Gefühl hervorgebracht, die theologische Begriffe sind. Diese sind von der Speculation immer angegriffen, und in sofern auch mit Recht, als man immer darthun kann, dass sie inadaquat sind, sofern wir sie isoliren. . . . Sagt man aber, sie sollen nichts sein als Darstellungen der Art, wie das Bewusstsein Gottes in unserem Selbstbewusstsein ist: dann kann man sie sich gefallen lassen, weil sie dann nicht unmittelbare Darstellungen sein wollen, sondern nur mittelbare. Man kann sie sich um so eher gefallen lassen, als alle philosophischen Ausdrükke über das höchste Wesen an und für sich eben so inadaquat sind, wenn sie nicht negativ sind.[4]

God then is available only immediately, that is, only in so far as relatedness is posited. Given this position, two possibilities are open: (1) God as apprehended in relationship is actually participating in this relationship, and the symbol used to designate the actuality of the relationship does participate in the actuality of the relationship, referring thereby to the relata involved. The symbol can then be called realistic, but in order for it to be realistic both relata must actually express themselves in the relationship and be expressed in it. Put otherwise, this means that God must be involved in actuality and relativity must be in God. The transcendental formula of the absolute which Schleiermacher has developed does not make this impossible, in effect it would suggest it; (2) God as apprehended does not internally participate in the relationship. In this case the relationship, if nevertheless desired, is simply asserted in spite of the absoluteness of God. The process of symbolization becomes then merely the process of self-symbolization of one of the relata, i.e., man as a member of the changing world.

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[1] D, p. 155. Cf. D, pp. 529-531.

[2] D, p. 154.

[3] D, p. 159. Cf. p. 158.

[4] Ibid.

In all conceivable relationships or polarities Schleiermacher operates with the principle of relative difference and relative identity, but he exempts the relationship of God to world from this principle of relativity. It is for this reason that we can assert that the relationship of God to the world as treated by Schleiermacher becomes the fundamental problem of the Dialektik, a problem which Schleiermacher is not able to treat adequately. It is not the principle of relativity which necessarily disturbs the continuing flow of the Dialektik, but Schleiermacher's inability or unwillingness to apply this principle rigidly, driving it to its last consequences even in the treatment of God and his relationship to the world.

Can Schleiermacher assert with equal firmness the absoluteness of God and his relationship to the world? He apparently does want to do both and he strives to reconcile both notions. This reconciliation or the transformation of the absolute into a living conception is accomplished by the substitution of the term God, with whatever this term implies, for the formula of the absolute. The transformation, as said before, is verbal or rhetorical but not actual.[1] It is executed concretely through the use of "inadaquaten bildlichen Vorstellungen, welche das religiöse Gefühl nur repräsentiren. . . ."[2] This procedure is finally justified as satisfactory, because no predication concerning an absolute is possible, because it is simple identity. It is important to note that the inadequate symbolization must be constantly placed in reference to the absolute. It is the effort of reference which is to be significant, not the symbolization as such. Schleiermacher puts it finally as follows:

> Die eigentliche Wahrheit darin ist uns das Interesse an der Sache, das sich darin auspricht, und das selbst nur ein Ausdrukk davon ist, dass es das Wesen des Geistes constituirt sich des transcendenten zu bemächtigen, dass alle Wahrheit des Selbstbewusstseins in seiner Zeitlosigkeit betrachtet, alle Wahrheit des Denkens und alle Realität des Wollens von dem Geseztsein des transcendenten in uns abhängt. Wir können also sagen, es komme wenig darauf an, wie weit man sich zum Vortheil der Anschaulichkeit von der Reinheit der Formel entferne, wenn uns die Reduction immer vorbehalten bleibe, dagegen müssen wir aber auch zugeben, dass an der Realization der Reduction immer müsse gearbeitet werden. . . . Die Zusammenfassung aller von allen wesentlichen Functionen aus

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[1] D, p. 472.

[2] D, p. 159. Cf., "Unsere Formeln haben einen doppelten Wert, einen realen, indem sie die Totalität des Seins ausdrükken, die Welt, und zwar auf Seite des Begriffs als Kraft, auf Seite des Urtheils als Subjekt und Prädikat; und einen symbolischen, nämlich den transcendenten Grund ausdrükken, was nicht adequat geschieht." (D, p. 432; cf. p. 424.)

> gefundenen Grenzen giebt die Idee der Welt. Es gilt also diese auf das absolute zu beziehen, also das Verhältniss zwischen Gott und Welt ins Auge zu fassen, worauf sich auch . . . alle speculativen Fragen reduciren. Weiter indess also bis zu Cautelen werden wir nicht gelangen können.[1]

We cannot assert more than that God and world are correlates[2]:

> Etwas genaueres aber zu bestimmen, sind wir durch unsre Aufgabe [dialectical task] nicht genöthigt. . . . Das religiöse Interesse allein muss eine nähere Bestimmung des Verhältnisses beider Ideen versuchen, und es hat ein Recht zu fordern, dass man es gewähren lasse, aber wie es nothwendig der Ursprung alles anthropoeidischen ist: so sind seine Productionen dieser Art durchaus nur als mittelbare Darstellungen für das Denken und als Wissen nicht eher zu sezen, bis sie den Regeln gemäss, welche wir hier vom unmittelbaren Interesse des Denkens aus gefunden haben, gestaltet sind.[3]

As an absolute, God is not subject to progressive inquiry, being only the terminus a quo and never the terminus ad quem of knowledge.

Schleiermacher lays down two canons which are to regulate the treatment of the relationship of God to world: (1) "Die Welt nicht ohne Gott, Gott nicht ohne die Welt"; (2) "Beide Ideen sind nicht dasselbe."[4] We are not justified in positing anything but the "togetherness" of God and world,

> Das Sezen einer Identität und eines Gegensazes zwischen beiden ist auf gleiche Weise ein Hinausgehen aus dem realen Denken. . . . Die philosophische Kunst [Dialektik] kann auf keine Weise bildliche Vorstellungen über das Verhältniss beider anstellen, mit welchen sich nicht das nothwendige Zusammensein beider verträgt. Und niemand kann mit solchen bildlichen Vorstellungen geholfen sein, welche realiter nichts als dieses Zusammensein ausdrükken.[5]

The positing of this "togetherness" is the final formula to which the relationship of God and world can be reduced. But Schleiermacher is aware that it is a formula: "Unsere Formel nun giebt freilich keine nähere Bestimmung beider Ideen, aber wir haben sie als Correctiv und sagen, Keine Formel des wissenwollenden Denkens ist genügend, die sich nicht mit dem Zusammensein beider Ideen verträgt."[1]

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[1] D, p. 167.

[2] D, p. 162.

[3] D, p. 168.

[4] D, pp. 167-168.

[5] D, p. 166.

The formulae which Schleiermacher developed for the world have always a double meaning. Their own proper meaning or real value expresses the world, but when referred to the transcendental ground they take on the character of a presentation or symbolization of the absolute. The relationship of ~~God to~~ world can be reduced to that of the relationship of these two values to each other. Both must be thought together; they must not be either identified or separated.[2] Logically an isolation is possible. In that case one term, i.e., God, supplies the element of unity and the other term, i.e., world, supplies the element of difference; the actual truth lies, however, in their togetherness. Schleiermacher puts this as follows: "Logisch zwar kann man das Verhältniss denken, Gott = Einheit mit Ausschluss aller Gegensäze; Welt = Einheit mit Einschluss aller Gegensäze."[3] While we are not in a position to capture the character of this relationship in its actuality, this does not mean that the unity of God and world, which expresses both difference and identity, is not actual. The logical formulae in their togetherness are the only way in which we can express ourselves, "aber real ist es nicht auszudrükken, als nur, es muss im Sein etwas = X diesem logischen Ausdrukk entsprechen. . . ."[1] The correct dialectical formulation is therefore:

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[1] D, pp. 167-168. Cf. Jonas' note in the Dialektik with regard to these formulae, where he expresses his pleasure with Schleiermacher's departure from the "pantheistic" version of 1811 and suggests that the later version in the effort to compensate for the earlier fault leans maybe too much in the direction of dualism. (D, pp. 168-69.)

[2] D, pp. 526ff.

[3] D, p. 433.

> *Wir können beide* [God and world] *realiter nicht identificiren, weil die beiden Ausdrükke nicht identisch sind; wir können sie auch nicht ganz von einander trennen, weil es nur zwei Werthe für dieselbe Forderung sind, auch apagogisch jedes bestimmte Verhältniss unhaltbar ist, und ohne bestimmtes Verhältniss keine wahre Trennung statt findet*.[2]

Schleiermacher thinks that a strictly formal or logical treatment of the relationship between God and world can be rendered, but as soon as this relationship is treated in terms other than logical ones, we impinge upon the absoluteness of God, bringing relativity into deity. Given the logical formula of relationship, we can say that religious concentration upon God without reference to the world is "das gymnosophistische Brüten über die Nasenspize,"[3] since contemplation of unity without difference is void, while neglect of God leads to atomism through concentration on difference. Both efforts belong together. We can therefore say that the togetherness of God and world, that is, their relationship is the exact equivalent of the transcendental formula which underlies the dialectical scheme. Just as the transcendental ground as formula is the absolute presupposition, so is the relationship of God and world no more and no less than absolute presupposition which is asserted but not demonstrated. Genuine religion which shows vitality must be both *Gottaufgeschlossen* and *Weltaufgeschlossen*. Theology must always be also *Kulturtheologie*. For Schleiermacher God and world are the prerequisite of all modes of thought,

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[1] *Ibid*.

[2] *D*, pp. 433-434. (Italics are not mine. Jonas must be responsible for them.)

[3] *D*, p. 435.

> denn Gott und Welt ist gleichmässig die Voraussezung zu allem wirklichen Denken, sofern es Wissen werden will, Gott die Voraussezung im Zurükkgehen, Welt die im Vorwärtsgehen. Ohne das erste keine Einheit im Moment, ohne das zweite kein Impuls zur Fortschreitung im Denken. So kann also die speculative Richtung nie dahin kommen, beide einander entgegenzusezen, d.h. so zu unterscheiden, dass eins ohne das andere sein könnte, vielmehr ist jenes Verhältniss der reine Ausdrukk für die Abhängigkeit alles wirklichen Denkens vom transcendenten Grunde. Darin liegt aber zugleich, dass der transcendente Grund eben als ein Lebendiges gesezt ist, und diese Bezeichnung also keineswegs im Widerspruche steht mit dem Gehalte dessen, was vom unmittelbaren Selbstbewusstsein ausgeht.[1]

Absolute dependence upon the transcendental formula might indicate to the dialectician the fact that the formula is also "highest actuality" or "Lebensquell"[2]; it is the same insight, which the religious mind postulates in immediate awareness.

It is essential for Schleiermacher that the transcendental ground and the relationship of God to world be more than a formal presuppositional abstraction, even though the "more" cannot be captured, being the downfall of philosophy and religion. While we recognize Schleiermacher's "will to actuality" with reference to God, we must also recognize that his effort to make absoluteness the sole definitive term of God or of the transcendental ground, militates against the principle of construction which determines the implicit logic in the Dialektik, namely the principle of relativity. By application of the principle of relativity Schleiermacher stands in opposition to both absolute dualism and strict monism; through it he attempts to bring together in relative unity such terms as thought and being, nature and spirit, individuality and communality, and God and world.

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[1] *D*, p. 530.

[2] Schleiermacher realizes that "life" is not an adequate expression for God conceived as absoluteness, since it does introduce antithesis into absoluteness. Cf. *D*, pp. 530-531.

Given even his necessarily limited understanding of the principle of relativity, his success in the dialectical task depends upon its radical application. Such radical application Schleiermacher seems to be able to make in almost all cases, with the exemption of the treatment of the notion of God, which he defined strictly in terms of absoluteness. It is this inability (whatever the reasons) to follow up the potential of his own method which makes for a basic dichotomy in Schleiermacher's thought. This becomes more evident even in the Dogmatik, in which he treats the Christian faith, which is predicated upon the possibility of God's relationship to the world, a possibility which is postulated upon the experience of its actuality.[1] If Schleiermacher, we might say, had treated of the actuality of God's relationship to the world as he had treated other polarities such as body and mind, namely as a given actuality, which though given, were not deducible, then he might have also attempted to account for the possibility of the relationship of God to world.[1] Since for him religious experiences were fundamental, and not illusory, this step could have possibly been taken. It then would have made the Dialektik more adequate by his own criteria, which required that the Dialektik take account of the totality of man's experience of actuality. If, on the other hand, the affirmation of the actuality of God and his relationship to the world was illusory or merely an expression of man's experience of the world, then the discussion of either the notion of God or of his relationship to the world was superfluous in the Dialektik. The effort of 1811 could then have sufficed. But we saw that the treatment of this question in the manner of the earliest version of the Dialektik did not satisfy Schleiermacher at all; it would be surprising if it had, for Schleiermacher was committed as much to his position as a theologian as to his work as a philosopher. In fact, we have indicated that the Dialektik originated from dissatisfaction with the then current philosophical positions, which seemed inadequate for his theological work. But we can also see how Schleiermacher unwittingly laid the foundations for the treatment of religion as mysticism or anthropology. Those readers who concentrated upon the unavailability of the absoluteness of God's "actuality" were directed toward a mystical approach.[2] Others who concentrated upon religious formulations as reflections upon man's self-consciousness could very easily interpret religion as a purely subjective phenomenon. I believe that neither of these solutions presents the main thrust of Schleiermacher's work; the absolute formula for Schleiermacher is to be found in the assertion of the togetherness of God and world. He himself attempts to be faithful to this formula. The problem in theological terms is for Schleiermacher: can a Dogmatik be built upon Christology without the foundation of a doctrine of the Trinity? Or does not the doctrine of Christ have its roots in the doctrine of the Trinity? Can we involve God in the actuality of the world, while at the same time making it a contradiction in terms through defining God solely in terms of absoluteness?[1]

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[1] Infra, p. 194.

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[1] Having said this, we must recognize and accept the fact that his ability to explore the notion of relativity was limited and that therefore criteria emerging from later scientific developments must not be applied to him.

[2] Rudolf Otto's, Das Heilige (12th ed.; Gotha-Stuttgart: F. A. Perthes, 1924) constitutes some such effort. Otto's method, though quite unique, is not unrelated to some aspects of Schleiermacher's work.

We have not been able to capture much of Schleiermacher's intricate treatment of a variety of problems in the Dialektik, but that which seems to be the skeleton of the dialectical structure, we have attempted to lift out, concentrating thereby upon the basic problem into which the movement of the Dialektik issued. Our effort was not solely guided by the idea simply to repeat Schleiermacher, the implicit problem with which we have dealt in our discussion of Schleiermacher was summed up in the first chapter of our study. We asked ourselves why the interpretation of Schleiermacher has been so divergent, making assessment difficult, and why in face of a theological climate which is hostile to Schleiermacher it has been possible to call for a reevaluation and even a reappropriation of Schleiermacher's work. It could be that some of the insights and problems with which Schleiermacher wrestled are very much the insights and problems which have come to the forefront in our own theological era.

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[1] Infra, pp. 186-195.

# CHAPTER IV

## THE DOGMATIK IN THE LIGHT OF THE DIALEKTIK

After the completion of our necessarily brief discussion of the fundamental structure and problem of Schleiermacher's Dialektik, we must now address ourselves to the question of the relationship of the Dialektik to the Dogmatik. In our study of the Dialektik or the speculative philosophy of Schleiermacher, we focused on Schleiermacher's basic methodological principle, both as exemplified in the total systematic structure of the work and as embodied in its speculative specification: the transcendental ground. We noted that the transcendental ground is presupposition as well as aim in Schleiermacher's dialectical construction. The presuppositional character of the transcendental ground is confirmed by the conceptually incomprehensible character of the aim, beginning and end coincide.[1] But quite unlike Hegel in his metaphysical logic, Schleiermacher does not treat the dialectical process as one of unfolding and enriching. On the contrary, the movement from presupposition toward aim is not the movement from implicit fullness and explicit emptiness toward explicit fullness; it serves only one purpose, to confirm the original presuppositional character of the transcendental ground, reduplicating it without adding anything to it. In the process of moving from the beginning toward the end of the Dialektik, Schleiermacher attempts, through rigid application of his methodological principle, to expose the relative character of all possible polarities or antitheses. These polarities, while exemplifying the transcendental presupposition, are not deduced from the transcendental ground; in fact, nothing can be deduced from the transcendental ground the character of which is not that of an originating first principle, but that of a sustaining principle.[1] By this we mean that it is also a principle of faith, that is, an ultimate ground of action, be this action knowing or doing. As a sustaining principle it is both principle of limitation and principle of possibility. It prohibits on the one hand the dissolution of the complex antithetical character of actuality and its tension into absolute simplicity or sheer multiplicity, and on the other hand it permits the affirmation of the actuality of difference and identity in their togetherness. It sustains formally the given actuality of antithetical polarities. As such it is a generalized principle of description of the highest order of abstraction. We can therefore also designate it as a metaphysical principle.

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[1] Supra, pp. 82-83 and 92-94.

We also noted that Schleiermacher loses partially sight of the designated character of the transcendental ground, treating it not consistently as the absolute, sustaining principle of relativity, but as absoluteness itself.[2] We indicated that the treatment of the transcendental ground solely in terms of absoluteness is not necessitated by the dialectical structure itself, but seems to originate in an idea extraneous to the Dialektik itself. Without tracing this idea or disputing its basic character in Schleiermacher's thought, we described it as the assumption that God must be defined solely as absoluteness.[1] And since God and transcendental ground are thought to be identical, we find Schleiermacher treating the transcendental ground also in terms of absoluteness only. It is this particular constellation of factors which gives rise to the fundamental problem of the Dialektik. As it must, this problem becomes acute in Schleiermacher's efforts to treat of God and his relationship to the world. By exempting God from relativity as exemplified in the methodological and metaphysical principle of the transcendental ground, the continuous structure of the Dialektik is ruptured. While it cannot be denied that Schleiermacher makes this exemption, it is denied that this exemption emerges naturally and necessarily from the fundamental structure of the Dialektik.[2]

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[1] Supra, pp. 94 & 119-120.

[2] Supra, pp. 113 & 124-125.

On the basis of our understanding of the fundamental structure and problem of the Dialektik, we must now focus upon Schleiermacher's Dogmatik in order to determine whether it is possible to gain new insights into some of the problems which have beset readers of the Dogmatik ever since its first publication.[3] Rather than treating of the Dogmatik in its total complex structure, it seems more advisable to select a few key issues in the *Dogmatik* for study and to apply to them the insights derived from our study of the *Dialektik*. Furthermore, it cannot be our purpose to treat even these key issues exhaustively, but we must rather restrict ourselves to a discussion of their problematic content, attempting to elucidate the nature of the problems themselves.

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[1] In a broader sense it can be designated also as that moment in Schleiermacher's thought in which a metaphysical notion of substance comes to the fore.

[2] Supra, pp. 133-135.

[3] These difficulties are already apparent in the Sendschreiben an Lücke, where Schleiermacher deals with some of his critics.

We have selected four issues for our study and propose to examine their problematic content in the light of the results of our analysis of the *Dialektik*. The first issue to be discussed emerges quite naturally from our proposed task itself, which is the correlation of the *Dialektik* and the *Dogmatik*. In view of the fact that Schleiermacher disclaims the dependence of his *Dogmatik* upon speculative philosophy, it becomes necessary for anyone, wishing to bring the *Dialektik* and the *Dogmatik* into correlation, to treat of the problem of correlation itself before proceeding any further. Our first task must therefore be to elucidate the problem of the relationship of the *Dialektik* and the *Dogmatik*. This particular problem has been a perennial one in the study of Schleiermacher, though usually it has been formulated as the problem of the relationship of philosophy and theology. We reject, however, this latter formulation as being both too broad and too vague for purposes of effective treatment. In yet more restricted terms, the problem could also be stated in the question concerning the relationship of the "Introduction" of the *Dogmatik* to the body proper of the *Dogmatik*. The second issue to be dealt with is a more specific one; it is the problematic notion of the "feeling of absolute dependence," which has been regarded as one of the key doctrines of Schleiermacher's theological thought. The third issue meriting investigation is Schleiermacher's doctrine of Christ, which ostensibly is fundamental to the Dogmatik, but the centrality of which has been challenged as only being a spurious one. Finally, we shall concern ourselves with Schleiermacher's treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity as being merely worthy of incorporation in form of an appendix to the Dogmatik. It is our intention to show how the treatment of these problems from the perspective of the Dialektik can contribute to our understanding and evaluation of these issues themselves and to the understanding of Schleiermacher. While it is not our intention to offer more than just a suggestion for the further study of Schleiermacher, we are hopeful, if nothing more, to be able to indicate some new and other directions for an approach to the understanding of this great theologian of the nineteenth century.

## On the Relationship of Schleiermacher's Speculative Philosophy to the Dogmatik

In his second letter to Lücke, written in 1829 just prior to the publication of the second edition of the Dogmatik, Schleiermacher remarks, "Was aber nun das Verhältnis zwischen Dogmatik und Philosophie anbelangt: so gestehe ich Ihnen, es geschieht mit einer gewissen Vorliebe, dass ich so wenig als möglich davon rede."[1] This attitude has been characteristic of Schleiermacher, who almost obstinately insisted that his Dogmatik was quite independent from speculative philosophy and that therefore such a discussion was superfluous. But just as Schleiermacher in his day was unable to silence the questioners who broached the subject from various perspectives again and again, so it has remained impossible ever since to avoid the discussion of this problem. Felix Flückiger has quite accurately described the current state of the discussion on this matter in saying:

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[1] SL, p. 65.

> Wer sich eingehend mit den theologischen Werken Schleiermachers befasst, muss sich auch mit unserem Problem beschäftigen, weil ein enges Beziehungsverhältnis zwischen Theologie und Philosophie unzweifelhaft besteht. Seine Philosophie zwar lässt sich nach ihren Grundgedanken und Hauptzügen darstellen, ohne dass eine Bezugnahme auf die Dogmatik unbedingt nötig ist; hingegen herrscht Einigkeit darüber, dass zum Verständnis seiner Dogmatik auf die Philosophie zurückgegriffen werden muss. Die Dogmatik ist durch die Philosophie beeinflusst. Umstritten ist aber, wie weit diese Beeinflussung geht.[1]

While Flückiger's assessment is generally correct, it should be noted that it is not even primarily the extent of the influence of philosophy upon the Dogmatik which is still in question, but even more so, the precise nature of this influence or relationship itself. This latter question is at present still the more urgent one and can only be answered by way of correlating the Dialektik and the Dogmatik.[2] We must ask: What is the nature and function of speculative philosophy in Schleiermacher's understanding and on the basis of his understanding, what can the relationship of speculative philosophy or the Dialektik to the Dogmatik be? It seems necessary to distinguish between Schleiermacher's own understanding of speculative philosophy and its function and his understanding of the nature of speculative philosophy as it was current among his contemporaries. In treating the problem of the relationship of speculative philosophy and dogmatic thought in Schleiermacher, we cannot ignore the fact that he held no brief for the speculative thought of his time which imperialistically seemed to swallow up theological thought.[1] In rejecting the idea of the dependence of his Dogmatik upon speculative philosophy, Schleiermacher rejects the dominant understanding of what the relationship between speculative philosophy and theology must be. His friends and foes alike interpreted his philosophical stance always from a perspective which assumed a definite understanding of the nature of speculative thought, but which was not necessarily identical with Schleiermacher's own use of speculative modes of thought. Just as his contemporaries, be they Ferdinand Christian Baur or Karl Gottlieb Bretschneider, were inclined to read Schleiermacher in terms of their own understanding of the nature of speculative philosophy, inciting Schleiermacher to disclaim the dependence of his dogmatic thought upon speculative thought, so have many later interpreters attempted to treat Schleiermacher as just one more representative of German

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[1] Philosophie und Theologie bei Schleiermacher, p. 9. Readers interested in a cursory summary of the main positions of scholars on this point may consult Flückiger, ibid., pp. 9-17, or the earlier work by Georg Wehrung, Die philosophisch-theologische Methode Schleiermachers (Göttingen: Univ.-Buchdruckerei von E. A. Huth, 1915), pp. 118-139.

[2] See E. Hirsch, who states that "es ist eine Streitfrage der Schleiermacher-Forschung, wie weit man die Philosophie Schleiermachers, d.h. aber vor allem seine Dialektik, nötig habe, um ihn als Theologen zu verstehen." (Geschichte der neuern evangelischen Theologie, V, p. 282.)

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[1] Supra, pp. 45-46. Hegel's subordination of theology to philosophy as the pure medium of thought is but one example of this tendency.

Idealism or of Spinoza's or Kant's philosophical modes of thought. While it is neither necessary nor possible to deny Schleiermacher's indebtedness to other philosophical patterns of thought, this does not mean that we can forget Schleiermacher's unique integration and modification of these philosophical strands. Maybe Schleiermacher's own speculative effort was unsuccessful; it certainly was sketchy, as he would be the first to admit, but it is doubtful that we can throw light upon the perplexing problem of the relationship of speculative philosophy to dogmatic thought, as it confronts us in Schleiermacher, if we do not attempt to understand his own constructive philosophical and theological efforts more precisely.

The relationship of speculative philosophy and theological thought is a problem which seems to be a perennial one. What then is so perplexing about its occurrence in the thought of Schleiermacher? The matter can be put very simply: We find that Schleiermacher denies the dependence of his Dogmatik upon speculative philosophy, while quite evidently such a relationship exists, and is even to a certain degree not precluded by Schleiermacher himself. Scholars are left by and large with the puzzling fact that such a keenly critical and analytical mind as Schleiermacher's should have been so blind at this point. Thus insofar as Schleiermacher is reluctant and maybe also unable to elucidate his own position on this matter more clearly, while insisting with all his might upon the independence of the Dogmatik or religion from speculative philosophy, he himself contributes to the puzzlement of his students. His one specific effort to deal with this problem more explicitly can be found in his commentary to the Dogmatik, contained in the two Sendschreiben to Lücke. But rather than clarifying the problem, he compounds it when he advances his position. Against his critics he maintains the integrity of his position in the Dogmatik:

> Hätte mich also von meinen sogenannten Gegnern einer gründlich überzeugt, etwa, dass mein Werk [the Dogmatik] sich selbst aufhöbe, oder dass der Glaube an Gott mit der von mir dargelegten Ansicht nicht konsequenterweise bestehen könne, oder dass ich den christlichen Glauben von der Phantasie [speculative philosophy] abhängig mache, oder--was vielleicht im wesentlichen dasselbe sagen soll--dass ich das Heidentum wieder in das Christentum einführen will, oder auch nur, dass meine Glaubenslehre sich vollkommen wohl mit dem Papalsystem der römischen Kirche vertrage--: nur eines von diesen, und es würde nie von einer zweiten Ausgabe meiner Glaubenslehre die Rede gewesen sein. . . .[1]

He continues almost belligerently, saying,

> Noch weniger aber kann ich eine Verpflichtung anerkennen, Einwendungen zu widerlegen, die nach meiner Überzeugung die Sache gar nicht treffen oder auf Missverständnissen beruhen. Der Schriftsteller kann dem Kritiker dies nicht schuldig sein, . . . er kann es ebensowenig dem Publikum schuldig sein, denn dies hat die Akten vor sich, und jeder hat Freiheit, für sich selbst zu entscheiden.[2]

The problem with Schleiermacher's position is, that the public did not possess the complete "record" in order to make his position on the relationship of speculative philosophy and the Dogmatik intelligible. The public had his word that he had not derived his dogmatic statements from speculative thought; what this assertion, particularly in the historical setting in which it was made, meant was not self-explanatory. We need only to remind ourselves that most of Schleiermacher's philosophical writings at that time were still buried in his study.[3] While it is permissible for Schleiermacher to scoff at his critics who call him by all kinds of philosophical labels,[1] it was incumbent upon Schleiermacher to make the necessary data available. If he had done so, then he would have been justified in saying:

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[1] SL, p. 9.

[2] Ibid., p. 9.

[3] Supra, pp. 37-38.

> Und mehr dürfen auch wohl alle die Männer nicht erwarten, deren Ansicht von meinem Werk eigentlich voraussetzt, entweder, dass ich so stumpfsinnig bin, die Widersprüche, in denen mein ganzes Leben verwickelt wäre nicht zu merken, oder so frivol, mir darin wohl zu gefallen, weil mir eben gar nichts Ernst wäre, oder so armselig, dass ich keine Existenz hätte finden können, ausser in einem Beruf [as a theologian and preacher], der mir eigentlich im höchsten Grade zuwider sein müsste.[2]

But it is precisely when we wish to take Schleiermacher seriously that our problem becomes so much more perplexing. Schleiermacher's objection to "Einlegungen" and "Unterschiebungen" and to "dergleichen idealistischem Zeug"[3] is justified, yet it is quite understandable that it should have occurred. When we analyze Schleiermacher's position, as it is revealed in the letters to Lücke, we find that he has one burning desire, to free religion or dogmatic thought from the usurpation of philosophical speculation and to establish its independence without delivering it into the hands of intellectual barbarism.[4] But he is equally concerned with the integrity of philosophical thought itself, which must not come under the domination of speculative theology. Positively, then, it is his aim to work out the terms of an "eternal contract" between the living faith of Christianity and free scholarly inquiry.[1] Schleiermacher views his own Dogmatik as a contribution to this task. A "Priestertum der Spekulation,"[2] a deduced Christian faith is just as untenable as

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[1] SL, pp. 10 and 25.

[2] Ibid., p. 10.

[3] Ibid., p. 11.

[4] Supra, p. 16.

> wenn man mit dem Schwert dreinschlagen kann gegen die Wissenschaft; wenn man im Besitz aller äussern Hilfsmittel sich einzäunen kann gegen allen Angriff gesunder Forschung, und nun drinnen eine gebietende Kirchenlehre aufstellen, die allen draussen wie ein wesenloses Gespenst erscheint, dem sie aber doch huldigen müssen, wenn sie einmal ordentlich begraben sein wollen: so braucht man sich freilich nichts anfechten zu lassen, was irgend auf diesem Gebiet geschehen mag. Aber das können wir doch nicht und wollen es auch nicht. . . .[3]

Dogmatik presupposes piety as a given reality and its task is to describe the phenomenon of piety in its concreteness. Therefore Schleiermacher asserts:

> Wer also von der Dogmatik verlangt, sie solle mit Beiseitesetzung alles Positiven, als welches nur eine historische Einkleidung sei, nur nach der reinen Wahrheit eines allgemeinen Vernunftglaubens fragen, der gebraucht das Wort in einem andern Sinne, als ich, und zwar für etwas, wogegen ich lange meinen Verdacht zu erkennen gegeben habe, ob es auch zustande kommen könne.[4]

Dealing with concrete phenomena, the Dogmatik is something positive and Schleiermacher rejects the idea that concretion can be speculatively produced; speaking of those wishing to deduce religious faith and its foundation, Schleiermacher says ironically:

> So müssen sie sich am Ende doch untereinander gestehen, dass ihre Spekulation das Positive nicht würde konstruiert haben, wenn sie es nicht schon gefunden hätte, und dass also die Frömmigkeit, so wie sie sich wirklich findet, das Unbegründete, Willkürliche, Zufällige, also Nichtige ist, womit die Philosophie ehrenhalber gar nichts zu tun haben kann. Und kommt dann dieses unglücklicherweise aus, dass die Philosophie in jenen kältesten Polarkreisen, . . . allein thront, und dass sich die Frömmigkeit aus den Ideen gar nicht entwickelt: So ist leider zu besorgen, dass gar viele edle, zumal junge Gemüter aus Ehrfurcht gegen die Philosophie sich der Frömmigkeit ebenfalls entschlagen, und sie den Nicht-

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[1] Ibid., p. 36.

[2] SL, p. 16.

[3] Ibid., p. 17.

[4] Ibid., p. 17; cf. supra, pp. 58-59.

> wissenden überlassen werden. Für diese nun bleiben immer wir andern, und suchen ihnen ohne Beweis und Ideen, mittelst des alten λογος ἀναπόδεικτος , ihre Frömmigkeit klarzumachen und zu befestigen; aber für jene, die uns treffliche Hilfe hätten leisten können, wären sie nicht auf diesen Abweg geführt worden, ist es doch jammerschade.[1]

But to say that piety is a given reality, rooted in feeling, does not mean that in piety there is no "Weltansicht," "ich hoffe, ein grosser Teil meiner Glaubenslehre ist nichts anderes, als die Darstellung dieser Weltansicht. . . ."[2] It also does not mean that the Christian faith cannot be descriptively explained, it only means that it is not deduced or "begründet."[3] The *Dogmatik* purports to be empirical-historical description; it is false to judge it in terms of speculative deduction, "als ob die in meiner Glaubenslehre aufgestellte Analyse des Selbstbewusstseins etwas anderes sein wollte als ganz einfach und ehrlich nur empirisch!"[4] Schleiermacher is amazed that this has been misunderstood. He thought he made it abundantly clear that he spoke in the *Dogmatik* of "wirklichen erfahrungsmässigen Tatsachen" and not of "vor der Erfahrung hergehenden Tatsachen des Bewusstseins."[5] He had no intention to philosophize in the *Dogmatik*. Hence he complains,

> Ebenso ist auch anderwärts gesagt worden, meine wahre Absicht sei, das Christentum nach dem Pantheismus, einer mit demselben ganz unverträglichen Philosophie, umzudeuten und zu modeln. Wenn das nun einem vorgeworfen wird, der so laut und wiederholt gesagt hat, die christliche Lehre müsse völlig unabhängig von jedem philosophischen System dargestellt

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[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

> werden: so müsste doch die Behauptung mit den stringentesten Beweisen versehen sein. . . .[1]

Schleiermacher is convinced that these accusations are not correct and that they are based more upon what his critics read into his thought than upon what he said himself,

> und wie musste ich mich wundern, meine Erklärung über Gott, wobei ich weder rechts, noch links nach einem Philosophen gesehen hatte, sondern ganz einfältig das allen Christen gemeinsame Gefühl gefragt, und dieses nur so zu beschreiben gesucht, dass ich es nicht auf einer anderen Seite verletzte, wenn ich ihm auf der einen zu genügen suchte, diese auf einem ganz andern chemischen Wege reproduziert zu sehen aus einer wundersamen Zersetzung von Spinoza und Fichte. . . . Mich tröstet nur, dass ich nun wenigstens ebensoviel Anspruch habe, ein Ichheitler genannt zu werden als ein All-Einheitler.[2]

It was his intention, he says,

> das in der christlichen Kirche entwickelte Gottesbewusstsein, wie wir es alle in uns tragen, in allen seinen Äusserungen so darzustellen, dass es in jedem einzelnen Momente möglichst rein erscheine. . . . Rein aus dieser Fassung der Aufgabe ist meine dogmatische Gotteslehre zu erklären. Wer dabei an irgendeine Philosophie denkt, der muss sich notwendig verwirren, und diese Verwirrung merke ich denn auch fast in allen etwas ausführlichen Kritiken.[3]

He rejects the idea that he intended to absorb "das besondere christliche in ein allgemeines religiöses Wissen" for general religiosity or natural religion is "nach meiner Ansicht nichts anderes . . . als eine Abstraktion von dem christlichen."[4] Speculation has its place, but it cannot produce religious faith, nor do we need it to sustain our faith; the old speculative method in theology is dead, one may attempt

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 24. But then again he could say on his deathbed, as his wife reports: "Ich muss die tiefsten speculativen Gedanken denken, und sie sind mir völlig eins mit den innigsten religiösen Empfindungen." (*LB*, II, pp. 511-512.) Cf. *SL*, p. 65.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

[4] *Ibid.*

> an der alten Methode zu putzen und zu feilen: es wird sich doch immer mehr zeigen, dass Formeln, die zusammengehören sollen, und die doch nicht zusammen leben wollen, auch nur tote Formeln sein können. . . .[1]

Dogmatik then is not produced by speculation, because the dogmatic content is rooted in concretion, in specificity; and speculative philosophy is not the productive source of actuality.[2] Those who concentrated on the "Introduction" to the Dogmatik and regarded it as "der rechte Kern des Ganzen" have overlooked that the introductory part of the Dogmatik is no more than "vorläufige Orientierung" which "genau genommen, ganz ausserhalb unserer Disziplin selbst liegt."[3] It was neither his intention to deduce Christianity nor did he actually do it, hence those who claim either are wrong. Statements in the "Introduction" to the Dogmatik are "eigentlich nur unausgefüllte Rahmen, und bekämen ihren wahren Gehalt nur durch die Beziehung auf das, was erst hernach vorgetragen werde."[4] To ignore this, is to treat the Dogmatik, which is a scholarly work, like a banquet where one picks what one wishes. Dogmatic statements are themselves derivative statements, which are rooted in the concrete reality of the inner "Gemütszustand" which is the "Ursprüngliche."[5]

Does the independence of Dogmatik from speculative thought mean that it is totally exempt from the strictures of disciplined inquiry? Does it mean that it is only a conglomerate of traditional statements which must be accepted as valid by sheer force of assertion? No, Schleiermacher insists that the Christian faith cannot exempt itself from the insights which have come and will come from research in the natural and historical sciences. It is not exempt from Wissenschaft! Yet it is not the child of speculative philosophy either! There is a difference between Wissenschaft and speculation! Those who wish to isolate Christianity from disciplined inquiry Schleiermacher asks:

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[1] Ibid., p. 29.

[2] Supra, p. 96.

[3] SL, p. 31.

[4] Ibid., p. 32.

[5] Ibid., p. 34.

> Wollt Ihr Euch dennoch hinter diesen Aussenwerken verschanzen, und Euch von der Wissenschaft blockieren lassen? Das Bombardement des Spottes, welches dann auch von Zeit zu Zeit erneuert werden wird, will ich für nichts rechnen. . . . Aber die Blockade! die gänzliche Aushungerung von aller Wissenschaft, die dann, notgedrungen von Euch, eben weil Ihr Euch so verschanzt, die Fahne des Unglaubens aufstecken muss![1]

He anticipates moves in this direction:

> Der Boden hebt sich schon unter unsern Füssen, wo diese düstern Larven auskriechen wollen, von enggeschlossenen religiösen Kreisen, welche alle Forschung ausserhalb jener Umschanzungen eines alten Buchstaben für satanisch erklären.[2]

The solution to the problems of dogmatic thought which are emerging from scholarly inquiries cannot be found in speculative theology; and if he, Schleiermacher, is seen to provide the speculative transformation of Christianity, he is only seen in a "Doppelgänger" which is no more than his ghost.[3] The Christian faith, and certainly not his own faith, does not derive its certainty from the "Begriff der Idee Gottes und des Menschen,"[4]but neither is it simply sheer arbitrariness which as such would be completely at the mercy of the fleeting selectivity of "Wissenschaft." If the latter were the only alternative to speculation, then Schleiermacher says, he would probably side with speculation, which gives to the natural sciences "ja ebenfalls die Regel" and subjects them to its own "allgemeinen Konstruktion."[1] But he does not believe that this is the only alternative; he believes that an "eternal contract" exists, and needs only to be explicated. Much of what seemed sacred will be lost in theology under this contract, but it is a question whether it was of the essence of the faith, or whether the foundation of faith is not much securer than all conceptualizations of it, no matter how pious and how necessary they may have been.

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[1] Ibid., p. 37.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 38.

[4] Ibid.

Schleiermacher does not claim to be philosophically disinterested; he simply insists again and again that his dogmatic formulations have not been derived deductively, and insofar as speculative philosophy is understood to mean deduction, his *Dogmatik* is not dependent upon it. He states:

> Und wahrlich, ich will lieber jenen ganzen Ruhm verlieren, als so damit missverstanden werden, als ob ich das Kunststück hätte machen wollen, das Christentum irgendwoher zu deduzieren! . . . Gibt es auch wohl eine Phrase, die weniger das Wesentliche meiner Bemühungen ausdrückte, als die, ich deduziere das Christentum aus dem Abhängigkeitsgefühl? Wörter sind freilich willkürlichen Gebrauchs; aber wenigstens müsste man dann sagen, ich deduziere alle Religionen daraus.[2]

The systematic principle and art which he employs in his *Dogmatik* is not that of deduction, it is

> nur ganz einfach das Geschick, solche Teilungsformeln aufzufinden, dass man dadurch eine Überzeugung von der Vollständigkeit der Darstellung gewinnt. . . . Wer mehr dahinter sucht,

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 39

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 46-47.

> darf seinen Regress nicht an mich nehmen, wenn er es nicht findet, sondern an irgend einen meiner allzu gütigen Gegner.[1]

Schleiermacher feels that if he had, as he very much desired to do, restricted the dogmatic exposition to the dogmatic "Grundform," leaving the "Nebenformen" out, that then there would have been even less danger of becoming entangled in speculation, or of being accused of it.[2] If there is to be any "Begründung" of the Christian faith, then it is simply to be found in its "Darstellung" which must be also the "Begründung."[3]

Schleiermacher is convinced that there is no particular need to discuss the relationship of philosophy and religion or any other of these relationships, at least no more so than a discussion of other relationships; he thinks that his position should be clear on this matter.[4] Rejecting the derivative character of dogmatic content, he maintains nevertheless that his formulations have and must have a "wissenschaftliche Form." Dogmatic language is technical language in this sense; it is scientific-philosophic in its character.[5] In the Dogmatik itself this is put very precisely: "Der dialektische Charakter der Sprache und die systematische Anordnung geben der Dogmatik die ihr wesentliche wissenschaftliche Gestaltung."[6] But finally Schleiermacher is also willing to go further than this, saying,

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[1] Ibid., p. 47.

[2] Ibid., pp. 47ff. Cf. Gll, I, pp. 176-178.

[3] Ibid., p. 56.

[4] Ibid., p. 64.

[5] Ibid., pp. 58ff.

[6] Gll, I, p. 165. Cf. supra, p. 129.

> Ich glaube wirklich und hoffe auch immer zu glauben, . . . dass beides sehr gut in demselben Subject bestehen kann, dass die Philosophie nicht notwendig dahin führt, sich über Christum, und Sie verstehen, ich meine hier wieder den wirklichen, geschichtlichen Christus, zu erheben, als ob alle Frömmigkeit nur unreife Philosophie und alle Philosophie erst zum Bewusstsein gekommene Frömmigkeit wäre; sondern dass ein wahrer Philosoph auch ein wahrer Gläubiger sein und bleiben kann, und ebenso, dass man von Herzen fromm sein kann und doch den Mut haben und behalten, sich in die tiefsten Tiefen der Spekulation hineingraben.[1]

There need not be a conflict between the Christian faith and speculative thought, just as there can be no conflict between our faith and the insights of disciplined scholarly inquiry. Fundamentally, speculative philosophy can neither produce the faith, nor help us to a better understanding of it in any substantive way. For speculative philosophy can be no more than "Logik" and "Grammatik,"[2] for it is the fundamental character of speculative philosophy to be a tool or organon only, which assists in the combination and construction of knowledge. As such it is as necessary as language itself. Therefore Schleiermacher says:

> Lassen sie mich also bei meinem timeo Danaos et dona ferentes immer bleiben und mich freuen, . . . meinem eignen philosophischen Dilettantismus, . . . keinen Einfluss auf den Inhalt der Glaubenslehre gestattet zu haben. Wie es mir mit diesem Vorsatz gelungen ist, das freilich ist eine andere Frage; . . .[3]

Schleiermacher is satisfied that his approach is sound and his exposition adequate enough to elucidate his understanding of the relationship of speculative thought and dogmatic thought. Factually we know that his exposition was not satisfactory, but it is also doubtful that it was theoretically satisfactory. Schleiermacher gives us glimpses into his thinking on the subject, but leaves large gaps, making for the bewilderment of his readers.[1]

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[1] SL, p. 67.

[2] Ibid., p. 66. Cf. supra, pp. 95-97.

[3] Ibid.

We have to differentiate much more clearly between Schleiermacher's opposition to all speculative philosophy which claims to deduce actuality, rejecting the undeducible as inferior, and Schleiermacher's own use and understanding of speculative thought and its function. It is only then that we shall be able to see how he can militate against speculative philosophy while at the same time being immersed in it. He has a right to object to being read primarily through the eyes of Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, or Jacobi, but he could have been more explicit about his own position than he chose to be during his lifetime, at least insofar as the larger public was concerned.

The following things then stand out in Schleiermacher's position: (1) he clearly rejects the idea that the dogmatic content can be speculatively deduced, which means to him that the *Dogmatik* is independent from speculative philosophy; (2) the conceptual objectifications, through which the Christian faith is always expressed, are not independent of the knowledge achieved by disciplined scientific inquiries in the natural and historical sciences, that means, dogmatic formulations cannot be phantasmagoria of one's wild imagination; they are positively related to physics and ethics, the two main branches of human inquiry; (3) Dogmatic formulations must exhibit precision and structural coherence in their combinations and constructions, which means that they are not only positively related to physics and ethics, but also to speculative philosophy, if by it we mean "Wissenschaftslehre" or "Dialektik" and not a "Wissen des Wissens" or "ein erstes Wissen;" (4) in the final analysis speculative thought and theological thought, each properly understood in its genius, are not mutually exclusive.

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[1] *Supra*, p. 12.

What then does Schleiermacher mean when he says the Dogmatik is independent from speculative philosophy? Schleiermacher's position seems ambiguous, for while independence is vehemently affirmed, it seems evident from the general tenor of his position that the opposite is the case. Apart from drawing upon sources other than the strictly theological ones, it is difficult to integrate the affirmation of dogmatic independence with the remainder of Schleiermacher's thought. The simple explanation of the problem as an instance of self-contradiction is not at all satisfactory; assent to it means that we must view Schleiermacher's total life as being essentially self-contradictory, which while possible is not likely. Contradiction on peripheral matters can be absorbed without leaving scars of a fundamental conflict, but not contradiction on central issues. Internal and external evidence can be adduced for the assertion that the independence of the Dogmatik or of religion generally is of central significance to Schleiermacher. In fact, his work has been defined in terms of the task of establishing the independent genius of religion over and against speculation and morality. Yet it is difficult to point to a basic conflict in Schleiermacher which can be traced back to the affirmation of the independence of the Dogmatik, in spite of the incongruous character of this affirmation as seen in the total structure of Schleiermacher's thought. The key to the understanding of the problem must be sought in his particular understanding of "independence," speculative philosophy, and dogmatics, and their relationship. It is at this point that we must refer to the Dialektik as a fundamental source for the understanding of Schleiermacher's position.

Very often when Schleiermacher insists upon the independence of his Dogmatik from speculative philosophy, he argues against the representatives of the dominant philosophical schools, all of which in one way or another treat speculative philosophy as the instrument by which true and actual knowledge of the world of concrete events can and must be deduced. Actuality is defined by them in terms of universality or in terms of rational simplicity, hence philosophical deduction is the proper method for the acquisition of knowledge. Their position is that unless a phenomenon is properly deduced, it remains contingent, lacking the true marks of knowledge. Religion and religious assertions must be produced and demonstrated by way of this method. Schleiermacher objects to the latter assertion and insists upon the independence of the Dogmatik from speculative deduction. But this objection is not restricted to the deductive production of religion and dogmatic formulation; on the contrary, it has a much broader base. The assertion of the independence of the Dogmatik from speculative philosophy is merely one instance, though an important one, of Schleiermacher's fundamental understanding of the nature of actuality and of knowledge itself. Thus while he can say that the

*Dogmatik* is not and cannot be the child of speculative deduction as then commonly understood, he does not and cannot assert the independence of the *Dogmatik* beyond this restricted frame of reference. Within his own framework of thought, the key concept is not "independence" but "contract" or relativity. The meaning and terms of the "eternal contract" must be explored within the internal structure of Schleiermacher's thought. If we view the problem of the relationship between the *Dogmatik* and speculative philosophy from the perspective of the *Dialektik*, the coherent, if not acceptable, structure of Schleiermacher's thought can be elucidated.

Schleiermacher's dialectical construction was just as much motivated by his dissatisfaction with the inadequacies of speculative philosophy as he confronted it among his contemporaries, as with his desire to discover a sound philosophical basis for his theological work. The task of speculation or dialectics was not primarily to deduce actual knowledge but to discover and to describe the given structures inherent in the very process of acquiring knowledge. By way of generalized, highly abstract, and strictly formal description, he wished to present a speculative philosophy which was a refined organon, guiding the integration and expansion of the body of knowledge. The roots of speculative philosophy were firmly located in an actuality which was not produced by man but given to him. Thus speculative philosophy emerged from concrete or, as Schleiermacher calls it, real knowledge, but could by itself not produce it. The *Dialektik*, as we attempted to show previously, was primarily logical or formal in character. But Schleiermacher by stressing the logical character of speculative philosophy did not intend to separate logic from metaphysics. Being convinced that knowledge had always objective reference,[1] he attempted to treat descriptively the various polar relations which man encounters in his experience. The actuality of relationships such as exist between thought and being and the organic and the mental, he did not attempt to deduce or to prove; he rather attempted to discover and to describe the structure of relationships itself. While describing relationships on the highest level of abstraction, he assumed neither that such descriptions were a substitute for concrete knowledge, nor that they had any meaning apart from concretion itself. He states therefore explicitly that neither physics nor ethics can be deduced from dialectics, or that either physical or ethical statements can be tested by the principles of the Dialektik as to their substantial accuracy. Physics and ethics are in this sense just as independent from speculative philosophy as the Dogmatik.[2] The problem with which the Dialektik deals is the problem of relationships, which are described as being fundamentally relative in character. The relative character of actuality, as most abstractly symbolized in the notion of the transcendental ground, makes absolute independence a useless doctrine for Schleiermacher. But it must be realized that relativity as the fundamental shape of actuality affirms distinctness and relatedness or particularity and universality in their necessary togetherness. The togetherness of what seem mutually exclusive polarities is postulated on the basis of

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[1] Supra, p. 97.

[2] Supra, 97-99.

Schleiermacher's fundamental experience of actuality; it is the transcendental presupposition upon which everything else is absolutely dependent. Attempting to avoid the atomization as well as the universalization of knowledge and of actuality itself, Schleiermacher unfolds and examines his doctrine of relativity in the Dialektik, the heart of which is the transcendental formula. As the transcendental ground epitomizes the total structure of the Dialektik, so the Dialektik epitomizes as a formal presupposition the total structure of the total body of knowledge. But just as the transcendental presupposition apart from the actual construction of a series of polarities, describes nothing but itself, so the Dialektik yields nothing but itself, if isolated from its living reality, the concrete body of knowledge.[1] The order of certainty is a descending one. The most certain is the transcendental ground, but its certainty lies in its abstractness; as we descend to levels of greater concretion, the complexity and therefore the degree of error increases, till finally we deal with the very web of actuality itself which within continuity shows infinite variety of all possible relationships. Just to say that these relationships are relative, that is, that they preserve particularity as well as universality, does not provide us with concrete knowledge, which must be produced under participation of the dialectical structure by way of scientific physical and ethical inquiry, which cannot be satisfied strictly with the collection of natural and historical data, but must join data together by way of construction and combination, producing wholes of various scope. Descriptive generalizations are therefore always subject to correction on the basis of their adequacy and relevance for the actual process of knowing the continuous, but also constantly changing stream of particular concretions.

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[1] Supra, p. 54.

To go beyond this formal but necessary function of speculative philosophy, that is, to make speculative philosophy as a deductive system the originator of knowledge or knowledge itself, is for Schleiermacher not permissible. Concretion, that is, structured actuality or content, is never produced by the power of speculative deductive reasoning. Speculative reasoning *a posteriori* lifts out given structures, and insofar as these structures are given, they are also *a priori*, which means only that they are ontologically grounded, but not that they can be used to deduce concrete actuality, that is, ontology, since particularity is for Schleiermacher as ultimate a metaphysical description as univeraslity. Schleiermacher's refusal to accept the idea that the dogmatic content can be or must be deduced by speculative philosophy is no more than an expression of his general philosophical position as explicated in the *Dialektik*. The relationship of the *Dogmatik* to speculative philosophy seems to correspond to the relationship of abstraction to concretion, which means under Schleiermacher's postulates that abstraction or speculative philosophy cannot originate concretion or the *Dogmatik*. Insofar as Schleiermacher disrupts his own methodological and metaphysical principle of relativity in the treatment of the divine, we shall see that this disruption finds its way also into the _Dogmatik_. The _Dialektik_ as a logical, scientific organon, has a definite function in the organizational construction and combination of concrete data as it takes place in all disciplined scholarly inquiries and presentations. The dogmatic presentation is a scholarly one, dealing with its unique subject matter; hence while it does not receive its data from the _Dialektik_, it does receive formal guidance from the _Dialektik_. Since the dogmatic subject matter is more than just illusory, it must be part of the continuous actuality which the _Dialektik_ attempts to describe on the highest possible level of abstraction. Hence it exemplifies the dialectical structure in its own unique way. If dogmatic subject matter is to be "really" actual, it cannot be exempted from the general order under which all things in actuality concretize themselves, for it does not deal with an actuality which is _totaliter aliter_; religion or the _Dogmatik_ has no particular license to be completely arbitrary, just as little as speculative philosophy has a right to regard itself as the fountainhead of actuality.

The general methodological and metaphysical principle, which requires that no absolute antithesis be constructed, determines also the character of the particular relationship between the _Dialektik_ and the _Dogmatik_.[1] While this indicates the general logical scheme of Schleiermacher's construction, it does not tell us how the _Dogmatik_ itself fits into the descriptive pattern of the _Dialektik_. The logical-metaphysical scheme of the _Dialektik_ attempts to explore through application the transcendental presupposition of relativity. In this process a more or less comprehensive description of relationship itself is given by way of examining certain highly abstract polarities such as the ideal and the real, nature and spirit, the physical and the mental poles of knowledge and others. In each case the irreducible character of these polarities is both assumed and explicated as a given datum of actuality. In terms of a systematic scheme of the various scientific disciplines, dealing with all types of concretion, we must ask ourselves, where in this scheme can the Dogmatik be located? What is its specific subject matter? For Schleiermacher, we noted, the triad of dialectics, physics, and ethics exhausts on the most general level the systematic scheme of scientific inquiry.[1] Where does the Dogmatik fit into this scheme? Quite evidently the Dogmatik is not regarded as being primarily speculative in character. For Schleiermacher there are degrees or levels of speculation or abstraction. The Dialektik is the highest, that is, the most general and comprehensive level of abstraction, but the empirical is not entirely absent, since the Dialektik presupposes given actuality and man's "knowledge" thereof as the ground from which it proceeds and to which it must return. Thus descending from the highest level of abstraction to a level of greater concretion, speculation is never absent. There is no need for us to provide a general scheme of the various disciplines as they reflect the movement from greater abstraction to greater concretion; it suffices to say that speculation or generalization stands in constant relation to concretion or particularity.[1] According to the *Dialektik*, knowledge is always knowledge of the world, that is, the world is the *terminus ad quem* of the process of knowing, which means knowledge is knowledge of physics and ethics.[2] What then are dogmatic formulations? The *Dialektik* itself reflects only the polarities of the world in a formal manner, but its transcendental ground as the foundation of the possibility of knowledge is not subject to knowledge, that is, it cannot be grasped either as a concept or judgment. The *Dogmatik* as a branch of the positive science of theology[3] cannot be concerned with the transcendental ground, for then it would become sheer phantasy, but neither can it be concerned solely with the world, for then it would have to be one sub-branch of physics or ethics. What then can the *Dogmatik* be? What is its subject matter? And what is, next to its relationship to the *Dialektik*, its equally important relationship to physics and ethics?

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[1] _Supra_, p. 83.

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[1] Supra, p. 98.

The formal answer to these questions is given by Schleiermacher in the *Dialektik* itself. We are told that the transcendental ground, while itself not subject to knowledge, is always related to, but never identical with, the world. This means for Schleiermacher that God is always in relationship with the world, or that God is always with "an other" but never approachable _a se_. As we can see, Schleiermacher restores here to the principle of relativity its fundamental character, from which, however, he wishes to exempt God _a se_. What God _a se_ might be or mean beyond sheer absoluteness, of which nothing can be predicated, is not entirely clear. For all practical purposes God is put in relationship to the world, and it is this relationship which is formally the ground of the _Dogmatik_.[1] And since this relationship as one example, though impure example, of the dialectical principle is metaphysical in character, the _Dogmatik_ must be said to be, at least in this minimal and formal sense, dependent upon metaphysics. The subject matter of the _Dogmatik_ is therefore the relationship of man to God, or of the world to God, since man is an integral part of the world. Physics and ethics deal with the relationship of man to the rest of the world, that is, with "worldly" relations, which though dependent upon the transcendental ground are not concerned with it in any particular way. The _Dialektik_ was concerned with it, but could only postulate and explicate its presuppositional character, but no more than this. The formal subject matter and concern of the _Dogmatik_ is therefore the relationship of God to the world as it is formally posited in the _Dialektic_. It is at this point for reasons indicated in our preceding chapter that problems arise. We pointed out that Schleiermacher, while insisting on the relationship of God to the world, made no provisions to allow for the possibility of this relationship. Treating the transcendental ground in terms of absoluteness, and identifying God with absoluteness, the necessary relationship of God and world, as the specific subject matter of the Dogmatik, loses its usefulness for any real attempt to establish the concrete independence of the Dogmatik. This is so because the one pole of this relationship, God, retains its sameness no matter how much the other pole is involved in change. All explications or descriptions, which are differentiations, are differentiations which are rooted in the change of the world.[1]

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[1] A reader interested in such a scheme may wish to consult Poul H. Jørgensen, *Die Ethik Schleiermachers*, p. 34. Jørgensen, however, fails to construct the scheme in terms of the basic polarities, which ontologically can be designated by the poles of the "ideal" and the "real," both grounded in the transcendental ground which designates their separateness and their togetherness as a unity, and which epistemologically in the system of sciences are designated by physics and ethics, both grounded in the *Dialektik* as their formal presupposition, serving the same function as the transcendental ground.

[2] *Supra*, pp. 109-111.

[3] Schleiermacher, *Kurze Darstellung*, p. 1.

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[1] _Supra_, pp. 122-123.

Insisting upon God's absoluteness, the immediate awareness or feeling is one of absoluteness, which on its subjective side permits as little differentiation as God in his absoluteness as the objective ground. By virtue of God's absoluteness, dogmatic differentiations can only be rooted in the world. Hence dogmatic predications must always be in basic harmony with physics and ethics. The genius of the Dogmatik emerges from its effort to predicate always in and with reference to the one eternal, absolute ground, whereby the predications reflect the concrete reality of a particular point on the space-time continuum. The particularity of the Dogmatik is the particularity in which the formal idea of the relationship of God to world, or the formal notion of the feeling of absolute dependence, is actual. The abstraact descriptive notion of the feeling of absolute dependence is only logically prior, but not actually prior. Piety is always a particular piety, i.e., Christian piety, but never piety as such, which is never more than an abstract descriptive notion. Schleiermacher refuses correctly, given his position, to make God as such the concern of the *Dogmatik*.[1] Christian piety is the concern of his *Dogmatik*. Apart from the assumed reality of God's relationship to the world, this piety could not arise, or would be only a subjective illusion. Yet an explication of piety, that is, all differentiations have their origin in the concrete change of the world in which man as an essential part of the world participates. The *Dogmatik* has a concrete subject matter, but this subject matter is and cannot be essentially different from the subject matter of physics and ethics. The difference originates in its point of reference, but since the point of reference, God, yields nothing, it is questionable that the act of referring is in and by itself strong enough to sustain the dogmatic enterprise. It is, however, clear from this that the act of referring itself does not justify the exemption of the treatment of man and world in dogmatic statements from the strictures of physics and ethics. The fact that a physical and ethical datum is referred to "absoluteness" does not alter the datum in any essential way. Therefore the *Dogmatik* is not exempt from the results of disciplined scientific inquiry; it is concretely dependent upon physics and ethics.[2]

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[1] Supra, pp. 126-135.

Man as part of actuality reflects actuality even in his immediate self-consciousness. The only proper concern of the dogmatic "Hauptform" is therefore man and the world which is in man and he in it as brought in reference to the absoluteness of God. God himself is not to be known; the world itself is known through other scientific disciplines, and man's relationship to the world other than the world which he is himself, can only be of indirect import to the *Dogmatik*, and can only be significant dogmatically if man's reference to God could produce modifications which would have their source in God and not in the change of the world. The problem of the *Dialektik* as it becomes evident in the treatment of God's relationship to the world, has direct bearing upon the evaluation of the *Dogmatik*. But contrary to the assumption that the problem of the *Dogmatik* is its relationship to speculative philosophy *per se*, we find that the problem of the *Dogmatik* is much more that of its relationship to physics and ethics.

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[1] *Supra*. p. 125.

[2] *Supra*, pp. 127-132.

The speculative scheme of the *Dialektik* does not abrogate the independent status of the *Dogmatik*, it supports it. But at that point where the speculative scheme is disrupted, we find that it is precisely this disruption which places a question mark on the dogmatic enterprise, the content of which it seems difficult to differentiate from physics and ethics, since its unique point of reference yields no differentiation, so that all differentiations are differentiations originating in the "world" but not in God.[1] Schleiermacher's insistence upon the concrete character of dogmatic statements is sound, when compared with the speculative entanglement of a speculative dogmatics, but the foundation which he has laid for the development of this idea, is weak, opening him to the criticism of anthropocentricity. If a relationship, a particular relationship, is to be the subject matter of description, then it is not possible to exempt one of the *relata* from the principle of relativity; to speak of relationship and to do this is to negate relationship. The concretion of dogmatics must not only be based upon the concrete reality of an actual world, but also on the concrete reality of God's participation in the process of actuality. Unless concrete differentiations are also rooted in God himself, it is difficult to see how one can avoid giving dogmatic formulations only phenomenal value. The actuality of particularity must be retained also with the dogmatic subject matter. If we do not wish to deny the ultimate actuality of religious particularity, then both God and man must participate in particularity. When we exempt God from involvement in particularity, then the actuality of even religious particularity is only rooted in the world. Dogmatic statements are actual descriptions of man in his world, but they are modal descriptions of God, objectively speaking, and of the feeling of absolute dependence, subjectively speaking, since any description of absoluteness can only be a modal description. As Schleiermacher himself realizes, the formal absolute of the *Dialektik*, while satisfactory as the formal presupposition of speculative descriptions, is religiously not satisfactory. Religiously speaking, God cannot be merely the *terminus a quo*, devoid of differentiation; God must be more than a formula! God cannot be only the eternal sustaining principle, but he must also be the judge, that is, differentiation must be part of the ultimate reality of God. It is only then that the *Dog-*

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[1] *Supra*, p. 126.

matik can be grounded in such a way that its relative independence from speculation itself, from physics and ethics can be established.

The study of the relationship between the Dialektik and the Dogmatik shows us that, given Schleiermacher's understanding of the nature and function of the Dialektik, it is understandable that he should assert that his Dogmatik is essentially independent from speculative deduction. It also shows that it is quite necessary for him to make dogmatic formulations responsible to the results attained in the natural and historical sciences. The organizational dependence upon the Dialektik as a scientific organon is required, since the Dogmatik constructs and combines linguistically, just as all other scientific disciplines. The particularity of the Dogmatik depends upon the particularity of its data, but not upon the assumption that its data are totaliter aliter, its particularity is not qualitatively different from any other particularity; differentiation emerges from the particularity within the unity of one actuality. Hence logical and material dependence is not eliminated from the Dogmatik but neither is independence. And it is finally the unity of actuality or the oneness of actuality of which particularity or plurality is a part, which makes it impossible for Schleiermacher to envision an ultimate contradiction between his speculative thought and his religious faith.[1]

Difficulties in Schleiermacher's treatment of the relationship between speculation and his exposition of the Christian faith are evident, but it cannot be said that Schleiermacher's speculation itself vitiates the dogmatic exposition. It seems that fundamentally his speculative thought supports the independence of dogmatic formulations and becomes threatening only when he violates his own deepest speculative insight, in exempting the relationship of God to the world from the dialectical principle of relativity. It is precisely this, not his speculation as such, which disrupts the formulations of the Dogmatik. We might describe the situation as follows: While in terms of his own understanding of the absoluteness of God, Schleiermacher makes the relationship between God and world principally impossible, he nevertheless yields practically to the dialectical principle of relativity or to the insight that God, to be of any significance beyond himself, must be related to an other; Schleiermacher therefore executes his Dogmatik on the basis of the assertion that God and World are correlated, that they are distinct from each other, that is, particular, and that they are related to each other, that is, continuous. They transcend each other not by virtue of absolute difference but by virtue of their particularity, transcendence being the principle of differentiation within the continuity of actuality. Hence Schleiermacher's dogmatic presentation, while shaky in its axiomatic foundation, is in its actual execution not vitiated by the cleavage in the substructure.

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[1] Supra, p. 59.

## On the "Feeling of Absolute Dependence"

The notion of the "feeling of absolute dependence" constitutes another problem center in the thought of Schleiermacher. Being treated in the "Introduction" to the *Dogmatik*, it lies strictly speaking outside of the dogmatic sphere proper, just as the problem of the relationship between speculative philosophy and the *Dogmatik*. Schleiermacher makes it abundantly clear that for him the "Introduction" to the *Dogmatik* is only the "Vorsaal" or the "unausgefüllte Rahmen"[1] of the *Dogmatik* itself. He rejects unequivocally the idea that the "Introduction" and the problems dealt with in it represent the heart of the *Dogmatik*.[2] In his opinion "Keiner hätte verkennen können, dass die Darstellung des eigentümlich christlichen Bewusstseins wahrhaft und wirklich der eigentliche Zweck des Buches [*Dogmatik*] sei."[3] Yet his protests against making the "Introduction" to the *Dogmatik* and its pivotal doctrine the "feeling of absolute dependence" the center of the *Dogmatik* were of no avail. Friend and foe alike persisted in ignoring his explicit statements on this point. Schleiermacher's failure to communicate his ideas on the subject and to make himself understood can be accounted for in several ways. But it seems that the single most important fact, making communication difficult, was the tendency of Schleiermacher's contemporaries and successors to regard abstract universal essences as the hard core of actuality, which were to be valued above the concrete particularity of the world of changing concretions. In this case religion in general seemed still more significant or more actual than the concrete historical actuality of particular religions. Schleiermacher, in pointing toward concretion rather than speculative abstraction as the subject matter of the Dogmatik, went counter to the main stream of philosophical thought of his time.[1] As many a mediator, he was either rejected or misunderstood by the contending parties. Orthodoxy rejected his concrete heterodoxy in the main body of the Dogmatik; speculative theology, encouraged by his deviation from orthodoxy, ignored his own emphasis on concretion, seeking the main center of his thought in his non-dogmatic speculative formulae, which were no more than the "unausgefüllte Rahmen" of the Dogmatik.

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[1] *SL*, p. 32.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 31-34.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 33.

Why is it so important for Schleiermacher to insist that the "Introduction" in general and the "feeling of absolute dependence" in particular do not belong in the sphere of dogmatics? The answer is: because the "Introduction" is primarily speculative in its character and the notion of the "feeling of absolute dependence" is a speculative-philosophical one, that is, it is a descriptive generalization of the highest possible order of abstraction, which by and of itself, just as any other logical construct, is not part of concrete actuality. To shift the emphasis from the main body of the Dogmatik toward the "Introduction" is to make dogmatic theology primarily speculative in character. On the basis of what we said regarding the relationship between speculative philosophy and the Dogmatik, between abstraction and concretion, it is evident that Schleiermacher must resist such efforts. In refusing to regard the "Introduction" as the core of the Dogmatik, Schleiermacher does not deny its significance for the dogmatic task. What he denies is that the concrete content of the Dogmatik is or can be deduced from the abstractions delineated in the "Introduction," i.e., from the "feeling of absolute dependence." Though only the "unausgefüllte Rahmen," the "Introduction" is nevertheless the necessary frame, which deserves our attention, although not our exclusive attention. In focusing upon the doctrine of the "feeling of absolute dependence" as the pivotal center of the "Introduction," we must ask ourselves, what precisely is the "feeling of absolute dependence" and what is its function?

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[1] Supra, p. 65.

If the "Introduction" in general is primarily speculative in character, then its central doctrine must share this character. Felix Flückiger describes the "feeling of absolute dependence" quite accurately as a "spekulativ-philosophische Konstruktion" which must not be confused with an "empirisch-psychologischen Tatsache."[1] Emil Brunner[2] too has a measure of insight into the speculative character of the "feeling of absolute dependence." But he ignores Schleiermacher's concrete empirical-historical concern in the Dogmatik as being merely an unessential addendum, if not spurious altogether, seeking the heart of Schleiermacher's religiosity in a contentless mysticism, of which the "feeling of absolute dependence" is the speculative-philosophical expression.

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[1] Die Philosophie und Theologie bei Schleiermacher, p. 39.

[2] Die Mystik und das Wort.

In the light of Schleiermacher's expressed concern for the "positive" character of religion, which has its roots in the dialectical substructure, nothing seems further away from the truth than the reduction of religion to a mystical experience which is said to find its central embodiment in a speculative abstraction.[1] Only Brunner's desire to make "subjectivity" the basis of Schleiermacher's theological thought accounts for such distortion. Having placed Schleiermacher on alien ground, Brunner can easily defeat the fictional enemy, bringing to victory a theology which in stressing the _extra nos_ exclusively, forgets the other essential of the Christian faith, the _pro nobis_ of the divine power, which as such is also an _in nobis_. Not God _a se_, but God in relationship to man, to the world, is the basis of theology for Schleiermacher. God must not only be God; God must be "my God."[2] Brunner chose to ignore that Schleiermacher was precisely concerned with retaining the tension within the "eternal contract" between God and man. Schleiermacher was keenly aware of the fact that a God who is not "my God" is not God at all.[3] But "my God" did not mean to Schleiermacher that the objective, transcendent reality of God had to vanish in man's subjectivity; it merely expressed the bi-polar character of all actuality, of which the actuality of God's relationship to man was no exception. Relatedness and distinctness are joined together in all of actuality, no matter how disturbing this complexity might be to the mind of man, which desires rational simplicity. The "contract" was not subject to proof for Schleiermacher; it was something given, something which cannot be deduced. The basis of piety is for Schleiermacher an actual relationship, the relationship of God to man, but not a mystical experience through which one attempts to transcend the limitations of concrete actuality, probing into the divine mystery of the divine aseity. The object of theology is neither God nor man, it is the relationship between God and man. Schleiermacher's difficulties arise precisely at that point where he violates his own principle of relativity, when he exempts God from the relational principle theoretically, though not practically. It is only because of this rupture in the theoretical foundation of his own thought that it becomes at all possible to make mysticism in Schleiermacher's thought a fundamental principle of interpretation. A more genuine mystical source than the divine, ontologically transcendent absolute otherness of God, which as such is an alien element in Schleiermacher's thought anyway, is, however, Schleiermacher's acceptance of the category of individuality or distinctness as ontologically basic. But it must be recognized that this category is always limited by the category of communality or relatedness.[1]

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[1] _Supra_, pp. 59, 84, 85, & 131.

[2] _Supra_, p. 123.

[3] _Supra_, pp. 112-119.

We must frankly admit that Schleiermacher made his own misinterpretation possible; hence it would be unfair to simply blame Brunner alone. Next to Schleiermacher himself, it was his friends who made it possible for later generations to misunderstand Schleiermacher. We have only to point to Alexander Schweizer,[2] who, in purporting to continue the work begun by Schleiermacher, attempted to establish the doctrine of the "feeling of absolute dependence" not only as the main center of Protestantism but also of the Christian faith itself. Years later Georg Wobbermin[1] treats the "feeling of absolute dependence" as an empirical-psychological notion, making it as such the foundation and center of dogmatic thought. But for Schleiermacher the "feeling of absolute dependence" is neither the foundation nor center of the Dogmatik, nor is it an empirical-psychological notion. It is a philosophical-speculative abstraction, from which the concrete historical content of the Dogmatik cannot be deduced. As a formal construct it is therefore not the center of the Dogmatik. Two errors must be avoided: first, we must not transfer the empirical-historical character of the main body of the Dogmatik to the "Introduction"; and second, we must not interpret the main body of the Dogmatik in speculative terms, because the "Introduction" is speculative in its character. The relationship between "Introduction" and the Dogmatik is a relative one, and corresponds to the nature of the relationship which Schleiermacher postulates between abstraction and concretion. The "Introduction," i.e., the "feeling of absolute dependence" is logically prior to the concrete actuality of religion, just as the Dialektik is logically prior to actual knowledge, be this knowledge physical or ethical knowledge. But as little as the Dialektik is the source of knowledge, so little is the "feeling of absolute dependence" the source of the Dogmatik.

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[1] _Supra_, pp. 83-87.

[2] Alexander Schweizer, _Die Glaubenslehre der Evangelisch-Reformierten Kirche_ (Zürich: Orell, Füssli and Co., 1844-47), 2 vols.

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[1] Georg Wobbermin, Systematische Theologie, Vol. II (Leipzig: J. E. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1921).

The source of Schleiermacher's doctrine of the "feeling of absolute dependence" is not to be sought in a transcendent mystical experience, but rather in the givenness of concrete experience. This is so regardless of the fact that it itself is not by and of itself an actual concrete datum. It is, as are all of Schleiermacher's speculative abstractions, a descriptive generalization, purporting to describe the dynamic structure of the process of concretion in isolation, which means abstractly or in separation from concrete embodiment, that is, separately from the actuality of its life. In this respect it is analogous to the transcendental formula which designates the transcendental ground.[1] The transcendental formula in the Dialektik embodies the fact of relationship itself as it underlies and supports all of actuality, as such we may describe it as an objective, ontological formula. The formula of the "feeling of absolute dependence" characterizes in the sphere of subjectivity the absolute presupposition of relativity as that ultimate structure of actuality upon which everything depends, while it itself does not depend upon anything in particular. But just as the transcendental presupposition cannot be concretely isolated, so it is impossible to isolate the "feeling of absolute dependence" in its purity as an actual empirical datum. Relativity as the ontological-epistemological presupposition is as much a transcendental formula as the "feeling of absolute dependence." If religion is described as piety and piety described through the "feeling of absolute dependence," then religion is as truly a universal foundation of all of actuality and of all of man's activities as the transcendental presupposition is the absolute foundation upon which actuality itself and man's knowledge of it depends. It is as necessary a foundation of ethics and physics as is the transcendental presupposition. Thus described the "feeling of absolute dependence" is a speculative category of the Dialektik. But should not and must not "religion" be incorporated in the dialectical structure? If, as Schleiermacher insists, "religion" is not merely a phantasm, it must be ontologically grounded. This means it must find a legitimate place in the Dialektik, which purports to give a structural description of actuality. But while pointing toward the dependence upon "relationship" as the absolute foundation of actuality, the "feeling of absolute dependence" is as empty a formula as the transcendental presupposition, which though designating "relationship" as such does not permit by and of itself any specification of this "relationship."

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[1] Supra, pp. 121-122.

The question arises, unless we wish to treat God and religion strictly as speculative formulae, what are God and religion concretely? Schleiermacher wrestles with this problem in the Dialektik when he attempts to move from the absolute as a formula to the living conception of the absolute as the divine.[1] Schleiermacher rejects the conclusion that the living actuality of God is the concrete actuality of the world. In an analogous fashion the concrete actuality of religion cannot be constituted by the multiplicity of relationships within the world; religion cannot be identical with ethics and physics. As indicated previously, Schleiermacher's difficulty at this point relates to his unwarranted definition of God in terms of absoluteness and his consequent treatment of the transcendental ground in terms of absoluteness, since transcendental ground and God are treated simply as equivalents by him. Given this treatment of God as the absolute, the "feeling of absolute dependence" becomes as unyielding a simple notion as the notion of God as the absolute. Since absoluteness in Schleiermacher's own dialectical terms makes relationship impossible, religion based upon the relationship of God to world becomes equally an impossibility. But we find that Schleiermacher in spite of this dilemma does not operate in terms of his own logical conclusions.[1]

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[1] Supra, pp. 111-125.

God is not merely a speculative formula to him. He is said to be related to the world with which he is not identical in spite of his absoluteness. The operating foundation is the maxim "God and world are in correlation," which means that the relationship of God and world is indeed only one, though the most significant, exemplification of the transcendental formula. Schleiermacher asserts therefore that God _a se_, that is, in his absoluteness, is not subject to knowledge, be this philosophical or theological knowledge. Terms referring to God as the absolute have merely symbolical value. The _Dogmatik_ can therefore not be concerned with God as such. In a corresponding fashion, the "feeling of absolute dependence" is posited as the counterpart of God's absoluteness, being never an empirical actuality just as

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[1] _Supra_, pp. 130-131.

God _a se_ is not "actual" in this sense. To apprehend God, we must posit God in relationship with an other, then describing this relationship which is always a particular relationship. In like manner Schleiermacher states,

> Da nun das schlechthinige Abhängigkeitsgefühl für sich betrachtet ganz einfach ist, und der Begriff desselben keinen Grund zur Verschiedenartigkeit darbietet: so können wir diesen nur daraus hernehmen, dass jenes Gefühl um einen Moment zu erfüllen sich erst mit einer sinnlichen Erregtheit des Selbstbewusstseins vereinigen muss, diese sinnlichen Erregungen aber als ein unendlich mannigfaltiges anzusehen sind.[1]

The self-identical "feeling of absolute dependence" provides as little a basis for differentiation or explication as the absoluteness of God. Dogmatic statements can therefore not be deduced from it, and it itself can only be posited as an abstraction, but not as an empirical-psychological datum. The simplicity of the "feeling of absolute dependence" is designed to reflect the simplicity or absoluteness of God. But at the same time it purports to point to "relationship" which, except as an abstract generalized descriptive formula, can never be absolutely simple.

The _Dogmatik_ is based upon piety, which itself is rooted in the actuality of God's relationship to the world, i.e., man. But a pure immediate awareness of this relationship, also described as pure God-consciousness, is no more than a speculative postulate, never to be found concretely. Piety must therefore be specific piety, or a specific relationship in order that dogmatic formulations may become possible. But given Schleiermacher's conception of God as the absolute, it seems inevitable that all specification must originate in the world or in man. In excluding any and all relativity from God, the source of differentiation is necessarily the world. A dogmatic which requires differentiation can then in the final analysis only be anthropologically grounded. But by the very fact that Schleiermacher designates the relationship of God to world or man as the basis of the actuality of piety, he makes the principle of relativity applicable to God, contradicting in his own dialectical terms the definition of God as mere absoluteness.

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[1] _Gll_, I, p. 56.

The *Dogmatik* is predicated upon the actuality of God's relationship to man as an essential component of the world. Insofar as the "feeling of absolute dependence" designates this relationship abstractly, it is the necessary foundation for the possibility of the *Dogmatik*. The actuality of the *Dogmatik* requires, however, the actuality of specific concrete relationships, that is, it requires the events within the historical-empirical process. Schleiermacher, in keeping with his conviction that religion is a concrete event, asserts that the relationship between God and world is an actual one, but he forgets that everything actual is something particular. But if particularity is excluded from God, the actuality of the relationship of God to world is put in question. Then the distinctive character of the dogmatic enterprise, which purports to describe this concrete, actual relationship, owes its distinctive features only to the changing actuality of the world, that is, it becomes only a peculiar version of ethics and physics, since from the side of God as one of the *relata* in this relationship nothing is being contributed which determines the relationship specifically. Pure piety, which does not occur by itself, as Schleiermacher admits, is as absolute as God; and since man cannot grasp absoluteness, he grasps only himself when in dogmatic descriptions he points toward the concrete actuality of piety, attempting to order its expressions conceptually. The abstract formula of the relationship of the absolute and the world is by itself not strong enough to sustain the distinct character of dogmatic formulations, since distinction does not also originate with the absolute. The distinctive character of piety, or of the relationship of God to world as the basis for the _Dogmatik_, requires that distinctness must not be restricted to the world, but must equally be grounded in God himself. Schleiermacher is not prevented by his dialectical structure from such treatment of God; in fact, his dialectical structure even suggests it. And since his actual execution of the dogmatic programme proceeds from the premise that God and world are in correlation, it must be stated that his definition and treatment of God as absoluteness is, while an actual component of his thought, not an integral part of his speculative structure itself. On the contrary, it threatens not only the coherence of the _Dialektik_, but also the distinctiveness of the _Dogmatik_ itself. The foundation of the criticism of Schleiermacher's "anthropological and subjective" character of the _Dogmatik_ cannot be sought in his speculative philosophy or "relativism" as such, but must be sought in his inability to follow the dialectical suggestions up to their last consequences by applying the principle of relativity also to God.

The empirical base of the "feeling of absolute dependence," just as of the transcendental ground, is to be found in the given actuality of relationship itself. In the transcendental formula we postulate relationship as the absolute prerequisite of knowledge and actuality itself; in the "feeling of absolute dependence" we postulate our dependence upon relationship. Either mode of our postulation has a supporting character, being the absolute *terminus a quo*, but not a productive one, since only relationship in its concretion, that is, concrete actuality can be our *terminus ad quem*. Concrete actuality is absolutely dependent upon the ultimate actuality of relationship itself; but, though postulating it in a speculative formula, we do not experience relationship as such. We experience only specific relationships. If God is simply identical with the ultimate absolute actuality of relationship, that is, with the transcendental formula, then even "feeling," if treated as mode of apprehension, cannot be richer than that which is to be apprehended through it. "Feeling" in its absolute self-identity is as unproductive of specification as the transcendental formula itself. The empirical base of the speculative notion of the "feeling of absolute dependence" is man's actual embeddedness in the stream of actuality. Trusting in the actuality of this embeddedness, we can nevertheless not specify this actuality except by constructing a notion in which we speculatively designate that which by itself is beyond designation. If religion is no more than this "immediate awareness" of our dependence, then it might very well be reduced to a mysticism in which no specification is possible.

We must, however, observe that Schleiermacher need not make "indifference" the absolute, but could have made "relationship" or relativity the absolute. While relativity is thus the supporting ground of actuality and of our knowledge thereof, it is not actual except in the particularity of concretion. Concrete religious actuality is predicated upon the concrete, actual relationship of God to world and man. This relationship must be a particular one. A merely miraculous participation of God in relationship in spite of his absoluteness is a less than adequate assumption. The actuality of God's participation in relationship must also be grounded in the very nature of God in terms of possibility. If we remember that the transcendental formula is not defined by absoluteness as such, but absoluteness defines relativity, then it seems not only possible that particularity should be in God, but also necessary. Given the actuality of God's relationship to man, it is both possible to affirm the unique character of the religious dimension of the actuality of complex relationships which constitute the actuality of man, and the distinct character of the Dogmatik, in which in a highly self-conscious, conceptual manner the concrete actuality of God's relationship to men is being described and systematized.

There is no doubt that Schleiermacher wished to escape from falling into the abyss of mysticism and from identifying dogmatic thought simply with anthropological thought. He affirms in his life and in the execution of his dogmatic programme the actuality of the relationship of God to man. By this he makes impossible theological and philosophical pretensions which yearn for the capture of the aseitas dei. But he makes it equally impossible to isolate this particular relationship as absolutely divorced from the actuality of all other relationships. Dogmatic thought must not simply go counter to insights originating in other disciplines of inquiry, for in asserting its independence it cannot ignore its dependence. The relationship of God to world and man, which is the subject of dogmatic thought, is a relationship which is an integral part of the complex of relationships which make up actuality. While being unique or particular, it is not a relationship which is exempt from the order of actuality which sustains as a necessary ingredient the processes of concretion, in which individuality is achieved without the destruction of communality. The relationship of God to man is as little totally private as any other relationship. Therefore it is possible to formulate dogmatic thought in the manner in which Schleiermacher attempted to do it: as a function of the church, of that church which exists within culture and culture within it, that church which rejects absolute identification with culture as well as absolute separation from it.

## On Christology

The basis of the Dogmatik is piety or the relationship of God to man.[1] The abstract vacuity of this relationship is embodied in the speculative notion of the "feeling of absolute dependence" just as relationship as such is designated by the transcendental formula in the *Dialektik*. But the actuality of relationship is always a particular one, hence religion in its concrete actuality is rooted in an actual relationship, that is, a particular one. The truth or actuality of religion resides in its particularity. The concrete actuality of piety is conceptualized in a descriptive manner via the conceptual apparatus which has been developed at any given point in the space-time continuum. Proceeding from particularity, dogmatic thought finds its validation in the actuality of particularity and not in universality as such. Its universality depends upon the actuality of shared and mutually constitutive relationships, which form the immediate and remote matrix, encompassing finally actuality in its wholeness. Universality depends upon the degree of participation of any particular in the web of constitutive relationships which surround it like concentric spheres in varying degrees of proximity. Universality is therefore not insignificant; on the contrary, it is extremely important, for it is only on the basis of relationships which are constitutive of the particular that conceptual description of particularity becomes possible. Complete universality which must encompass the total web of relationships is based upon speculation which ascends to the highest possible degree of abstraction. To achieve this level of abstraction is the aim of metaphysical speculation, which by the very nature of its task is very risky.[1] Dogmatic thought, while not independent from metaphysical speculation, has another goal. Its concern is the description of concrete actuality of piety, which, as all description, is abstract, but of a much less high order of abstraction. For religion or dogmatic thought to yearn after absolute universality in its formulations is to yearn for the metamorphosis into metaphysics. Absolute religion or the absolute validity of religious-dogmatic formulations is a contradiction in terms. The concern for the loss of such universality is only justified if we deny that particularity itself is absolute, that is, that it is rooted in God, who participates in it and it in God. If by metaphysical absoluteness or universality we designate the *aseitas dei*, then we must admit that as such God is not the concern of dogmatic thought.[1] Dogmatically we are concerned with God in his relationship to us. And it is in this sense that the Christian faith does not claim to be the "absolute religion." In the light of the above we must understand Schleiermacher's position which is summarized by him as follows:

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[1] *Supra*, pp. 125-127.

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[1] *Supra*, p. 53.

> Endlich wird auch dieses noch hinzuzufügen sein, dass wenn eine Glaubensweise die Anwendung, welche sie von dem Begriff macht, geltend machen will gegen die übrigen, sie dies keinesweges durchführen könne vermittelst der Behauptung, das ihre göttliche Mittheilung reine und ganze Wahrheit sei, die andern aber falsches enthalten. Denn zur vollkommenen Wahrheit würde gehören, dass Gott kund machte, wie er an und für sich ist; eine solche aber könnte weder äusserlich aus irgend einer Thatsache hervorgehn, ja auch wenn eine solche auf unbegreifliche Weise an eine menschliche Seele gelangte, könnte sie nicht von derselben aufgefasst und als Gedanke festgehalten werden, und wenn auf keine Weise wahrgenommen und festgehalten, könnte sie dann auch nicht wirksam sein. Eine Kundmachung Gottes, die an und in uns wirksam sein soll, kann nur Gott in seinem Verhältniss zu uns aussagen; und dies ist nicht eine untermenschliche Unwissenheit über Gott, sondern das Wesen der menschlichen Beschränkheit [sic] in Beziehung auf ihn.[2]

The dogmatic restriction to particularity is not to be deplored as "infra-human ignorance" but is of the very essence for the dogmatic enterprise. The *Dogmatik* proceeds not from an abstract universal formula, but from the particularity of an actual relationship, "da wir nur von geschichtlicher Betrachtung ausgehn konnten,"[1] which is in keeping with the description of the Christian faith as a historical faith, and defines the Dogmatik as a historical discipline. Schleiermacher asserts therefore over and against all those for whom dogmatic truth is conditional upon the apprehension of the aseitas dei or God's absoluteness that,

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[1] *Supra*, p. 123.

[2] *Gl1*, I, p. 73. Cf. *D*, pp. 72, 490, 589-609.

> Auf jeden Beweis für die Wahrheit oder Nothwendigkeit des Christenthums verzichten wir vielmehr gänzlich, und sezen dagegen voraus, dass jeder Christ, ehe er sich irgend mit Untersuchungen dieser Art einlässt, schon die Gewissheit in sich selbst habe, dass seine Frömmigkeit keine andere Gestalt annehmen könne als diese.[2]

The speculative foundation of religion is to be sought in the formula of God's relationship to man; the actual foundation of the Christian faith, embodied in the historical community of the Christian church, is to be sought in a concrete actualization of the abstract formula of God's relationship to man. The historical or particular point of origin is the event of Jesus Christ, which constitutes a concrete actualization of God's relationship to man. This historical event is causally efficacious in unity with the continuing concrete relationship of God to man, that is, in unity with the work of the Holy Spirit in the contemporary life of the church. The work of the Holy Spirit takes place in a definite historical situation, which is shaped by its peculiar historical antecedents, of which in the community of the Christian church Christ Jesus has emerged as the central one. The work of the Holy Spirit and the work of Christ presuppose each other, converging in the subject. In this sense the doctrine of Christ and the doctrine of the Holy Spirit constitute the two determinative poles of Schleiermacher's *Dogmatik*; one enhances the other.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 84.

[2] Ibid.

The effort of Schleiermacher to make the doctrine of Christ central in his *Dogmatik* is evident and by and large recognized;[2] but has this effort been vitiated through the corrolary of his Christology, that is, through his Pneumatology? We stated that both doctrines require each other. If this is so, then that which poses a problem for his Christology must also lead his Pneumatology into difficulties. The problematical character of the doctrine of Christ within the *Dogmatik* cannot be simply referred back to Schleiermacher's inability to make Christology the superordinated doctrine, under which the doctrine of the Spirit must be subsumed. The source of the problematic character of Schleiermacher's doctrine of Christ is not its necessary correlation with the doctrine of the Spirit. If "real" Christology is conditional upon the superordination of the doctrine of Christ above all others, particularly the doctrine of the Spirit, then Schleiermacher is not and cannot be a christocentric theologian. But the fact of correlation must not be used to justify the collapse of Christology into Pneumatology, since a genuine Christology and Pneumatology have identical roots. Both must be grounded in God, both expressing beliefully the actual relationship of God to man. If Schleiermacher's Christology is not securely grounded in God, then his Pneumatology lacks the same grounding. An attack upon Schleiermacher's Christology is fundamentally an attack upon his doctrine of the Holy Spirit. This is actually the case in many criticisms of Schleiermacher. After eliminating Schleiermacher's doctrine of Christ from the Dogmatik as not a genuinely integral part of it, his theology is then described as a theology of the Holy Spirit. But investigation shows that what is meant by the theology of the Holy Spirit is actually a euphemistic way of calling Schleiermacher's Dogmatik an "anthropology of the Human Spirit," that is, an "anthropology of subjectivity."[1] If, as Karl Barth rightly observes, it is Christology which is at stake in Schleiermacher's theology, then the theological character of the work itself is at stake.[2] We may wish to suspend judgment on this, as Barth does, but this is the final issue.

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[1] *Infra*, pp. 197-198.

[2] See *Gl1*, I, pp. 74 and 96. Cf. Barth, *Die protestantische Theologie*, p. 385.

Karl Barth sums up his view of Schleiermacher's Christology as follows:

> Die Christologie ist die grosse Störung in Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre, vielleicht keine allzu wirksame Störung, aber eine Störung. Was er sagen wollte, wäre vielleicht besser, einleuchtender, geschlossener gesagt worden, wenn er es in Form eines Kreises mit einem Mittelpunkt, statt in Form einer Ellipse mit zwei Brennpunkten hätte sagen können. Aber er konnte diese Störung nicht vermeiden. Er konnte seine Sache nicht anders, er musste sie so sagen. Jesus von Nazareth passt verzweifelt schlecht in diese Theologie des im Grunde doch wirklich sich selbst genügenden geschichtlichen "Gesamtlebens" der Menschheit; er muss auch in Schleiermachers Predigten nur diese auffallende Rolle spielen, weil er einmal da ist--möchte man meinen. Er macht dem Professor und dem Prediger Schleiermacher sichtlich viel Mühe! Aber eben: er ist da. Und der Professor und Prediger macht sich diese Mühe, schwimmt unablässig gegen seinen eigenen Strom, will unter allen Umständen, sei es auch um den Preis von gewissen Künsteleien und Sophismen, christozentrischer Theologe sein.

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[1] Flückiger, Philosophie und Theologie bei Schleiermacher, pp. 174-176.

[2] Die Protestantische Theologie, p. 385.

Ob er es nun wirklich ist--wer will das sagen?[1]
Granting that Christology is a disturbing element in Schleiermacher's dogmatic thought, it is nevertheless one of the foci, the other being the doctrine of the Spirit. The doctrine of Christ and the doctrine of the Spirit as correlates do not militate against each other, since both are imbedded in the doctrine of the Trinity. We are faced with the realization in the Dogmatik of Schleiermacher that both his Christology and his Pneumatology lack their grounding in the doctrine of the Trinity, which is the presupposition of both the doctrine of Christ and the doctrine of the Spirit. Thus both doctrines, while actually central in the construction of Schleiermacher's Dogmatik, are shaky because theoretically groundless.

Karl Barth, in pointing toward the problem of Christology in Schleiermacher, states, "Es kann gefragt werden, ob das, was er über das Verhältnis von Gott und Mensch sagen wollte, es ertrug, auch in der Form einer Christologie gesagt zu werden."[2] To this we may add, could it be said in the form of Pneumatology? Barth himself puts the genuine pneumatological character as well in question, when spirit is seen as the spirit of humanity, which is "fundamentally self-sufficient." What really is the problem center of both doctrines, and what forces Schleiermacher, no matter how unwillingly, into the direction of anthropology? We may state the issue as follows: What Schleiermacher can finally accomplish in his Christology and Pneumatology depends upon what he has to say of the relationship of God to man or the world. In fact the very possibility of Christology and Pneumatology depends upon what he has to say concerning the possibility of God's relationship to man. There can be no question that Schleiermacher assumed the actuality of this relationship; piety, expressing this relationship, is something actual. The reflections upon piety, put forth conceptually and descriptively determined and systematized under the guidance of dialectical methodology, as required by the use of language, are grounded in this relationship. Hence dogmatic formulations are neither wholly object-centered nor wholly subject-centered; they are focussing upon actuality or relationship, in this case, upon the relationship of God to man, which means upon specific events. But this conceptualization, that is, abstraction, is always a particular event, which proceeds from the given situation in the space-time continuum, and returns to it as a determinative ingredient in the process of concretion. If we deny the actual ground of piety, that is, the concrete actuality of God's participation in space-time, then "christliche Glaubenssäze sind Auffassungen der christlich frommen Gemüthszustände in der Rede dargestellt,"[1] but then in the sense of descriptive accounts of merely subjective "states of mind," as some have interpreted Schleiermacher's paragraph fifteen in the *Dogmatik*. Such interpretation of "christliche Glaubenssäze sind Auffassungen der christlich fommen Gemüthszustände in der Rede dargestellt," while linguistically possible, is misleading. Schleiermacher's operational basis is the correlation of God and world, yet the fact that doubt is thrown on the fundamental character of this operational principle suggests that a problem exists in the speculative foundation of his actual procedure. We must ask, is the actual procedure also grounded dialectically, that is, is it supported in terms of possibility? Put specifically, we must ask, is it possible to predicate a relationship between God and man, if we define God solely in terms of his absoluteness? Schleiermacher in treating God as the absolute does not provide the speculative possibility for the postulate of the relationship of God to man, a postulate which for him is actually very necessary. The possibility of this relationship is dialectically not grounded, but nevertheless asserted. Hence the assertion of this relationship seems in the framework of the Dialektik a tour de force, and in the Dogmatik a sophism, which conceals the fundamentally anthropocentric character of the work, suggesting that dogmatic thought is a mode of pious self-awareness. The dialectical foundation of the relationship of God to man requires God's actual participation in space-time. Barring this participation, faith or piety loses its character as a relationsl notion, opening the door for a subjectivism which seems theologically unacceptable.[1] Karl Barth expresses this when he says of Schleiermacher's position:

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

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[1] *Gll*, I, p. 108.

> Das Bewusstsein um Gott bleibt also "eingeschlossen" in das Gefühl, und so kann die Aussprache der Vorstellung "Gott" nichts Anderes bedeuten als die Aussprache des Gefühls über sich selber, die unmittelbarste Selbst-Reflexion.[2]

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[1] Supra, pp. 125-135.

[2] Die protestantische Theologie, p. 418.

Given the definition of God as the absolute, which is to be other than the transcendental formula, that is, given the exclusion of God's participation in particularity and of the participation of particularity in ultimate reality, it becomes impossible to regard the relationship of God to man in any other way as a floating idea. Christology and Pneumatology respectively become, in spite of their centrality, floating doctrines in the Dogmatik. Christ's "exemplary" ("vorbildliche") dignity expresses human dignity, being an intra-worldly, historically efficacious source, which is merely expressive of itself. His "ideality" ("Urbildlichkeit") refers speculatively to an "ideality" of man. In either case we are restricted to a mode of an Ebionitic Christology; a docetic doctrine of Christ, given Schleiermacher's treatment of God as the absolute, is nonsensical, unless we intend to identify Christ with the transcendental formula of the Dialektik, which is then treated as strictly co-terminous with God. It seems that it is not Schleiermacher's lack of emphasis of the "transcendent" dimension in a doctrine of God which is the source of danger, leading him to the point where it seems that his dogmatic thought is not primarily theologically centered, but anthropologically centered, but his exclusive reliance upon "transcendence." In his doctrine of God he seems unable to reconcile speculatively transcendence and immanence, that is, he is unable to apply the fundamental dialectical principle of relativity to his treatment of the notion of God.

## On the Trinity

Schleiermacher concludes his Dogmatik with a brief treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity. Separating it from the main body of the dogmatic material, he discusses this classical doctrine in a conclusion which takes the form of an appendix. He states concerning the doctrine of the Trinity:

> Wenn es irgendwann gelungen wäre oder jemals gelingen könnte, eine Dreiheit in Gott, sei es auch auf Veranlassung unserer kirchlichen Lehre, denn ohne diese würde es schwerlich jemanden eingefallen sein, aber doch ohne Beziehung auf die Verhältnisse der Erlösung und ohne jede Berufung auf die Schrift, aus allgemeinen Begriffen oder a priori anschaulich zu machen oder zu beweisen: so würde eine solche Dreieinigkeitslehre, und wenn sie auch weit vollkommener ausgeführt wäre, als es der an die Grundthatsachen des Christenthums gebundenen kirchlichen bisher gelungen ist oder jemals gelingen kann, doch in einer christlichen Glaubenslehre keinen Plaz finden können. Ja wenn sie sich auch genau an dieselben Ausdrükke hielte, sowol um die Dreiheit als um die Einheit zu bezeichnen, deren sich die kirchliche bedient, würden wir dennoch fest behaupten, dass sie eine andere sei; indem solche Deductionen die mit jenen Grundthatsachen nicht in Verbindung stehn, nicht nur einen ganz anderen Ursprung jener Lehre beweisen, sondern auch eben deswegen in der christlichen Lehre von gar keinem Nuzen sein können. Solche können wir demnach als Philosopheme hier nur auf sich beruhen lassen. . . .[1]

As he sees it, the doctrine of the Trinity constitutes among other things an effort to probe the aseitas dei, which is not and cannot be a dogmatic task. He says:

> Denn da wir es nur mit dem in unserm Selbstbewusstsein uns mit dem Weltbewusstsein gegebenen Gottesbewusstsein zu thun haben: so haben wir keine Formel für das Sein Gottes an sich unterschieden von dem Sein Gottes in der Welt, sondern müssten eine solche aus dem speculativen Gebiet erborgen, mithin der Natur unserer Disciplin ungetreu werden.[2]

The doctrine of the Trinity as a speculative doctrine does not belong in the Dogmatik. Yet speculation itself, as we have seen, is not rejected by Schleiermacher; it merely has no place in the *Dogmatik*, but can be and must be employed in its proper place. Nevertheless, Schleiermacher, in rejecting the doctrine of the Trinity as not belonging in the *Dogmatik*, does not assign it another, more proper place in the structure of his thought. Could it be that Schleiermacher rejects this doctrine *in toto*? Is the doctrine of the Trinity for him not only speculative in character, but also rhetorical? Speculation concerning the life of God *a se* is not possible, neither philosophically nor theologically.[1] Hence the utilization of the doctrine of the Trinity for such purposes must by necessity give to this doctrine the character of false speculation, that is, of rhetoric. Schleiermacher in seeing the tendency toward the misuse of the doctrine of the Trinity, comes to the point where he holds no brief for this doctrine itself.

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[1] Gll, II, pp. 579-580. [2] Ibid., p. 589.

Yet he is quite aware of the fact that the doctrine of the Trinity has also another purpose or dimension, and we might say a more legitimate one. Recognizing this other dimension, he says:

> Gehn wir nun auf die ursprüngliche Tendenz der Lehre, nämlich deutlich zu machen, es sei kein hyperbolischer Ausdrukk unseres Bewusstseins von Christo und von dem Gemeingeist der christlichen Kirche, wenn wir behaupten, dass Gott in beiden sei: so zeigt sich als die erste Aufgabe diesser Lehre, dass dieses eigenthümliche Sein Gottes in anderem bestimmt werden müsse in seinem Verhältniss sowol zu dem Sein Gottes an und für sich, als zu dem Sein Gottes in Bezug auf die Welt überhaupt.[2]

The original purpose or function of the doctrine of the Trinity is to support the doctrine of Christ and the doctrine of the Spirit, or, as we might put it, to account speculatively in terms of possibility for the actuality of God's relationship to man and the world. This doctrine as all other speculative doctrines in Schleiermacher is to be explanatory of what is experienced as actual. Schleiermacher summarizes his position as follows:

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[1] *Supra*, p. 125.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 589.

> Wesentlich ist unserer Darstellung in diessem Theile die Lehre von der Vereinigung des göttlichen Wesens mit der menschlichen Natur, sowol durch die Persönlichkeit Christi als durch den Gemeingeist der Kirche, mit welchem die gesammte Auffassung des Christenthums in unserer kirchlichen Lehre steht und fällt. Denn ohne ein Sein Gottes in Christo anzunehmen, könnte die Idee der Erlösung nicht auf diese Weise in seiner Person concentrirt werden. Und wäre nicht eine solche Vereinigung auch in dem Gemeingeist der Kirche, so könnte auch diese nicht auf solche Weise der Träger und Fortbeweger der Erlösung durch Christum sein.[1]

The doctrine of Christ and the doctrine of the Spirit as the two foci of the Christian faith depend upon the actuality of God's relationship to man and world. To ground the actuality of God's relatedness in possibility, the doctrine of the Trinity is speculatively constructed. It itself is not an actual ingredient in piety, hence it is not properly dogmatic in its character. It is actual only insofar as the relationship of God to man and world is actual, that is, it can become part of the dogmatic subject matter only in Christology and Pneumatology. The speculative and functional character of the formula of the Trinity is discerned and accepted by Schleiermacher when he says:

> Eben dieses nun sind auch die wesentlichen Elemente in der Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit, die sich offenbar nur festgestellt hat in der Verfechtung dessen, dass nicht etwas geringeres als das göttliche Wesen in Christo war, und der christlichen Kirche als ihr Gemeingeist einwohnt, und dass

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 575.

> wir es mit diesen Ausdrükken weder in einem verkürzten noch in einem ganz uneigentlichen Sinne meinen, und nichts wissen wollen von besonderen höheren Wesen, als gleichsam untergeordneten Gottheiten in Christo und dem heiligen Geist. Dass die Trinitätslehre keinen andern Ursprung hat als diesen, und zunächst nichts anders wollte als nur eine möglichst bestimmte Gleichstellung des göttlichen Wesens in dieser Vereinigung betrachtet mit dem göttlichen Wesen an sich, das ist um so weniger zu bezweifeln, als ja diejenigen christlichen Religionspartheien, welche die Lehre von der Erlösung auf eine andere Weise auffassen, auch notwendig die Trinitätslehre entbehren. . . .[1]

Relating the doctrine of the Trinity as the speculative ground to the dogmatic formulae of Christology and Pneumatology, Schleiermacher can say:

> Vermöge dieses Zusammenhanges nun sehen wir mit Recht die Trinitätslehre, sofern diese Elemente darin niedergelegt sind, als den Schlusstein der christlichen Lehre an; somit auch diese Gleichstellung des göttlichen in jeder dieser Vereinigungen mit dem in der andern, und so auch beider mit dem göttlichen Wesen an sich für das wesentliche der Trinitätslehre.[2]

Schleiermacher admits freely that the doctrine of the Trinity is "arrived at in a speculative way,"[3] and he resists its transformation into a dogmatic formula. Christology and Pneumatology are not directly derived from the doctrine of the Trinity by way of deduction. Unless we wish to open the door to speculation even in Christology and Pneumatology, we must exclude the doctrine of the Trinity from the Dogmatik proper.

Admitting the speculative character of the doctrine of the Trinity, we must ask ourselves why Schleiermacher does not incorporate it in his speculative philosophy, that is, in the Dialektik? Is it no more than a "coping-stone," that is, an ornamental, really unessential "Schlusstein"? Would it not be more accurate to regard it as an essential contribution to the speculative methodology of the Dialektik, a contribution to speculation, made on the basis of the actuality of God's relatedness to the world and to man, an actuality by the assertion of which one alone is able to retain the actual and essential character of religion or piety? Schleiermacher's assertion in the Dialektik that God and world are in correlation is not speculatively secured, but could be secured by making God conform with the dialectical principle of relativity or the transcendental formula. This formula rules all relationships, but not the final relationship of God to world, since God as the absolute is made an exemption to the principle of relatedness. Yet the doctrine of the Trinity, arising from Christology and Pneumatology, suggests the contrary, namely, that relatedness is grounded in God himself.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 576.

[3] Ibid., p. 592.

We can easily see why Schleiermacher rejects the doctrine of the Trinity as a means to explore the aseity of God, for the theological focal point is for him not God a se, but the relationship of God to man in the world. The doctrine of the Trinity has as its original and main function the grounding of the possibility of relatedness in the very nature of the divine. It is only because God is capable of relatedness that predications concerning the relatedness of God and man as asserted in Christology and Pneumatology can be theological predications and not just mere anthropological descriptions.

Yet we know that Schleiermacher hesitates to posit speculatively God's participation in relativity, though he does not hesitate to affirm this participation dogmatically. The speculative assertion of this participation in relativity endangers and conflicts with God's absoluteness, which Schleiermacher chooses to make the definitive category in his view of God. He is well aware of the fact that in the doctrine of the Trinity God's participation in particularity and the participation of particularity in God is at stake, but wishes to speculatively legitimize his Christology and Pneumatology by an other than the trinitarian way. The actual union of the "Divine Essence" with humanity as predicated in the particularity of Christ and in the work of the Holy Spirit must be asserted. But this union must not lead to the assumption of "eternal distinctions" in God, that is, without involving God actually in particularity, while nevertheless claiming actuality for the relationship of God to man. Schleiermacher asks,

> ob sich nicht Formeln finden liessen, welche ohne ewige Geschiedenheiten in dem höchsten Wesen auszusagen beide Vereinigungen desselben mit der menschlichen Natur auf gleiche Weise in ihrer Wahrheit darstellen können.[1]

Schleiermacher is fundamentally opposed to postulating "distinction" in God. His opposition is reinforced by the fact that the doctrine of the Trinity in its development had lost its functional character, taking on a life of its own, leading to endless rhetoric concerning the aseitas dei. To go beyond the functional dimension of the doctrine of the Trinity is not possible for him. Yet he feels that it is only the "further elaboration of the dogma" which justifies the ordinary term "Trinity." While the relatedness of God to the world can be designated in a speculative formula, it is not possible to make the internal actuality of God the subject of speculation, quite independently from Christology and Pneumatology. In this sense, he says,

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[1] Ibid., p. 593.

> Nun aber ist schon jene Voraussezung von einer ewigen Sonderung im höchsten Wesen keine Aussage über ein frommes Selbstbewusstsein, in welchem ja dieses niemals vorkommen konnte.[1]

But it is questionable, particularly in the light of his acceptance of the functional dimension of the doctrine of the Trinity, that his question, "oder wer dürfte behaupten, dass in dem Eindrukk, welchen das göttliche in Christo machte, aufgegeben gewesen sei, eine solche ewige Sonderung als den Grund desselben zu denken?"[2] can be fully accepted. For, as he admits, it is Christology and Pneumatology which press for the securing of the divine-human relatedness, though they do not press for an elaboration of an inner-trinitarian life. It is only this latter aspect of the doctrine of the Trinity which does little to secure the pivots of the Dogmatik: Christology and Pneumatology. In this respect Schleiermacher is correct when he says: "Und darum ist es wichtig, die Unabhängigkeit jener Hauptangelpunkte der kirchlichen Lehre, Sein Gottes in Christo und in der christlichen Kirche von der Trinitätslehre festzustellen."[3] A thoroughgoing criticism of the doctrine of the Trinity is in order, its exclusion from the Dogmatik proper is justified, but its treatment as a mere "coping-stone" is not. Schleiermacher is not opposed to its reconstruction, in fact he feels that the critique of the doctrine must prepare the way for it, but he himself does not succeed in integrating it either dogmatically or, what is worse, speculatively into the total structure of his thought. Yet he offers enough indications, both positive and negative ones, which may point toward a new utilization of the doctrine of the Trinity, particularly (and maybe only) of its functional dimension. The issue is: Can we build a dogmatic which rests upon Christology and Pneumatology, that is, upon the actuality of the relatedness of God and man, without making God also conform to the principle of relatedness or relativity itself? Schleiermacher wishes to do this by holding fast to the definition of God in terms of absoluteness. Yet it seems that it is precisely by virtue of his effort to treat God as _totaliter aliter_ that he opens the door to the transformation of theology into anthropology, imprinting a huge question mark on his entire dogmatic work.

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[1] Ibid., p. 576.

[2] Ibid., pp. 576-577.

[3] Ibid., pp. 578-579.

## CHAPTER V

## CONCLUSION

It is the thesis of this study that the unity and harmony of Schleiermacher's thought is dependent upon the applicability of the principle of relativity to all and any descriptions of actuality. This principle as the absolute presupposition of Schleiermacher's thought is the transcendental ground of knowledge and being. It embodies as a descriptive formula the prerequisite condition for the possibility of the actuality of a world and of knowledge. But it does not predicate the "what" of actuality and knowledge. It merely posits the "that" of an actual world and of knowledge. In this formal sense "relativity" is the *ratio essendi* and the *ratio cognoscendi*. It is the *terminus a quo* for the actuality of a world and of knowledge, but is not and cannot be the *terminus ad quem*. As a metaphysical-epistemological descriptive generalization, "relativity" is the methodological principle which determines the basic character of Schleiermacher's thought and sustains the coherence of its structure. Insofar as he departs from it, the structure of his thought is ruptured.

We discovered such a departure from the principle of relativity in Schleiermacher's basic conception of God. He felt compelled, for reasons not explicable from the structure of his fundamental position, to view God in terms of absoluteness only. Thereby he made an exception to the applicability of the principle of relativity. By virtue of this exception the possibility of God's participation in any relationship, if not actually denied, was made impossible in principle. Hence the legitimacy of any enterprise, predicated upon the participation of God in relationship or relativity, was put in question.

Schleiermacher, while not providing for the possibility of God's participation in relationship, that is, while not accounting for it in dialectical terms, posits nevertheless the actuality of such a relationship. He affirms categorically God and world as correlates, making this affirmation the basis for the dogmatic-theological enterprise. But having precluded the possibility of God's participation in relationship, the postulation of its actuality becomes groundless, and hence the source of great difficulties.

Actuality and participation in its structures, as well as all efforts of description, require distinctions. If God is absoluteness, then God must transcend all distinctions. Strictly speaking, God is then beyond actuality, beyond experience, and beyond description. Likewise, religion, if actual, must be a-theistic and theology a form of cosmology and anthropology. Schleiermacher is faced with a dilemma. As long as he insists upon the theoretical exemption of God from the principle of relativity, the genuinely theological character of his dogmatic thought is in peril. He strives to prevent a metamorphosis of his theology into a form of mysticism or anthropology, but can he?

The criticism by his interpreters demonstrates this point. His fundamental theological position is sometimes regarded as a modification of mysticism or anthropology. Such interpretation when placed in the contemporary theological context is in effect a questioning of Schleiermacher's position as a Christian theologian.

The contemporary theological situation is widely characterized by the desire to recover and to retain God-directedness or theocentricity. In the wake of the theological revolt against the major expressions of theological liberalism in the nineteenth century, the new theological realism spurns both mysticism, speculative and diffusive, and subjectivist anthropocentricity in Christian theology. Insofar as Schleiermacher is judged to be a representative of either of the above mentioned modes of thought, he is placed in opposition to the dominant mood of contemporary theology. In some theological circles today, it is customary to make the theocentric, realistic character of theology conditional upon the acceptance of the doctrine of the _totaliter aliter_ character of God. This is not only confusing, but seems also erroneous in the light of our study of Schleiermacher. Theocentricity or the realistic character of theology, as is evident from the thought of Schleiermacher, is not secured through the assertion of God's absolute, metaphysical transcendence. In fact, it appears that it is made impossible by it. Schleiermacher, by insisting, in violation of his own methodological principle, that absoluteness defines God exhaustively, is forced into a position where he leaves himself open to a charge of mysticism or anthropocentricity. But contrary to the assumption of some of his critics, it is not his relativism, which is generally well noted, but precisely his absolutism which sets him apart from the dominant mood of theology today.

If it is Schleiermacher's absolutism which makes the conception of a God-world relationship a problematic one, then this same absolutism which is still current today among some theologians must participate in what is problematic in Schleiermacher. Given God as a totaliter aliter, the God-world relationship must remain the crucial problem. That new methods to cope with this problem have been conceived, methods which differ from the one of Schleiermacher, cannot be disputed. But whether these methods are more adequate than Schleiermacher's is still a question. If the required relationship of God to the world is today as theoretically groundless as it was for Schleiermacher, then methodological devices to establish it in spite of its theoretical impossibility must remain as dubious as the one used by Schleiermacher. It seems that many of Schleiermacher's critics do not actually reject him because he lacks a transcendent God, but because they disapprove of his method to establish the relationship between the absolute "X" and the world. It is true that Schleiermacher does not use Christology or the doctrine of divine revelation in and through the word of God in the same manner as do his critics, as a device to establish an otherwise impossible relationship. But it is not evident why arbitrariness of one kind should be more adequate than any other kind. The disagreement seems to be over the method by which to affirm in actuality what is denied in possibility.

Schleiermacher recognized the necessity of a God-world relationship as the basis for religion and religious descriptions of all orders of abstraction. Accepting relativity as the necessary ground of the actuality of religion, he, contrary to some of his critics, saw that with the unavailability of the aseitas dei, he would have to forego the absolute character of any religion, his own not excluded. His method of establishing a relationship of God to world was therefore not designed to bring back an absoluteness which was lost to start with in the acceptance of relationship as the basis for religion. In this he differs from those theologians, employing Christology and revelation as the methodological device by which to neutralize the effects of a doctrine of God which makes relationship theoretically impossible. For Schleiermacher religion, since dependent upon the relationship of God to the world, has to be as particular as any relationship must be. The disturbing element in this scheme of thought is the theoretical impossibility of God's participation in actuality. Wanting to maintain participation as well as non-participation, Schleiermacher placed himself in a position in which the final, though particular, character of religious actuality is put in question. In his attempt to build a bridge to the aseitas dei through the symbolic method, Schleiermacher succeeds in subjectivizing the character of his theological thought but not in throwing light upon the darkness of the unknowable divine absolute.

No matter by what method one attempts to bridge the gulf between God's absoluteness and the relativity of actuality, without the postulation of God's participation in relativity and its participation in God it seems unlikely that the God-world relationship can have secure anchorage. Religion and theology must remain suspended over the abyss of absolute cleavage, in constant fear of a plunge into the nothingness of their own actuality or into the nothingness of the non-being of God. The relationship of God and world must be ontologically grounded. To assert it as a consequence of an act or acts of miraculous arbitrariness is to deliver it into the fangs of contingency. The possibility of a theology depends both upon the possibility and actuality of this relationship. While it seems possible to ignore the problem of possibility, being content with an assumption of the actuality of this relationship, it is not possible to claim that by substituting an arbitrary solution in favor of a continuing exploration of the question of possibility we have satisfactorily eliminated the problem.

The problem with which Schleiermacher had to wrestle is to a large extent still the problem of contemporary theology. Many theologians while not sharing in Schleiermacher's methodological approach, nevertheless participate in the problem itself. Hence it is not false to regard ourselves as "children of his age." We as well as Schleiermacher require the relationship of God to the world for our theological undertaking. We can also observe that the more central the theoretical impossibility of God's relationship to the world becomes as the foundation of our thought, the greater becomes the practical need to establish it. Hence it is not surprising that an ever greater concentration upon the doctrine of Christ, as a methodological device by which to neutralize the besetting problem and by which to establish the theological foundations, should emerge. Such concentration upon Christology seems to approach Christolatry. In keeping with the same tendency it is quite understandable that theologians should again focus upon the doctrine of the word of God as that divine revelation by which God and world are brought together. Whether these methods to deal with the problem of Schleiermacher are more adequate than his, is a matter of grave doubt. Fervor cannot be judged a substitute for plausibility. Yet it is possible to respect the honest admission of the absence of plausibility. But to proclaim its absence as an admirable feature in one's thought, or to go even so far as to proclaim it the theological feature, is to sell theology into the hands of a cultural barbarism, to use Schleiermacher's words.

Schleiermacher's insistence upon the complete otherness or transcendence of God is, however, not a central element in his thought. It is not required to sustain its structure; in fact, it disrupts it. Central is his doctrine of relativity without which this structure collapses. Many of Schleiermacher's critics have recognized this and proclaimed it that feature of his thought which transforms his theology into anthropology. In the contemporary theological situation this means that it is Schleiermacher's relativism which is viewed as incompatible with the theocentric mood of theological realism. Yet it is precisely the principle of relativity which functions to preserve distinctness and relatedness, or particularity and universality, joining them together in indissoluble though unexplainable unity. Transcendence is preserved. It is, though not restricted to God, the category of distinction within the structure of immanence or relatedness. To be sure, transcendence here no longer signifies absolute ontological otherness, because the principle of relativity cannot support the rupture of the essential unity of being. But the self-enclosure of an autonomous humanism is as little promoted by it as an absolutely theonomous theology. A realistic theology, in which the relationship between the divine objective actuality and the human subjective actuality is the foundation of the theological task, is not only possible within the purview of the principle of relativity; it is actually required by it. Not compatible with the principle of relativity are a doctrine of absolute transcendence and those modes of transition by which the separation of God and world is being neutralized without the admission of relativity into God.

The principle of relativity or the transcendental formula is ratio essendi and the ratio cognoscendi for Schleiermacher. It is absolute as a presuppositional formula; every actualization presupposes it, but no one actualization is presupposed by it. Lacking the principle of relativity, but nevertheless requiring it for the grounding of the God-world relationship, some theologians have relegated its function to Christology. Christ is treated by them as the ratio essendi and ratio cognoscendi. The shift which has taken place is the shift from relativity as a universal natural feature to relativity as a non-natural phenomenon, not to say supra-natural phenomenon. Interestingly enough, we find Karl Barth, the major representative of the contemporary theological mood, asserting that man's being or its meaning is constituted by the covenant relationship between God and man. Interposing between the direct relationship is the doctrine of Christ as the man for God and of Christ as the God for man. The eternal and universal character of the covenant relationship, whether mediated through Christology or not, is witnessed to by Barth's willingness to posit with respect to man's being an axiomatic non posse peccare. Relativity or relationship as a fundamental characteristic of ontology appears again, though in a different form. The difficulty of this position does not emerge from the implied universal and absolute character of relativity, but rather from the attempt to make a universal metaphysical description the specific and exclusive domain of theology, contrary to the method of Schleiermacher. Theology is thereby forced into a position of having to claim that it alone can be true ontology. This cannot but lead to theological arrogance. Remaining within the spirit of Schleiermacher's thought, we cannot claim that the speculative, dialectical notion of relativity is the exclusive province of theology. Christ cannot be treated as the exemplification of relativity as such. Rather Christ, if paradigm at all, points to the concrete particularity of God's relationship to man in the world. Christ, beyond being a concrete instance of God's actual involvement in actuality, points beyond himself toward the Holy Spirit, that is, toward the continuing actual participation of the Father in actuality.

If Schleiermacher is to be a resource to contemporary theology, then we must turn to his relativism as the abiding element in his thought. But in so doing, we must be aware of the consequences this implies. We must with Schleiermacher forego making the truth of the Christian faith conditional upon its absoluteness or universal necessity. We must then be content with the concrete particularity of our relationship with God. But if we are unable to sustain our faith apart from its particularistic basis, that is, if we are not able to find God within a particular relationship, then we must face up to it that we may not find God at all. Theology today shares with other scholarly disciplines the problems posed by the involvement in speculative modes of thought. But more than this, it is the problem of theology's relationship to other modes of human inquiry which must be the concern of the theologian. For only in relationship to them and in the common concern for the actual can he establish his own relative independence.

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